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2ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to chart the 
development and the intei— relationship of the concepts of 
Heaven and of Man in Chu Hsi ’ s philosophy. As Chu Hsl 
<1130-1200) is generally regarded as having brought to its 
completion the unification of the doctrines of his Uea- 
Confuclanist predecessors, it is hoped that this research 
will throw light both upon the central tenets of his 
philosophy and upon those of Sung philosophy in general.
The method adopted is to use the development of these 
concepts as a central thread, Chu Hsi*s metaphysics and 
ethics will then be discussed accordingly as they are 
relevant to this theme, although it has not been feasible 
to present an independent survey of these branches of his 
philosophy.
The development of these two concepts is discussed in 
six chapters. In the first chapter, 1 give a brief account 
of Buddhist Idealism, to the refutation of which Chu Hsi 
had dedicated his whole life. In the second chapter, I 
describe how, in his thirties, he had used the Immanent 
Vitalism of the earlier Heo-Confucianists to attack the 
Buddhist view of Emptiness. In the third chapter, I 
discuss how he struggled, in his forties, to construct his 
own metaphysics, after becoming disillusioned with the 
approach to the Way taught by the Immanent Vitalists, In 
the fourth and fifth chapters, I discuss both the 
development of the ideas of Principle, Material Force, 
Nature, Mind, and moral cultivation, and their 
systematisation in his later metaphysics. In the final 
chapter, I explain the relation between Heaven and Man 
within this system, and show the way in which it differs 
from its Buddhist counterpart.
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6CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND: THE TRANSITION OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE 
WORLD AND OF MAN FROM CH* AN TO NEO-CONFUCIANISM
SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter is to present a 
background to Chu Hsi*s <1130-1200) philosophy by 
surveying the changes which took place in the concepts of 
the World and of Man in the transition from Buddhism to 
the early Neo-Confucianism,
This account begins with the conception of life and 
the universe in Hinayana Buddhism, proceed© to the 
negative method of metaphysics and the Original Mind in 
Mahayana Buddhism, and to the tendency towards acceptance 
of the world in Ch* an Buddhism. We shall find that 
Buddhism was inclined to Idealism, individualism, and the 
search for supra-moral values. But we ©hall also see that 
this idealistic world-view was gradually transformed into 
a more realistic view with the development of Buddhism, 
This paved the way for the rise of Neo-Confucianism.
Neo-Confucianism continued this development until a 
complete reversal of the original Buddhist view was 
reached, From Chou Tun-i’s (1017-1073) T'ai-chi t'u shuo 
C An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate'] , we 
see that the modes of Neo-Confucian thought were Immanent 
Vitalism, a realistic world-view, and an emphasis on moral 
and social values.
In addition, I present the socio-political background 
of the Sung dynasty, in order to show that in a society 
characterized by bureaucratic politics and dominated by 
landowning gentry, both Ch* an and Neo—Confucianism were 
able to flourish,
7A. THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF LIFE ABD OF THE WOULD 
BEFORE THE FORMATIOB OF CH'AB
1. The Concepts of Life and. of the World in Hinayana 
Buddhism
Yamanoi Y6 summarizing recent studies on the problem of 
the origin of Heo-Confucianism, says:
Confucianism before the Sung dynasty is called 
"the philological school of Han and T ’ang”, whose 
task was no more than making over-detailed but 
superficial verbal commentaries on the Confucian 
Classics. Thus from Han onward, in the realm of 
philosophy Buddhism and Taoism had long since 
surpassed Confucianism. Beo-Confucianism arose as 
a school which committed itself to the 
Illumination of the spiritual content of the 
Classics. In order to compete with Buddhism and 
Taoism, it developed speculative philosophy which 
had been weak in the earlier Confucianism. 
However, in its refutation of their heterodoxies 
it also borrowed ideas from them, especially from 
Buddhism, for the sake of enriching its own 
system. In this sense Heo-Confucianism may be 
called "the merging of three teachings"...’1
In this chapter I shall centre my investigation on the 
development of the concepts of the World and of Man in 
Buddhism, and on the rise of Heo-Confucianism, which 
refuted the views of Buddhism but at the same time 
assimilated some of its fundamental problems and modes of 
thinking. I shall also discuss this transition from the 
point of view of the socio-political context, Taoism will 
be ignored here, partly because, as Yamanoi indicates, 
Heo-Confucianism had borrowed more ideas from Buddhism, 
partly because Chinese Buddhism, especially Ch1an, had 
already incorporated much of Taoism.:s
In the Sung dynasty Ch'an was the dominating sect of
8Buddhism, but its doctrine had grown out of the long 
history of Buddhism. It will therefore be necessary to 
give a brief survey of the development of Buddhist 
doctrine.
The basic doctrine of Buddha is called "the three 
codes of truth". They are:
1) all activities of will (.sankhara, hslng) are 
unstable;
2) all activities of will cause suffering; and
3> all beings (dharma, fa) are devoid of self­
nature. 3
Buddhism thought that life is the activity of will, 
which is always under the pressure of needs. This state 
they regarded as suffering. The needs which the will 
pursues occur in an endless sequence. For example, if the 
basic needs such as food and drink are met, one will then 
turn to higher needs such as wealth, power, and fame. 
Therefore the activity of will has no stability and causes 
continuous suffering.
The third code of truth means that all dharma are 
dependent. They are determined by previous dharma, affect 
one another, and determine subsequent ones. There is no 
independence or freedom for anything in life and the 
world. In Buddhism this is another proof of universal 
suffering.
Buddhism is mainly concerned with the means of 
emancipation from universal suffering. For this purpose it 
has developed many kinds of Interpretation of life and the 
world in its long history. According to its historical as 
well as philosophical development, these theories may be 
classified into two groups, Hinayana and Mahayana.
In Hinayana Buddhism, there is a Self as the subject 
who suffers and searches for emancipation. The Self comes 
into existence in the world because illusion iavijja, wu~ 
ming) brings out the activity of will. It therefore 
suffers under the pressure of the struggle for living,
9What’s more, it not only suffers in this life, but, 
because at its end illusion will bring it to subsequent 
lives, it suffers continuously. This is the Buddhist 
theory of transmigration. But if the Self becomes 
enlightened, there will be no more illusion and 
consequently no activity of will incurred. In this case
life may be cancelled and the emancipation reached. In 
principle enlightenment can be accomplished within a
second, but in practice it requires assiduous training.
For this purpose it proposes three kinds of practice: to
behave correctly (slla, chleb) , to discipline the will
(samadhl, ting), and to realise the truth of the world 
(.panna, hue!) . They are the right way, so that a person 
who practices assiduously will someday became enlightened 
and get out of the wheel of transmigration. This state of 
perpetual peace is the ideal of Buddhism, which is called 
Nirvana inleh-p*an),
Generally speaking, Hinayana Buddhism is confined to 
the phenomenal world. There is an implicit Idealism in it. 
While it says that the Self starts the will, and the will 
brings out endless lives, it suggests that the Self is the 
substratum of the phenomenal life. And in the case of the 
world, since the world is composed of dependent dharma, it 
seems reasonable to think that in the state of Nirvana, 
because the corresponding life is extinguished, the world 
should also cease to exist. Therefore while the world 
exists, it should have a certain dependence on the Self. 
It is implied, then, in Hinayana Buddhism that the Self is 
the ultimate substance of the phenomenal world. On the 
other hand, its theory is only concerned with the level of 
phenomena, thinking that in the state of Nirvana when 
there are no phenomena there will be no Self either. Since 
there is no substance at all, it cannot strictly be called 
Idealism, even if there is implicit a tendency towards 
Idealism.
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The development of this Idealism would result in the 
discovery of the substantial Self under the phenomenal 
self and the world, But this step is not reached until the 
rise of Mahayana Buddhism.
2. The Origin of Realism in the School of Buddha Nature
Fung Yu-lan says:
On the whole, the way in which Mahayana Buddhism 
most influenced the Chinese has been in its 
concept of the Universal Mind, and in what may be 
called its negative method of metaphysics. 65
This gives us a clue to the identification of the 
contributions of Mahayana Buddhism to China and to their 
development there.
The main difference between Mahayana Buddhism and 
Hinayana Buddhism consists in the fact that the former 
seeks Nirvana in the present life and in this world. This 
doctrine has been propounded in three forms throughout the 
history of Mahayana Buddhism, Firstly by the School of 
Emptiness (K*ung ±sungt in India it is called the School 
of the Middle Path), which developed the negative method 
of metaphysics. Secondly by the School of Phenomena 
(Hsiang tsung, in India the School of Consciousness-Only) , 
which devoted itself to the theory of causation to 
interpret the emergence of the phenomenal world, A third 
form is associated with the School of Buddha Nature (Hsing 
tsung') , None of these schools were native to China. The 
second had very little influence on the Chinese, and will 
not be discussed here. The third seems to have received 
very little attention in India, but aroused the greatest 
interest in China. I shall discuss first this third
11
school, the Buddha Mature School, and then the School of 
Emptiness.
In Mahayana Buddhism, the division of the substantial 
Self from the phenomenal world is made. But one may still 
ask what is the Self, and what causes the world to appear. 
The answer was also implicit in Hinayana Buddhism, and the 
elaboration of that answer resulted in the School of 
Bu ddha Mat u re.
In its theory of transmigration and salvation, by 
using the terras ”illusion" and "enlightenment" Cwu), 
Hinayana Buddhism in fact suggests that the Self is not a 
physical body, but Mind. The Buddha Mature School is 
characterised by the identification of the Self with Mind. 
This Mind is enlightened and underlies the phenomenal 
world, including mind in its phenomenal aspect. This 
enlightened Mind is called the Original Mind <pen-h&in) , 
and is the same as Buddha Mature (.f'o-hsing-') .e Mirvana is 
the state of the Original Mind; the phenomenal world is 
caused by the delusion of the mind. In the Buddha Mature 
School the implicit Idealism of Hinayana Buddhism has 
become explicit. The Self as the Original Mind is 
differentiated from the phenomenal world. The Self is 
eternal, so it may transmigrate through successive lives, 
just as the traveller may pass through endless stations, 
But it is also possible for the Self to leave the world, 
just as the traveller may step down from this vehicle. In 
this way the doctrine of transmigration and emancipation 
are explicitly accounted for,
But here there appears an interesting paradox. The 
moment the implicit Idealism of Hinayana Buddhism becomes 
explicit, an incipient realism with respect to the 
phenomenal world emerges. In the School of Buddha Mature, 
the Self, the Original Mind, and the Buddha Mature are one 
and the same because they are all empty. Illusion is the 
cause of the world. But now for an elightened Mind, 
although illusion disappears, the phenomenal world
12
including the phenomenal self remains, It also teaches 
that it is neither necessary nor possible for seekers of 
Mrvana to leave the present world. A straightforward 
expression of this idea was made by the founder of the 
Chinese Buddha Nature School, Tao-sheng ( ? -434), who
said:
The Enlightenment of Mahayana Buddhism is not to 
be sought outside the Wheel of Birth and Death.
Within it one is enlightened by the affairs of
birth and death.r
As to reaching the other shore, if one reaches 
it, one is not reaching the other shore, Both 
not'-reaching and not-not-reaching are really 
reaching. This shore here means birth and death;
the other shore means Nirvana.e
If one sees Buddha, one is not seeing Buddha. 
When one sees there is no Buddha, one is really 
seeing Buddha.®
It is also said that Tao-sheng held the view that for 
Buddha there is no Pure Land or other world. The world of 
Buddha is simply here in this present world. '10
We must now examine the justification for this 
realistic view of the phenomenal world in Tao-sheng* s 
theory. As long as one realises one's own Buddha Nature, 
he argues, the veil of illusion is removed, but the 
phenomena remain. His explanation is as follows. He says 
of the phenomenal self and world:
They are not self-generated, and therefore have 
no self-nature. They have no nature of any kind. 
If then they have no existence in themselves, how 
can they cease to exist? Thus they are as it were 
phantasmata. 1 ’
Phenomena are accepted as phantasmata. Although they 
cannot cease to exist, they are valued as emptiness 
because of their lacking self-nature.
The other side of this argument is that there is not 
an independent status of Nirvana outside the present
13
world, Of the dharma, the insubstantial consecutive events 
of the phenomenal world, he says;
They are inconstant, subject to suffering, and 
devoid of nature. If one has an enlightened view 
of this, one achieves the permanently empty 
lirvana. In Nirvana, they never come again into 
existence, Non-existence implies quiescence. 
Their ultimate achievement of quietness is 
possible because they originally did not really 
exist. Since their existence was not real, how 
can their extinction be real?121
We may conclude that in Tao-sheng’s theory, because 
he combined Nirvana and the phenomenal world, the farmer 
cannot be reached except in the latter, and the latter 
cannot be exterminated because it is as empty as the 
former. Therefore with respect to the phenomenal world its 
existence is acknowledged.
3. The Strengthening of Realism in Chi-tsang*s Negative 
Method of Metaphysics
Now we turn our focus to another way of affirmation of the 
phenomenal world, the negative method of metaphysics in 
the Emptiness School. Hinayana Buddhism introduced the 
concept of illusion between the Self and the world, 
falsifying the latter. The Emptiness School started from 
this illusory world, and tried to reach the truth by 
repetitive negation. Here I shall introduce the theory of 
the last master of this school, Chi-tsang <549-623), who 
summed up the negative method in his three levels of 
double truth (common truth and higher truth),
Of his first level he says;
The common people take all things as really 
existent ’'having being") and know nothing
about the non-existent < wut "having no being"). 
Therefore the Buddhas have told them that
14
actually all things are non-existent and empty. 
On this level, to ©ay that all things are non­
existent is the higher truth.'13
This is the first step of the negative method. Common 
truth takes all things as existent, and the higher truth 
lies in revealing their non-existence.
His second level of double truth may be paraphrased 
as follov7s*
To say that all things are existent is one-sided, 
but to say that all things are non-existent is 
also one-sided. The one-sidedness consists in 
making this distinction, because existence, flux, 
and life-and-death will be on this side, while 
non-existence, constancy, and lirvana will be on 
that side. This choice of one side is the common 
truth. The "no-two-sides middle path1' consists in 
understanding that there is neither existence nor 
non-existence, neither life-and-death nor 
lirvana. This is the higher truth.
At first sight this second step seems to be a simple
negation of what has been negated in the first step. But
a closer examination would show that its real purpose is 
to negate the discriminating mind. The higher truth lies 
in neither affirming nor negating anything. Compared with 
the first level higher truth, this is a further negation, 
but paradoxically things as they are, left without
discrimination, are given more reality than they were in 
the first level, where their existence was denied,
The following paraphrases Chi-tsang*s third level:
The second level which discriminates "no-twa-
sides*’ from "two-sides,11 is still common truth. 
It regards the distinction between "this side" 
<of existence and life-and-death) and "that side" 
<of non-existence and lirvana) as one-sided. It 
also thinks of the non-distinction as the "no- 
two-sides middle path.’* In this case we find the 
contrast between one-sidedness and the middle 
path, which is still two sides. Therefore we have 
to call it common truth. The real raiddle-pathed
higher truth consists in not distinguishing 
between the one-sided and the middle-pathed, 11B
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The purpose of the third, step is to negate the middle 
path, i.e., the non-discriminating mind of the second 
step, because it is in contrast to one-sidedness. 
Elsewhere Chi-tsang indicates that the purpose of the 
second level truth is to sweep away people’s stubborn 
adherence to either existence or non-existence. But when 
such adherence is swept away, the sweeping-away is no 
longer necessary, and should also be swept away. In this 
case both existence and non-existence may be accepted 
under the condition of non-adherence. 1 s This is the 
purpose of the third level of truth.
What concerns me here is the implication of this 
doctrine far the question of the reality of the phenomenal 
world. In the third level, what Chi-tsang proposed is that 
every level of truth from the beginning should be re­
affirmed, but under the condition of its following level. 
In this sense, negation means non-adherent affirmation. 
The highest truth of the third level consists therefore in 
the affirmation of both ’’not-one-sidedness” (meaning the 
non-discriminating mind), and the ”not-middle-pathedness” 
(meaning the acceptance of both existence and non­
existence) . The mind makes no distinction now, but neither 
does it cancel the former distinction it made. Therefore 
the present world and all things within, according to the 
highest truth, remain. But they have no objective reality 
because their existence is still reliant on our non­
attachment, However, on the other hand, to say that their 
existence is due to our indifference is hardly different 
from saying that they exist objectively. The tendency to 
realism is therefore greatly strengthened.
Another argument by which Chi-tsang affirmed the 
present world is that the world is the starting point in 
the pursuit of lirvana. Therefore it must be affirmed in 
the first instance in order to proceed to higher truth. 
Nirvana is the highest truth, but relies on caramon
16
truth, 1 ^  In this sense the present world is prior to 
lirvana, Therefore, it must be real, although its reality 
is obviously of lower value.
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B. THE AFFIRMATION OF THE WORLD IN THE 
CH* AN THOUGHT OF HUI-MENG
1. The Concept of Self Nature < tzu-hsing)
In the two schools discussed above the theoretical 
background for Ch'an had been prepared, Ch'an was built 
on the conclusion reached by the Buddha Nature School, it 
also adopted the negative dialectical method of the 
Emptiness School in a simplified form. With Ch'an, 
Mahayana Buddhism had reached its highest stage; what is 
of interest is no longer extensive knowledge or detailed 
argument, but rather the essence of the scriptures. The 
following story shows that precisely this interest was the 
starting point of the religious exploration of Hui-neng 
(638-713), the Sixth Patriarch (though in fact the real 
founder) of Ch'an. At the age of twenty-four, a stranger 
he came across told him that the Fifth Patriarch had 
encouraged people to recite the Chln~kang ching C the 
Diamond Sutral , saying that thereby they could see into 
their own Nature ihsing') and that through such direct 
apprehension they could become Buddhas. Hui-neng then went 
to the Fifth Patriarch to pay reverence. When asked his 
purpose, he replied, "I am seeking no particular thing, 
but only the Buddha Dharma.” 13 Obviously what he sought 
was an understanding of the spirit of Buddha. Another 
story tells us that his teaching was based upon his 
insight into the spirit of the scriptures. A priest by the 
name of Fa-ta, who had been reciting the Fa-hua ching [the 
Lotus SutraH continuously for seven years without 
discovering where the true Dharma lay, came to question 
him. Hui-neng said, "I have never in my life understood 
written words, but if you bring a copy of the Fa-hua ching 
and read it to me, on hearing it, I will understand it at
18
ance," Fa-ta brought the Fa-hua ching- and read It through 
to the Master. Hearing it, the Sixth Patriarch understood 
the Buddha's meaning, and then discoursed on the Fa-hua. 
ching for the benefit of Fa-ta. 13 In my opinion, it is 
likely that Hui-neng*s illiteracy was merely a legend, but 
it has the symbolic significance that Buddha Dharma lies 
not in the text of the scriptures but in their spirit.
For the purpose of gaining insight into the spirit 
of the scriptures, the Buddha Mature School, which 
proposed that our Original Mind is the same as the Buddha 
Mature, had provided a suitable theoretical basis. Thus, 
Hui-neng found the essential import of Buddhas' teachings 
within the Self: "The Buddhas of the three worlds and all
the twelve divisions of the canon are from the beginning 
within the Mature of man. With regard to the fact that
there are differences, even contradictions, within the 
scriptures, he could also answer by reference to the 
Mature of man. He says:
In the (Buddha) Dharma there is nothing sudden 
or gradual, but among people some are keen and 
others dull. The deluded are to be instructed
gradually, and the enlightened achieve
cultivation suddenly. To understand your own 
Original Mdnd is to see into your own Original 
Mature. Once enlightened, there is from the 
outset no distinction between these two 
methods.
The scriptures, divided into Sudden and Gradual Schools, 
use different methods appropriate to people at different 
levels of understanding. But in essence they are one, just
as underlying different levels of understanding there is
only one Original Mdnd, or one Original Mature, Therefore 
once a man is elightened he will know that differences 
among methods (in different scriptures) make no difference 
in the essence.
The concept of Self Mature is the basis of Hui- 
neng* s doctrine, He claimed it to be the central point of
19
the sayings of all the Buddhas, and for that reason he 
argued in favour of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment. 
In order to see how, based on Self Mature, Hui-neng 
contrasted this doctrine with the gradudal method and then 
incorporated the latter into his own method, it is useful 
to consider the following verses. The first of these is by 
Shen-hsiu, a fellow student of Hui-neng and the founder of 
the Gradual Enlightenment School of Ch’an. The verse of 
Shen-hsiu which was regarded as unenlightened is:
The body is the Bodhi tree,
The Mind is like a clear mirror.
At all times we must strive to palish it,
And must not let the dust collect,-*-'"
Against this we have two verses by Hui-neng;
Bodhi originally has no tree,
The mirror also has no stand.
Buddha Mature is always clean and pure;
Where is there room far dust?
The Mind is the Bodhi tree,
The body is the mirror stand.
The mirror is originally clean and pure;
Where can it be stained by dust?-*3
Both verses reveal Hui-neng’s concept of Self Mature, but 
it seems more convenient to start from the second.
The first two lines of Hui-neng’s second verse and 
of Shen-hsiu*s verse are concerned with Self Mature and 
virtually identical, but Shen-hsiu*s verse was regarded by 
the Fifth Patriarch, their common teacher, as ’’not having 
reached true understanding,” and Shen-hsiu was advised to 
"endeavour to see his own Original Mature. The two
lines of Shen-hsiu in themselves grasp the meaning of Self 
Mature theoretically, but fall short of an enlightened 
understanding. Comparing his last two lines with those of 
Hui-neng, he fails to achieve the insight of Hui-neng, 
because he sees Self Mature as requiring to be kept clean,
20
whereas Hui-neng has understood the truth that Self Nature 
cannot become polluted.
Here I shall examine the significance of the 
discipline of "polishing Mind" in Shen-hsiu1s doctrine. 
Shen-hsiu seems to mean that Self Nature provides the 
basis for the purification of Mind, which is the method of 
ethical cultivation. He also implies, however, that Self 
Nature, as ultimate truth, can only really exist and be 
realised in this world by ethical cultivation. The 
question, it seems to me, consists in whether ultimate 
truth can be reached through ethical cultivation. 
According to the Fifth Patriarch the answer is negative. 
It seems to me that the following interpretation of his 
answer is plausible. Ch’an, as a religion, pursues the 
only and eternal metaphysical reality, but its uniqueness 
and eternity consists in its neither affecting, nor being 
affected by, ethical cultivation, the purpose of which is 
the creation, realization, or modification of truth. 
Therefore Shen-hsiu1s attempt to arrive at ultimate truth 
by ethical cultivation is futile. If ultimate truth is 
eternal and singular, he will not reach it. If he reaches 
something, then either what he has reached is not ultimate 
truth, or ultimate truth is not eternal and singular. The 
Fifth Patriarch therefore pointed out that Shen-hsiu would 
achieve some other kind of result: "If they practise in
accordance with it (ethical cultivation), they will not 
fall into the three evil ways. Those who practise by it 
will gain great benef it. " But this is not the 
realization of, nor access to, the one and eternal 
ultimate truth.
However, for a religion to establish itself, its 
ultimate truth must be accessible in some way, In my 
opinion Hui-neng1s method offers a significant solution to 
this problem. He avoids the above dilemma by proposing 
that ethical cultivation is unnecessary. In this way he
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cuts the link between metaphysics and ethics, and attains 
ultimate truth directly through sudden-enlightenment, A 
question may arise in this connexion, namely, since 
ultimate truth is transcendent, can it be realised, and of 
benefit to, this world? We shall look at Hui-neng*s reply 
later. We are only concerned here with the fact that he 
severed the direct link between metaphysics and ethics.
How we return to the first verse by Hui-neng. In my 
opinion this verse is significant for distinguishing the 
character of Hui-neng*s metaphysics. The first two lines, 
"Bodhi has no tree and mirror has no stand,** do not mean 
that Self Mature has no existence, because the third line, 
"Buddha Mature is always clean and pure," affirms its 
existence. They rather mean that Self Mature is a 
subjective faculty, not an abject. Therefore it cannot be 
found by applying an objective method, It can only be 
reached by self-enlightenment. Self Mature, which is the 
same as Buddha Mature, is the sole metaphysical reality. 
Therefore, Hui-neng’s metaphysics may be properly called 
Subjective Idealism.
2. The Negative Method of Metaphysics
To achieve an enlightened understanding of Self Mature is 
the only way to attain metaphysical truth. But what are 
the characteristics of such enlightenment? It is 
interesting that for his answer Hui-neng appealed to a 
relationship of identity between enlightenment and the 
present world. The question of the possibility of 
metaphysics in the present world which was raised above 
may also be answered in this way. For his answer Hui-neng 
adopted the negative method of the Emptiness School, but 
simplified it to a great extent, He says:
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From ancient times to the present, all have set 
up no-thought as the main doctrine, non-form as 
the substance, and non-abiding as the basis, 
lon-form is to be separated from form even when 
associated with form, Uo-thought is not to 
think even when involved in thought. Uon- 
abiding is the original nature of man,
The negative concepts in this passage refer to the same 
thing; their differences reflect only differences in point 
of view taken. Ho-thought refers to the method of 
enlightenment; non-form to the object of enlightenment; 
and non-abiding to the enlightened subject. In order to 
understand the characteristics of enlightenment, it is 
sufficient to examine his explanation of no-thought.
Hui-neng says:
To be unstained in all environments is called 
no-thought. If while you have your own
thoughts, you are separated from the
environment, then no thoughts regarding things 
are produced.
In other words, by "no-thought," he means remaining 
unattached amid thoughts and the world which is their 
environment, but does not mean "ceasing to think of the 
myriad things and cast aside all thoughts." "No-thought" 
is his negative method to free thoughts from attachment to 
this world:
Because man in his delusion has thoughts 
regarding his environment, heterodox ideas 
stemming from these thoughts arise, and
passions and false views are produced from 
them.
If the above faults are avoided, the metaphysical truth 
can be reached in this world, In that case, "no-thought" 
can be given a positive interpretation:
The "no" is the separation from the dualistic 
world of suffering. "Thought" means thinking of 
the original nature of True Reality. True 
Reality is the substance of thoughts; thoughts
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are the function of True Reality, If thoughts 
arise from your Self Mature, then, although you 
see, hear, perceive, and know, you are not
stained by the manifold environment, and are
always free,®7
The negative method is a means of escaping from 
attachment both to the external environment and to one's 
self, In the state of non-attachment, the true Self 
expresses itself freely in the external world and the
external world becomes brightened by the illumination of 
the true Self. It is through this relationship that Hui- 
neng answers the question concerning the characteristics 
and the application of enlightenment. In the quotation 
discussed in the proceeding paragraph this is expressed in 
terms of that between True Reality and thoughts. To use 
another pair of terms, this relationship may also be
expressed in terms of meditation <ting■) <of the self) and
wisdom (hui') <of the world). The impassibility of the
separation of this pair is exemplified by the following 
metaphor:
If there is a lamp (i.e. , meditation of the
Self) there is light (i.e., wisdom of the
world); if there is no lamp there is no light. 
The lamp is the substance of light; the light 
is the function of the lamp, sae
3. The Relationship Between Self Mature and the 
Ten Thousand Things < imn—fa)
Ve have seen that in the doctrine of Hui-neng, Self 
Mature, that is, Buddha Mature, is the ultimate 
metphysical truth, and that by the negative method, Self 
Mature is enlightened amid the Ten Thousand Things and is 
related to them as substance to function. But one may
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still ask why such a negative method is adopted, and why 
after enlightenment, the Ten Thousand Things remain as 
they were and become the manifestations of Self Nature. 
The answer is simple. The Ten Thousand Things, although 
not ultimately real, have in themselves an independent 
reality. That is why they exist both before and after the 
enlightenment of Self Nature,
Although in metaphysics Self Nature has priority, in 
temporal sequence the Ten Thousand Things are what we 
first meet. Ch’an fully acknowledges this fact and gives 
them a relatively independent place in its system. 
Therefore the realization of Self Nature must start from 
non-attachment to, rather than from simple negation of, 
the Ten Thousand Things, After enlightenment, Self Nature 
still expresses itself through those pre-existent things.
The substance-!unction relationship between Self 
Nature and the Ten Thousand * Things is therefore of an 
unusual kind. Substance does not create function, it 
throws light upon existent things which then become its 
function. Hui-neng* s own saying is evidence of this:
Self Nature contains the Ten Thousand Things, 
in this it is "great.” The Ten Thousand Things 
are all in Self Nature. To see all men and non- 
men, evil and good, evil things and good 
things, and not throw them aside, nor cling to 
them, nor be stained by them, but to be to them 
as the empty sky, this is called "great.”30.
In this passage, the Ten Thousand Things exist together 
with Self Nature which embraces them with its limitless 
capacity. It therefore seems proper to say that Self 
Nature is the ultimate existence whereas the myriad things 
also have some form of Independent existence. The Ten 
Thousand Things are illumined by Self Nature, which 
embraces them as its function in the sense of the analogy 
of the lamp.
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The idea of the existence of things is a development 
of Chi-tsang* s doctrine that common truth is 
methodologically prior to the higher truth. However, in 
Hui-neng* s theory, things have existence in their own 
right; Self Nature only contains and illuminates them, but 
is not a condition of their existence. Therefore we may 
say that although his metaphysics is Subjective Idealism, 
his world-view is almost totally realistic.
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C. THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF CH' Ail
1. Ch* an as a World. Orientated Movement
We have seen that although Rui-neng accepted the 
fundamental Idealism of the Buddhist tradition, he 
departed from this tradition in certain important ways, 
namely in his realistic world-view, his independence of 
the received scriptures, and in his direct method of 
enlightenment. This departure represented, in fact, a 
turning-point in the history of Buddhist thought in China, 
in so far as it led to the recognition of the important 
role of mundane life in religious development, Hui-neng’s 
Liu-tsu t'an ohing■, in effect, advocates a major reform 
which leads Buddhism out of the cloister into society.
This book re-interprets the religious practices of 
the monastery and re-defines their objects, For expample, 
’'sitting in meditation” is diverted from its original 
sense of a formal private activity and is presented in 
terms of one’s orientation in this world. Hui-neng says:
With this method, there are no obstructions. 
When outwardly with respect to things, thoughts 
do not arise, it is "sitting,” When looking 
inward, Original lature is not disturbed, it is 
”meditat i on. ”31
Another example is the re-interpretation of the 
traditional Buddhist doctrine of the "three refuges,” 
namely Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, Hui-neng advocates "the 
formless precepts of the three refuges”:
People should take refuge in the three 
treasures of their Self lature, enlightenment 
(the Buddha), truth (the Dharma), and purity 
(the Sangha) , 3S:
What's more, the ultimate destination, the other shore, is 
moved to the present world. In the interpretation of 
p&r-amit&i the Sanskrit term for "othez— shore-reached,” 
Hui-neng described it as merely a state of not being
attached to the environment. In that state man is no 
longer agitated like a wave up and down, but like water 
smoothly flowing with the current,33
All of the above examples show that Hui-neng
attempted to bring people from institutional religion back 
to their Self lature, from seclusion back to common life, 
and from the other world to this world. He preached lay 
Buddhism, saying:
If you wish to practise, it is all right to do 
so as laymen: you don’t have to be in a temple.
If you are in a temple but do not practise, you 
are like evil-minded people of the Western 
Land. If you are a layman but do practise, you
are like people of the East, who practise the
good. If only you practise purity yourselves,
then this would be the Western Land, 3';!-
The theoretical construction of Ch*an was laid down 
by Hui-neng. The subsequent Ch’an Masters, although asking 
the same question proposed by Hui-neng, namely, "What is 
the basic idea of the Dharma preached by the Buddha?”3a 
were even more radical than he. They tended to find the 
answer in themselves rather than in the spirit of the 
scriptures. Therefore in their hands institutional
religion was further damaged. Some Ch’an Masters pushed
the negative method to the extreme and became very 
rebellious, especially those in the Lin-chi School. Yi- 
hsUan ( ? -866), the founder of this school, says:
If you want to have the right understanding,
you must not be deceived by others. You should 
kill everything that you meet internally or 
externally. If you meet Buddha, kill Buddha.
If you meet the Patriarchs, kill the 
Patriarchs. . . Then you can gain your 
emancipation. 3e
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Although these killings are for the purpose of returning 
to one's Self lature, which is no other than Buddha 
Nature, at the same time it indicates the irrevelance of 
the religious life, and the primacy of common life.
To sum up, Ch* an urged the return to ordinary life, 
Although it did not negate religion itself, it did negate 
religion as a seclusive practice. Fung Yu-lan puts this 
position very clearly:
Spiritual cultivation does not require special 
acts, such as the ceremonies and prayers of 
institutionalised religion. One should simply 
try to be without a purposeful mind or any 
attachments in one’s daily life; then
cultivation results from the mere carrying an 
of the common and simple affairs of daily 
life.3"-"
2. Ch*an and the Great Social Change During T*ang and Sung
This approach of Ch’ an to the practice of Buddhism in the 
world is worth examining further with particular regard to 
the historical background.
In Ch’an, the novel and unconventional techniques of 
enlightenment were developed and vigorously applied from 
the ninth century to the eleventh. 30 This was the time 
from the mid-T’ang to the late Northern Sung - one of the 
greatest revolutionary periods of social and political 
construction in China. In politics, before the mid-T*ang 
there were aristocracies, while during the Northern Sung 
there developed a centralized bureaucracy. In connexion 
with the political change, a new landowning class arose in 
place of the old aristocracy. The details of the new 
social system will not be treated here. We need only note 
that the development of Ch’an took place in parallel with
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drastic social changes. In Early T'ang, when the 
aristocracy reached its last stages, all other schools of 
Mahayana Buddhism achieved their apogees. Ch’an, whose 
beginnings were in the early T* ang dynasty, developed its 
radical methods from the mid-T'ang. This was a time when 
the aristocracy was disintegrating rapidly, and the new 
landowning class and bureaucratic politics were beginning 
to take shape. It seems proper to say that the earlier 
schools of Mahayana Buddhism were in line with the 
ideology of the old aristocracy, whereas Ch*an met the 
spiritual needs of the changing period, when despite the 
collapse of the aristocracy, the newly appearing 
bureaucracy had not yet been consolidated. But as the new 
socio-political structure gradually stabilised during the 
Sung dynasty, Ueo-Confucianism in its turn appeared and 
took the place of Ch'an.
How did Ch’an fit into this changing period? I would 
like to propose a hypothetical answer. In my opinion, in 
an era of upheaval, not only do the socio-political 
institutions fall to pieces, but the spiritual 
institutions also suffer disintegration. While the bonds 
of society and ideology are loosening, the individual may 
feel anxious and indecisive; on the other hand he may draw 
strength from inner spiritual values, In this way, Ch'an, 
which advocated self-reliance and a spirit of 
individualism was able to play an important role. In fact, 
the orientation of Ch'an towards the acceptance of the 
world and the individual which was embodied in the 
teaching that every individual, regardless of his social 
status, has the capability of attaining Buddhahood, 
provided a basis for the regeneration of the social order.
Let us look at a few examples. The story of Hui-neng 
is symbolic. He was illiterate and in his youth sold 
firewood for a living. When he went to the Fifth Patriarch 
for Buddha Dharma, he was dismissed as a "barbarian" and
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was sent to tlie threshing room to tread the pestle. But he
knew that he had the same Buddha Nature as anybody else.3®
In his refutation of Ch' an, Chu Hsi once discussed 
one of its teachings:
They say that things like earning a living and 
running a business are not opposed to the Real 
Form (i.e., Truth). Among the fifty-three
sources of learning of the Good-Fortune-Boy, 
the following are all included: gods, ghosts,
immortals, scholars, peasants, workers, 
merchants, and artisans. . . . The original
teaching of Buddha is not so inclusive. But 
afterwards Ch’an, ashamed of its narrowness, 
overturned the original doctrine, preaching 
that pointing to one's Mind to see one’s Nature 
will make one a Buddha,40
This is further evidence that Ch’an fitted into the spirit 
of popular culture.
Chu Hsi also once said:
I have seen pictures of some patriarchs. They 
all look awesome. That is why Tsung-kao has 
said that if Lin-chi had not been a monk, 
certainly he would have been a big bandit. I
have also seen the picture of Kuei-tsung in
Mount Lu, which is especially horrifying. If he 
had not become a monk, surely he would have
become a great robber.41
This illustrates that at -that time when the social order 
was disintegrating, persons of very strong characters 
might either go astray and become bandits, or realise and
search for spiritual values on their own. In this
connexion Ch’an was able to provide spiritual guidance.
3. The Mature of the Dominant Class in the Mew Socio- 
Political Structure
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Although it represented popular culture, from the 
beginning Ch* an had attracted the interest of the 
intelligensia and officials, both because those of higher 
status were also part of the mundane world to which Ch* an 
was preaching, and because it had been a tradition for men 
of letters to believe in and to patronise Buddhism, During 
the Sung dynasty, while the new socio-political structure 
was consolidating, the Lin-chi School, the most radical 
branch of Ch1an, outdid the other branches and gradually 
won the greatest popularity among men of letters. Ch'an 
was also welcomed by the emperors, especially Jen-tsung 
(r. 1023-1063), ICao-tsung <r. 1127-1162), and Hsiao-tsung
<r, 1163-1189) , ^  Chu Hsi also enumerated many prominent
scholar-officials of his dynasty who were devoted to 
Ch’an,
But while Ch’an was flourishing in the dominant 
class, Feo-Confucianism began to emerge, and developed by 
way of criticising Ch'an. This, in my view, is because 
Ch’an, as a belief of scholai— officials, had difficulties 
in trying to cope with the new socio-political situation. 
For this reason it could not stop the emergence of its 
philosophical rival. Before discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the doctrine of Ch’an for the new
dominant class, I should first like to examine the 
characteristics of that class itself.
The formation, the position and the purpose of this 
class is clearly depicted by Yamanoi Yo as the following:
First, the aristocratic polity, which started 
in the late Han, collapsed during the mid- 
T’ang, After the warlord regimes of the late
T’ang and the Five Dynasties, there arose, in 
the Sung dynasty, a new raonarchial autocratic 
government founded upon a new bureaucratic 
system. Secondly, as regards the class basis of
Beo-Confucianism, with the decline of the
earlier aristocratic class, a new landowning 
class"1-4, whose lands were tilled by tenants, 
came to take its place. This class furnished 
the bureaucratic stratum, which is the so-
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called scholai— official stratum or the literati 
stratum. Commerce and manufacture also
progressed} prosperous cities emerged; people 
running business in the cities became rich. 
Some of them ascended to the landowning class 
by purchasing land, and endeavoured to squeeze 
into the stratum of the scholai— officials,
Thirdly, throughout the Sung dynasty, China was 
under threat from states established by 
northern peoples such as Liao <the Tartars), 
Hsi-hsia (the Tibetans), and Chin (the
Jurchens), and was forced to sign unequal 
treaties after disgraceful defeats. Sung not 
only gave up half of its territory to Chin, but 
finally perished in the hands of Yuan (the 
Mongols). In the Sung dynasty, China was 
constantly subject to ethnic crises,4S
How did this socio-political environment on the one 
hand enhance the popularity of Ch'an, and on the other 
hand provoke the development of Neo-Confucianism? In my 
opinion, the fundamental change from aristocracy to 
bureaucratic-and-landowning-class consisted in the 
centralisation of political power. Local governments were 
demoted to the position of merely administrative branches 
of the central government; their powers were delegated at 
the discretion of the ultimate authority, the autocratic 
monarch. In connexion with this, the family lost its 
political function and became merely an economic unit. 
Before the T’ang dynasty, aristocrats dominated the 
peasants on their desmesne as lord over serfs; but in the 
Sung dynasty, no matter how rich a landowner was, his 
relation to tenant peasants was founded upon contracts. 
The lord was as much a subject of the emperor, as his 
tenants were. Moreover, he was not a ruler in his own 
land. Although he was independent in the economic sense, 
he was not in the political sense. The safeguard of each 
family was in the power of the state, which in the final 
resort was the power of the monarch. People became 
politically dependent when power was centralized in the 
monarch. Under such circumstances, people tended,
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voluntarily or involuntarily, to pay more attention to the 
world outside their family, Their spiritual orientation 
consequently became external and mundane, rather than 
internal and transcendent.
The elites of the landowning class, when they passed 
the civil examinations and joined the government, were 
called "scholai— officials" <shih-ta—fu') i and when they 
stayed at home and managed local affairs, "scholar-gentry" 
(shih-shen') , Whether they were scholai— officials in the 
government or local leaders in the country, they were 
engaged in mundane affairs in a complex world. Under these 
circumstances both Ch’an and Neo-Confucianism were able to 
meet their spiritual needs.
4. The Significance of Ch*an to the Dominant Class
What were the advantages and disadvantages in the practice 
of Ch’an by the dominant class in this new socio-political 
structure?
Ch* an in the Sung dynasty was a form of Buddhism 
which emphasised the significance of everyday life. From 
the doctrine that the world of Buddha is here in the 
present world, and that Self Nature encompasses the Ten 
Thousand Things, Ch’an was able successfully to combine a 
transcendent ideal with mundane life. The negative method, 
besides being a means to the metaphysical truth, was at 
the same time a way of approaching mundane affairs. By the 
practice of no-thought amid the existing thoughts, 
everything would be exalted under the illumination of Self 
Nature. One may therefore find complete equality, peace, 
freedom and harmony while engaged in even the most 
complicated worldly affairs, For the scholai— officials who 
had social and political burdens upon their shoulders, 
while at the same time aspiring for spiritual
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transcendence, nothing would have been more attractive 
than such a doctrine.
But this method was based upon Idealism and 
individualism, and would soon find its limitations, Ch*an 
did not regard affairs of the world as obstacles to 
emancipation, but its theory did not extend to an account 
of how to practice such affairs. For it met the world by 
way of the negative method, not by positive elucidation. 
The individualistic spirit urged man to seek supra-moral 
values. But duty and morality, crucial to running an 
organised society, were not its main concern. This does 
not mean that Ch’an was wholly irrelevant to community 
life; on the contrary, the positive role it played in
politics and society was acknowledged even by Chu Hsi.
The practice of the negative method involves a
broad-minded attitude toward the world. Hui-neng pointed 
out:
The capacity of the Mind is broad and huge,
like the vast sky. , . . Emptiness includes the
sun, moon, stars, and planets, the great earth, 
mountains and rivers, all trees and grasses, 
bad men and good men, bad things and good 
things, heaven and hell; they are all in the 
midst of emptiness. The emptiness of Self
Mature is also like this.4e
Hui-neng suggests in this passage that the mind should 
comprehend both good and evil. However, although the 
doctrine does not advocate the elimination of evils, I can 
see no reason why an individual who had broadened his mind 
in this manner should still be thought to persist in the 
evils of his earlier ways, For in the pursuit of the 
supra-moral value of emptiness, he would be no longer 
interested in the worldly pleasure which often causes
evil-doing. In the socio-political context, a man with 
supra-moral values in mind usually became a good man. This 
is why Chu Hsi says:
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The former eminents who had understanding of 
Buddhism often stood firm before threat and 
allurement. This is because of the teaching of 
Buddhism that one should courageously improve 
oneself, and should keep to cleaness and
firmness. This teaching made them desireless 
and immovable by external things, ^
Therefore, despite being a supra-moral religion, and 
a Subjective Idealism, Ch’an could still encourage its 
believers to perform their socio-political
responsibilities. But it is just here that the limitations 
of Ch’an are revealed: Ch’an urges men to purify their own
minds, but the teaching that Mind is inclusive both of
good and evil suggests an attitude of unconcern toward the 
evil actions of others. The most a believer can hope for 
then, is, by attending to the purification of his own 
mind, to unconciously inspire others to da the same.
Here we shall examine a practical principle of the 
negative method. In a verse by Hui-neng there are the 
following lines:
If you are a person who truly practises the Way, 
Do not look at the faults of the world,
For if you see the wrongs of other people,
Criticising them, you will be evil.
The wrongs are theirs but you should not blame, 
In blaming them you yourself become guilty.
Only by removing the antagonism in your mind, 
Disturbances may be crushed and destroyed, ':l-3
This illustrates clearly that for a scholai— official, 
Ch’an is enough for his self-cultivation but not for his 
performance of the leading role in the socio-political 
context. For as a leader he cannot assign uniform value to 
people and events in his world. He must discriminate good 
and evil in others, and by the action of reward and 
punishment maintain the successful functioning of society 
and politics, The weakness in Ch’an was that, lacking a 
workable conception of law and justice, it offered no 
philosophical basis for such intervention in the world. It
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was this lack that opened the way to the rise of its 
antagonist, Neo-Confucianism,
37
D. THE RISE OF NEO-CONFIJCIANISM
1. The Dawn of Neo-Confucianism
After the foundation of the Sung dynasty and the 
consolidation of the new socio-political system, men of 
letters increasingly developed a strong awareness of their 
social and political responsibilities, and the rise of
Neo-Confucianism became inevitable.
Ch’ien Hu ascribes the rise of Neo-Confucianism to 
two scholars, both of whom came a little earlier than Chou 
Tun-i. One was Fan Chung-yen (989-1052), a prominent
official, and the other a college director, by the name of 
Hu Yuan (993—1059), They proclaimed the importance of the 
Confucian Classics and emphasised socio-political 
responsibility. Fan Chung-yen is famous for the dictum, 
”The scholar should worry about the world before the world 
has time to worry about itself; and he should enjoy his 
own life only after the world is satlsfled.”^
This socio-political duty was felt both by officials 
and by country gentlemen. 6tsuki Nobuyoshl examines the 
biographies of hermits in the Sung- shlh [the Sung 
History] , and finds that more than half of them were 
inclined to Confucianism. ”Hermits” here means those 
landowners who rejected from recruitment into the 
government, although many of them were still concerned 
over public affairs. The common tendencies of the 
Confucian hermits were: 1) emphasis of the importance of
the Essential Relationships (jTen-Iun), 2) deep concern in 
national affairs, 3) studying and writing around the I
ching [the Book of Changel , and 4) the practice of
quietitude. We may conclude that in the landowning 
class, many had a sense of commitment to public affairs. 
The tash of Neo-Confucianism was to express this tendency
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in philosophical language, and so to provide a theoretical 
basis for their practical commitment.
But although those precursors were Confucianistic, 
they were not generally speculative. The philosophy of 
every age must develop from that of an earlier age. Those 
scholars capable of speculative thinking were therefore 
not pure Confucianistic, and should be called Eclectics. 
In fact the Neo-Confucianists were later to classify them 
as adherents of Ch* an,
We have seen that for many scholar-off icials, the 
ideal was to engage in social and political affairs on the 
one hand, and to enjoy spiritual freedom on the other. 
Eclecticism arose in accordance with this ideal, so that 
before the rise of Neo-Confucianism it was the most 
dominant school, The representatives included such 
eminents as Wang An-shih (1021-1086) and the Su brothers, 
including Su Shih (1036-1101) and Su Ch*e (1039-1112),
In the next chapter I shall discuss how Chu Hsi 
criticised this Eclecticism. Here we need only note that 
it directly combined the metaphysics of either Ch’an or 
Tao and the political system of Confucianism, Eclecticism 
played the role of a middle position in the transition 
from Ch’an to Neo-Confucianism. In Ch’an, as we have seen, 
the empty substance can embrace the Ten Thousand Things. 
Eclecticism is farmed by the replacement of the Ten 
Thousand Things with Confucian elements - rites, music, 
history, the socio-political institutions, and so on. 
Hence, it may be regarded as the adaptation of Ch’an to 
the new social and political environment. But it may also 
be regarded as the first step in the transition to Neo- 
Confucianism,
2. The New Direction of Northern Sung Neo—Confucianism
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As Eclecticism developed out of Ch'an, so XTeo-Conf ucianism 
grew out of Eclecticism dialectically, Ueo-Confucianism 
can be seen to be the direct opponent of Ch'an and Tao, in 
that the Ch'an and Tao elements of Eclecticism are 
deliberately picked out and refuted. The rise of Ueo- 
Confucianism was a response to two important needs: 1) for
an ideology of the rising dominant social class, aimed at 
the promotion of morality; and 2) for the rationalisation 
of the gradually consolidating socio-political structure, 
incorporating the conception of law in its metaphysics. 
Therefore, the fundamental philosophical question it faced 
was the formation of a new world-view in contrast with 
that of Ch* an.
The earliest of the Ueo-Confucianists were chiefly 
interested in cosmology, 31 because cosmology is the first 
and most convenient way to display a new world-view, There 
were three major Ueo-Confucian cosmologists, Chou Tun-i, 
Shao Yung <1011-1077), and Chang Tsai <1020-1077). Chou 
Tun-i's T*a.i-chi t'u shuo is a classic of Ueo- 
Confucianism, and may serve as an example of the new 
direction that Ueo-Confucianism took.
The first part of T* ai-chi t * u shuo deals with the 
evolution of the universe since its beginning, and the 
second part with the emergence of Man. The primordial 
substance is called the Great Ultimate <t'ai-chi). The 
essay begins with the problematic words "The Ultimate of 
Mon-being < wu—ohi^ and also the Great Ultimate!" which we 
shall skip temperorarily in order to examine the rest of 
the essay. From the second sentence onward, the essay is 
purely Confucian, and may be examined by contrasting it 
with the viewpoint of Ch'an.
With respect to the movement of the Great Ultimate, 
there appears Yang or the positive, and with respect to 
its tranquility, there appears Yin or the negative. Then 
comes the formation of the world. Chou Tun-i says:
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By the transformation of Yang and its union with 
Yin, the Five Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, 
and Earth arise. When these five material forces 
are distributed in harmonious order, the four 
seasons run their course.
When the reality of the Ultimate of Mon-being and 
the essence of Yin, Yang, and the Five Agents 
come into mysterious union, integration ensues. 
Heaven (ch'ien) constitutes the male element, and 
Earth Clf'un) constitutes the female element, The 
interaction of these two material forces 
engenders and transforms the myriad things. The 
myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in 
an unending transformation. 33
It is at this point that Man enters the stage. This forms 
the subject of the second part of the essay. Chou Tun-i
says;
It is Man alone who receives <the Five Agents) in 
their highest excellence, and therefore he is 
most intelligent, His Physical Form <hsing) 
appears, and his Spirit (.shea) develops 
consciousness, The five moral principles of his 
Mature (Humanity (Jen), Righteousness (1),
Propriety (li>, Wisdom (chlh) , and Faithfulness 
(hsin)) are aroused by, and react to, the
external world and engage in activity; good and
evil are distinguished; and human affairs take 
place.33
The significance of this cosmology will be clear when 
constrasted with that of Ch'an. Let us first consider the 
substance. In Ch'an the ultimate substance is Original 
Mind. Under its illumination all things become absolute, 
equal, and empty. Therefore, the world and all things 
within it are dependent upon my ultimate Self. But in Chou 
Tun-i's theory the substance is the Great Ultimate, which 
had existed before all other things, including Mind. As 
the substance is independent of myself, so all things, 
being manifestations of the substance, are also
i ndependent.
Secondly, we consider the development of the
universe. As we have seen, Ch’an already accepts the
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independent universe ipso facto. But only after the 
practice of non-attachment from every individual item can 
the universe exist as truth and exibit its real nature. 
Thus the true universe still ensues from Original Mind, In 
contrast, Chou Tun-i's cosmology is totally realistic. The 
Great Ultimate has independent reality; and as the term 
sheng <giving birth to) suggests that the moving force is 
vital rather than mechanical, the universe and things 
within are regarded as born by the Great Ultimate, and 
share the same independent reality.
The third contrast concerns the different grounds on 
which each claims the central position of Man in the 
universe. In Ch’an Man is, as we have seen, the real 
originator of the universe because he gives it truth by 
his true understanding. So that ultimately we cannot find 
a demarcation between the universe and the individual 
Self. According to this doctrine, one may find peace, 
equality, and freedom both in oneself and in the external 
world. It transcends conflicts, so that no social measures 
to control conflicts are necessary. This theory leads Man 
to think that the world is composed of individuals, and 
that each individual is absolute in itself, Therefore in 
its anthropocentric teaching, Ch’an is advancing an 
individualistic philosophy.
In the case of Chou Tun-i, Man acquires his central 
position because he represents the final stage . of 
evolution. In his theory, the universe comes first, then 
Man. And in Man Physical Form comes before the development 
of his consciousness. So the distinction between cosmos 
and Man is clearly drawn, Man is pre-eminent because with 
consciousness he starts a human world. The Five Agents of 
the cosmic force, when incarnated, become the five moral 
principles of his Mature. Parallel to the process of the 
universe, because of consciousness, these principles are 
activated, and through them good and evil are 
distinguished, and subsequently all kinds of human affairs
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emerge. In this way Chou Tun-i introduced the conception 
of society into his philosophy. Society is to Chou Tun-i 
as realistic as the other stages which fallow the Great 
Ultimate, Good and the evil exist in society and are not 
illusory, Moral standards become indispensable and so are 
regarded as rooted in the universe. Instead of Ch’an*s 
individualism, then, in Chou Tun-i’s philosophy we have a 
commitment to the society, If morals are chiefly
concerned with the Essential Relationships, then as an 
individualism, Ch’an is concerned with supra-moral values. 
The fact that moral values are once again hallowed in Neo- 
Confucianism reflects its strong social orientation.
The third and last part of T* ai -chi t'u shuo is 
concerned about the method of moral cultivation and the 
value of morality:
The sage settles these human affairs by the 
principles of the Mean (.chung) , Correctness 
icheng) , Humanity, and Righteousness (Chou’s own 
footnote: for the Way of the sage is none other
than these four), regarding tranquility as 
fundamental (Chou’s own footnote: Having no
desire, there will therefore be tranquility). 
Thus he establishes himself as the ultimate
standard for Man. , . ,
Therefore it is said that ”Yin and Yang are
established as the Way of Heaven, the Weak (jou)
and the Strong drang') as the Way of Earth, and
Humanity and Righteousness as the Way of Man,*'3'1'
Man is commensurate with Heaven and Earth because his 
innate moral principles are the same as the principles of 
Heaven and Earth, Man needs ethical cultivation in order 
to act according to his Nature. A perfect example is the
sage, who has shown us the foundation of, and the means
toward, moral being. The foundation is one’s own Nature, 
and the means is ’’tranquility." In claiming tranquility as 
the means toward moral being, Chou Tun-i has no doubt been 
influenced by Taoism and Ch’an, but when adapted to moral 
practice, it has a different significance. In Ch’an, the
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purpose of tranquility is to suspend both affirmation and 
negation, and to establish an attitude of non-attachment. 
But according to Chou Tun-i, the practice of tranquility 
is to eliminate selfish desires which disturb the carrying 
out of moral behaviour. The practice of tranquility 
therefore does not aim to cancel the distinction between 
good and evil, but to support that distinction.
3. Five Types of Metaphysics
Now we go back to the first sentence of T'&i—chi t'u siji/o, 
’’The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate,” 
which has caused much controversy among later scholars. 
There is, no doubt, the influence of Taoism and Buddhism 
in the term ”Non-being. ” If the sentence is understood as 
saying that the universe emerges from nothingness, the 
whole essay is given a Taoistic keynote, and consequently 
Chou Tun-i would have to be regarded as an Eclectic. But 
Chu Hsi struggled to interpret Chou Tun-i as a pure 
Confucianist. Chu Hsi insisted that "Non-being” was only 
an epithet characterising the transcendence of the Great 
Ultimate. The beginning of the universe, the Great 
Ultimate, is called the Ultimate of Non-Being because it 
is both infinite and non-material.33
But my concern here is not to ascertain the real 
meaning on the part of Chou Tun-i, but rather to show that 
during the transition period from Ch’an to Neo- 
Confucianism, there were several conceptions of substance 
and function. Accordingly, we may enumerate five types of 
metaphysics which appeared during that transition period, 
from Ch’an to the establishment of Chu Hsi's philosophy.
The first is Idealism which regards Original Hind or 
Self Nature as the ultimate substance. This is the view of
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Ch'an, and obviously is what Chou Tun-i, and all other 
Heo-Confucianists fought against.
The second type is that for which I suggest the name 
"Evolutionary Vitalism." I call this the first kind of 
Eclecticism. It attempts to combine the Taoist conception 
of substance and the Confucian conception of function. Its 
main thesis is that substance is the absolutely void Ion- 
being, but by way of a vitalist cosmology, the function 
involves the successive emergence of the natural and human 
worlds. Representatives of this metaphysics are the Su 
brothers, who were famous men of letters of the northern 
Sung, If the Ron-being of Chou Tun-i were to be 
interpreted in the Taoist sense, he too would belong to 
this group of Eclectics,
The third type may be named "Idealistic Vitalism," 
and constitutes the second kind of Eclecticism. It 
involves a combination of the idealistic substance of 
Ch'an with the vitalist conception of function. Because 
Ch’an flourished again during the turning period between 
the northern and the Southern Sung, many Heo-Confucianists 
of that time adopted Ch'an Idealism and consequently 
advocated this type of metaphysics, Chang Chiu-ch’eng 
<1092-1159) is the principal representative of this 
school.
The Eclecticism of this period may in general terms 
be divided into these two kinds, but traditional Chinese 
scholarship has tended to conflate them into a single 
phenomenon described as "Ch’an-Tao," or simply as "Ch'an." 
Chu Hsi though consciously committed to refuting Ch'an, 
directed his principal attack against these forms of 
Eclecticism, which he regarded as "the Ch’an of scholai—  
officials,"
The fourth type is the metaphysics of northern Sung 
Heo-Confucianism, which I shall call "Immanent Vitalism." 
This view regards substance as a permanent living force,
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without beginning or end, and function as the natural and 
human worlds which are its manifestation.
The fifth is the metaphysics which Chu Hsi 
established in his mature period, Chu Hsi*s philosophical 
enquiry started from Eclecticism, whence he moved to
Immanent Vitalism, but later, finding defects in the 
latter, he struggled to establish his own metaphysics. His 
final position is characterized by the doctrine of
Principle <(_Z1> and Material Force (ch'l). Principle, as
substance, is transcendent and non-material, and should be 
understood as a regulative standard. Material Force is
that which actualises (often with limitation) the 
regulative standard, and is also the reason for the 
multiplicity of individual lives.
4. The Purpose and the Method of this Thesis
There is a factor caramon to many Heo-Confucian thinkers, 
namely, the influence upon them of Buddhism and Taoism. 
Some of them even indulged in these "heterodoxies" for 
some time before finally returning to Confucianism. In the 
development of Heo-Confucianism, this occurs again and 
again; and the reason for this, I contend, is that these 
thinkers were not merely solving philosophical problems, 
but searching for a principle on which,, to base their 
lives. Because Ch'an was the dominant metaphysics of that 
time, it was natural that it should have preoccupied them 
considerably during their philosophical pursuit, Failing 
ultimately to find satisfaction in it, philosopher after 
philosopher returned to Confucianism, absorbing and 
advancing the views of their predecessors. The development 
of Heo-Conf ucianism was the result of this iterative 
search for a moral basis for life in the "this world" of
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Buddhism. Chu Hsi, too, began his research with Ch’an, but 
it was only after several stages of dialectical
development that he was able to establish his own
philosophy.
Before he was twenty-four, Chu Hsi's education had 
been in Confucianism, but at the same time he had been
attracted by Ch’an. From twenty-four to thirty-seven, he 
gradually adapted the Northern Sung tradition of ETeo-
Confucianism represented by "Immanent Vitalism," and
through it finally refuted Eclecticism. From thirty-seven 
to forty he devoted himself to the attempt to experience 
this Immanent Vitalism subjectively. The result was that 
he found Immanent Vitalism inadequate to provide a basis 
for the morality which was his crucial concern. From the
age of forty, he struggled to construct his own
metaphysics. In the fallowing years, by self-cultivation 
and by elaborating the implications of his new
metaphysics, he gradually came to revise his theory, and 
to produce a new version which was eventually completed in 
his sixties.
But the fundamental questions with regard to both the 
formation of Ueo-Confucianism and of Chu Hsi’s 
metaphysics, concern the concepts of Heaven, of Man, and 
of their intei— relationship. The difference in world-view 
between Confucianism and Buddhism was described succinctly 
by Ch*eng I: "The CConfucian] sages based [their system]
on [the concept of] Heaven, and the Buddhists based [their 
system] on [the concept of] Mind."ae; It is easy to 
understand that the Buddhist philosophy is based on the 
concept of Mind. Since the Buddhists hold an idealism, 
Mind is regarded as substance, and consequently Man is the 
centre of the world, and can include the world within 
himself. But the basis of Confucianism is more 
complicated. The purpose of replacing Mind with Heaven is 
to support a realistic world-view, and to advocate order
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and objectivity. But what is Heaven? "To imitate the Way 
of Heaven*' (fa-t’ien> had been a traditional doctrine in 
Confucianism and continued to be emphasised in Heo- 
Conf ucianism, What was to be imitated was clearly its 
metaphysical aspect, which may be taken, on the one hand, 
to be the idea of "law," and on the other, the ideas of 
"creation" and "constancy."S7 The northern Sung Heo- 
Conf ucianists made use of the conception of creation and 
constancy in the idea of Heaven in order to developed 
their philosophy of Immanent Vitalism. It was this 
Immanent Vitalism that Chu Hsi accepted when he rejected 
his own Ch’an tendency. However, as will be shown in this 
thesis, since Immanent Vitalism was not sufficient to 
provide a basis for the morality and order which was 
crucial to the historical mission of Heo-Confucianism, it 
had to be revised by including the idea of law into its 
metaphysics. Chu Hsi's new metaphysics is significant in 
completing this final step. Although Heo-Confucianism is 
based on the concept of Heaven, Chu Hsi1s philosophical 
enquiry started from the problem of Han; and so his 
reconstruction of the concept of Heaven may also be viewed 
as the establishment of the place of Man in the cosmos.
This study, as its title shows, deals with the 
development of Chu Hsi’s metaphysics by concentrating on 
those, for him, most fundamental questions, the concepts 
of Heaven and of Man. Our focus will be the development of 
Chu Hsi's own metaphysics; but, as his spiritual journey 
is virtually a miniature of the history of philosophy from 
Ch’an to fully-formed Heo-Confucianism, it is hoped that 
this discussion of Chu Hsi’s own development may also 
throw light on the philosophy of that period as a whole.
Because the concern of this thesis is to give an 
overview of the development of Chu Hsi's philosophy, all 
of his important concepts will be discussed, but 
particular attention will be given to the dating of his
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ideas, bath with respect ta their origin and raodification. 
Emphasis will also be laid on the relationship between 
these concepts, because his view of Heaven and Han is best 
shown, not in any single concept, but in the ways he 
organises them into a total system.
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CHAPTER II
THE IIFHERITARCE OF THE NEO CONFUCIAN TRADITION
SUMMARY
This chapter presents the process through which Chu 
Hsi inherited the Northern Sung Neo-Canfucian tradition 
characterised by Immanent Vitalism,
In his adolescence, Chu Hsi, influenced by the 
scholarly trend of that time, was inclined to an 
Eclecticism drawn from Confucianism and Ch* an. Because 
soruces for this period of his life are scanty, it is not 
passible to provide a very complete account.
From twenty-four to thirty-four years of age, Chu Hsi 
gradually rejected Ch’an and adopted Northern Sung Neo- 
Confucianism. This transformation resulted from his 
experience in political life, his reading of the Confucian 
Classics, and, most importantly, his discussions with Li 
T’ung <1093-1163). Through those discussions, Chu Hsi was 
able to develop the concept of ’’the oneness of principle 
and the distinct!veness of particulars" <li-i fen-shu) , 
which in its turn prepared him for the acceptance of the 
Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism.
In his thirty-seventh year, Chu Hsi wrote the Tsa- 
hsueh pien C .4 Criticism of Eclecticism! , in which he 
presents his final refutation of Eclecticism, I shall give 
a brief account of the theories of the principal Eclectics 
whom he attacks, as well as those of Chu Hsi’s. The main 
controversy here is the relationship between the Way (tao) 
and Concrete Things (cli'ii), and Chu Hsi attempts to 
explain that relationship on the basis of Immanent 
Vitalism.
/ fa \
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A, THE ECLECTIC TENDENCY OF THE YQUHG CHU HSI
<1130-1153)
Chu Hsi is one of the most important philosophers in 
the history of China. From his early childhood he showed a 
considerable inclination towards philosophy. For examples 
of this we may quote from his own memories of early years. 
He apparently had a propensity for metaphysics, for he 
said: "When I was five or six, I was troubled in my mind
about the essence of Heaven, and wondered what might exist 
outside it."Be The Confucian ideal of life also attracted 
him: "When I was in my teens, I was glad to know from the
Meng-t&u that the sages and I belong to the same 
category."3™' He was inclined to be concerned about 
understanding ultimate truth and moral principles rather 
than pursuing particular branches of knowledge, So, 
despite a great thirst for knowledge,30 he displayed no 
interest in history, thinking it dealt with external and 
trivial affairs.31
The sources of Chu Hsi’s Eclecticism were 
Confucianism and Ch'an. He himself says that the common 
emphasis of these two schools on "self-cultivation" (wei- 
chi chih hsueh> was an attraction, and that in his youth 
he preferred to embrace what they had in common to seeking 
out their differences.3 1^ First we shall examine the 
Confucian element in his early learning.
1. His Confucian Education
Between the ages of eight and twenty Chu Hsi*s reading 
included the Confucian Classics and the works of 
contemporary Confucianists, such as the Hsiao ching [the
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Book of Filial Piety! , the Lun-yu C the Analects! , the 
Meng-t&u, the Ta-hsCieh C the Great Learning! t the Chung- 
yung [the Doctrine of the Mean! , the Chou-1 i [the Bites of 
Chou! , the Shih ching [the Book of Odes!, and the 
Collected Works of Ssu-ma Kuang <1019-1086), and those of 
Ch'en Huan <1057-1122),S3 Chu Hsi studied these works, 
partly because they were the common culture of the 
literati, but more importantly because they were required 
tests for the civil examinations. Despite the career 
orientation of his study, Chu Hsi paid particularly 
attention to the philosophical import of these texts.®4 
Another purpose of the civil examination curriculum, 
namely, inculcation of the Confucian ideal of socio­
political commitment, also had its affect on the young Chu 
Hsi. This is clear from the remarks of the examining 
officer at the local level who said of Chu Hsi: MI passed
a young man, all three of whose essays proposed great 
plans for the country. He should amount to something in 
the future.
2, The Influence of Ch’an on his Thought
Chu Hsi1s interest in Ch'an in his youth was encouraged by 
the spiritual environment of his time, Ch*an flourished 
during the Shao-hsing period <1131-1162), the second 
period of Kao-tsung, the founder of the Southern Sung 
d y n a s t y . I t  was not only patronized by the emperor but 
widely accepted among scholar-officials. Under the 
influence of Ch’an, the Eclecticism of the Northern Sung 
continued to flourish. The School of Eclecticism which was 
particularly popular in the Southern Sung was that of the 
Su brothers, because the School of Wang An-shih had been 
banned at the end of the Northern Sung under the 
accusation that it had been responsible far both the
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corruption of government, and the consequent inability to 
resist the Chin invaders.s7 At the beginning of the 
Southern Sung, the Eclectic tradition of the Su brothers 
which historically lent towards Taoism was adapted in the 
direction of Ch* an by Chang Chiu-ch' eng.
Chu Hsi was born in a remote area of Fukien and had 
many chances to come into contact with Ch'an in his youth. 
His father Chu Sung <1097-1143) , a man with broad 
historical knowledge and of upright personality, was, 
according to Chu Hsi, in his youth fond of making friends 
with Buddhist and Taoist masters.60 He died when Chu Hsi 
was fourteen. On the paint of death he entreated his
friend Liu Tsu-yii <1097-1146) to take care of his family,
and commanded Chu Hsi to study with his three other 
friends, Hu Hsien <1086-1162), Liu Mien-chih <1091-1149), 
and Liu Tsu-hui <1101-1147) . Liu Tzu-yii was a high
official and rich landowner, and was at that time staying
at home while out of political favour. He provided the 
Chu family a house and a small estate. The other three 
were also living in retirement, Liu T;su~hui being the
younger brother of Liu Tsu-yu.
This group had two things in common: they belonged to
the landowning gentry and they were philosophically 
inclined towards Eclecticism. ro They were Confucianists in 
that they had studied the Confucian Classics and had a 
concern and capability for political affairs, even though 
they refused to seek office for political reasons.71 The 
Northern Sung collapsed in 1126; Kao-tsung, the founding 
emperor of the Southern Sung, fought for his first ten
years to check the further invasion of Chin, but
thereafter he had no ambition to recover the northern half 
China. In line with this policy, he appointed Chfin K*uai 
<1090-1155) as the prime minister and concluded a peace 
treaty with Chin in 1140, Ch*in K*uai presided over the 
government from 1138 to 1 1 5 5 , during which time he
banished "upright gentlemen," from the government. This
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was the reason for the political exile of Liu Tzu-yii, and 
part of the reason for the voluntary seclusion of the 
other three of Chu Hsi ’ s teachers. Chu Hsi was already 
twenty-six when Ch'in K’uai's premiership ended, so he may 
be said to have grown up in an atmosphere which, though 
seclusive, was patriotic.
Ch' an was also an important factor in the spiritual 
lives of these gentlemen. The case of the Liu brothers is 
an example. Of all his father’s friends, Chu Hsi was 
closest to the Liu family. Liu Tzu-yii supported him; Liu 
Tzu-hui, at that time a private tutor, taught him essay
writing in preparation for the civil examinations; and the
two sons of Liu Tzu-yii were his classmates. Although the 
Lius, like most of the scholar-gentry, had an eager
interest in Ch’an, they did not necessarily have a 
profound understanding of it. For example, a famous monk 
Tsung-kao (10897-1163?> ridiculed them with the words, 
"Yen-ch’ung (Liu Tzu-hui) is diligent in the cultivation 
of Ch1 an, but does not know it; Pao-hsueh (Liu Tzu-yii) 
knows Ch’an, but pays no attention to the cultivation.”'73 
However, through them Chu Hsi was provided with an 
environment in which to come into contact with Ch’an.
Besides tuitoring him for the civil examinations, Liu Tzu- 
hui, on learning of Chu Hsi's aspiration for ’’self- 
cultivation,” taught him "the gate to learning,” probably 
meaning his own introduction to Ch’ an. '7'-1- At that time Chu 
Hsi was fifteen or sixteen. In Liu Tzu-hui's home Chu Hsi 
had another chance to meet and converse with a Ch’an monk. 
Later, when he was nineteen and took the civil examination 
he incorporated the opinions of that monk in his papers 
and was successful.75 Another reliable source says that 
from seventeen to eighteen years old Chu Hsi went to see a 
famous monk Tao—ch'ien three times.7S Whether Tao—ch’ien 
was the monk that Chu Hsi met at Liu Tzu-hui’s home or 
not,'7"7 he had an important influence on Chu Hsi.
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3. His Method of Study
As well as recollecting the readings and interests of his 
early years, Chu Hsi also tells us of his methods of
study. However, since we only know the general trend of 
his early days, it is difficult to reorganize these 
fragments into a systematic whole. Two things are worth 
mentioning here. Chu Hsi recollecting his early education, 
says: "I studied the Ta-h&ueh and the Chung-yung while I
was seventeen and eighteen. Every morning after I got up, 
I recited them ten times, M-5'lia This account tells us that, 
although at that time he was inclined to broad learning 
and devoured many branches of knowledge,'"3 he was also
diligently learnt some of the basic Confucian Classics by 
heart. I believe this familiarity with the Confucian 
Classics is an important factor, which would later
encourage him to return to, and to develop his interest
in, Confucian philosophy.
Another noteworthy passage is from the impression of 
Chu Hsi by Li T*ung. Li T’ung said:
This man is very intelligent and devoted to 
practice. His learning hits the subtlest points. 
All his debates are relevant and start from the 
essence of things. Therefore it is easy to
discuss with him, . . .  At first he studied with 
Tao-ch' ien, so that all his efforts have been
from within. . . .30
Li T1ung made this remark when Chu Hsi was thirty-one and 
had already discarded the Ch’an element in his learning, 
nevertheless it gives us a clue to Chu Hsi' s early
efforts. In his admiration of Chu Hsi's ability in
philosophical enquiry, Li T ’ung ascribed the reason to Chu 
Hsi’s early cultivation of Ch’an, It seems to me that, Chu 
Hsi’s study of Ch'an, especially that with Tao-ch’ien, had 
enhanced his attention to the "cultivation of the mind," 
After Chu Hsi returned to the Confucian tradition, his
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dedication to self-cultivation continued and became the 
foundation of his achievements in his objective
understanding of both the Classics and the external world. 
On the other hand, although the Ch’an view of Mind had 
been rejected, the endeavour to find a proper 
understanding of it played an important role in the 
development of his philosophy.
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B. CHU HSI’S IMHASEHT VITALISM AS A FOLLOWER OF LI T’UITG
(1153—1163)
1. The Gradual Abandonment of Ch’an Through Political 
Commitment
Chu Hsi’s Eclecticism in his adolescence constituted the 
first stage in the development of his thought, and was a 
reflection of the philosophical trends of the Shao-hsing 
<1131-1162) period. After this period he rejected these 
early eclectic tendencies. This Important transition took 
place between 1153 and 1163, that is, between the ages of 
twenty-four and thirty-four, under the influence of the 
ideas of Li T ’ung.
The Ch’ing scholar Hsia Hsin (1789—1871) categorises 
the influence of Li T’ung on Chu Hsi under six headings. 
The first is concerned with the refutation of Ch’an, the 
next two with study and philosophy, the fourth with 
politics, and the last two with the method of self- 
cultivation. 3-1 Using these categories, I shall attempt to 
describe Chu Hsi’s philosophical position in this period.
The first and most obvious aspect of this period of 
transition in Chu Hsi’s thought is his rejection of Ch’an, 
Liu Tzu-hui died when Chu Hsi was eighteen. The only 
senior he could consult thereafter was Hu Hsien, But the 
scholarship of Hu Hsien appeared even more meager than 
that of Liu Tzu-hui. From Chu Hsi’s recollection, although 
Hu Hsien admired Buddhism and Taoism, he had no great 
understanding of them, Chu Hsi thought that there was 
little to learn from him, and so, on his way to his first 
government post at the age of twenty-four, he dropped in 
to see Li T’ung,1®5* a highly praised friend of Chu Hsi’s 
late father. This was the first time Chu Hsi met Li T*ung. 
When Chu Hsi elaborated his own philosophy, which without
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doubt contained many elements of Ch'an, Li T’ung, lacking 
eloquence in debate, merely told him that it was not 
right, and suggested that Chu Hsi should study only the 
sayings of the Confucian sages. At the time, Chu Hsi 
suspected that Li T'ung did not understand Ch'an at all, 
but nevertheless, somewhat reluctantly, accepted his 
suggestion. During his service as the clerk of records 
Cchu~pu) of T ’ung-an between his twenty-fourth and twenty- 
eighth year, he put aside his Ch’an books and concentrated 
solely on the Confucian Classics. Gradually he discovered 
the significance of Confucianism, and the flaws and 
defects of Ch’an,03
In another recollection of this first meeting Chu Hsi
says:
When I first met Master Li, I expounded a great 
deal of philosophy. Master Li replied, ’’You 
speculate a great deal, but you don’t understand 
the things in front of you. In fact there is 
nothing mysterious in the Way. To be able to see 
it, you only need to be serious in your daily 
practice.
This was another way of criticising Chu Hsi’s inclination 
to Ch'an. His return to Confucianism thus took place in 
two ways: one was through study of the Confucian Classics,
and the other was by paying attention to the activities of 
daily life.
Chu Hsi gradually shifted his interest from Ch’an to 
Confucianism during the fallowing three years, from the 
age of twenty-four to twenty-six. His twenty-fourth year 
was also the first of his official career. As he had been 
brought up in a peaceful rural area and in an environment 
which encouraged Ch’an meditation, Chu Hsi found some 
difficulty in adjusting himself to trivial and tiresome 
duties, Mow and again he craved for seclusion, and 
sometimes dreamt of leaving his office to pursuit a 
transcendental style of life. He named his study Kao-shih
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hsiian [Studio of the Transcendental 1st3 , explaining that 
although he was toiling through secretarial duties, his 
spirit was soaring in the state of transcendence. This was 
an ideal compatible with Ch’an. However, in the following 
two years complaints of this kind became less and less 
frequent. It appears that he had found contentment in
performing his duties, and came to look on them as 
valuable in themselves, and no longer dismissed them as 
merely irrelevant to his transcendental ideals. Perhaps we 
should attribute this change to Li T* ung* s advice to pay 
attention to daily life.
In those years, besides his normal duties as the
clerk of records, Chu Hsi also took charge of the 
prefectural school. For that task he invited ’’virtuous 
scholars” as supervisors, encouraged students to dedicate 
themselves to learning and moral cultivation, and 
established a library. It is evident from his writings
that he carried out all these works in a spirit of
dedication to the Confucian ideal.
2. The Investigation of Things Through Study of the 
Confucian Classics
The second category, according to Hsia Hsin, of Chu Hsi’s 
thought under the influence of Li T’ung was the 
Investigation of Things i]co~wu') , This was developed in 
response to another piece of advice from Li T*ung, namely, 
to learn the Way from the Confucian Classics, We shall see 
how Chu Hsi followed this advice and thereby advanced his 
philosophy.
It seems that this was the first time that Chu Hsi 
was confronted with the idea of discriminating between 
Confucianism and Ch'an. This advice inspired him to read 
again the Confucian Classics which he had been studying
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since boyhood and had continued to study on hie own. What 
was required was a change in his habits from broad and 
rapid reading for general ideas, to a close and thoughtful 
study which allowed him to reach deeper levels of 
understanding. There are sources which deal with the 
nature of his studies at this time. Once in the autumn of 
his twenty-seventh year, while he went to the neighbouring 
county an an official errand, for three or four nights in 
a monastery he thought over a section of the Lun-yu\ 06 In 
the winter of the same year, while he was waiting for the 
order of retirement he borrowed a copy of the Meng-isu to 
study. He devoted himself to the section on "nourishing 
strong moving force” until he understood its meaning.ey 
Another source tells us that in his twenty-eighth year, 
when he had already retired from his official duties and 
was living alone in T’ung-an, for the period of about a 
whole year he read only ten chapters of the Lun-yiL
This very careful study of the Confucian Classics, 
and his positive involvement in his official duties, were 
the two practical routes through which Chu Hsi returned to 
the Confucian tradition. These two routes have in common 
the fact that both may be regarded as daily disciplines. 
But as will appear below, these daily disciplines were 
themselves seem to have a philosophical basis. While it is
true that in his first official post Chu Hsi returned to
the practice of Confucianism, it was only when he had 
clarified for himself the philosophical basis of that 
practice that he could be said to have adopted the 
tradition of northern Sung leo-Canficianisra. In other 
words, he had to reflect upon his practice in order to
reach its philosophical significance. This insight was to
be reached through further discussions with Li T'ung. This 
is the subject of the following section.
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3. The Philosophy of One and Many
Heia Hsin* s third category was the philosophy of "the 
oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of 
particulars" (.li-i fen-shu) which represents the 
conclusions Chu Hsi drew from reflecting on his experience 
of daily disciplines.
Chu Hsi’s first official post ended in the autumn of 
1156, when he was twenty-seven, While waiting for his 
successor’s arrival, he lived alone in T ’ung-an for nearly 
the whole of the next year. In the January of 1158, Chu 
Hsi was free to leave and far the next twenty years 
enjoyed the freedom of a sinecure. His first act was to 
visited Li T'ung again. Thereafter he visited Li T'ung 
several times until the death of the latter in 1163. Each 
time he did so he stayed for a few months to discuss new 
philosophical insights. Furthermore during those periods 
when he was not in direct contact with Li T' ung he 
continued to correspond with him. This correspondence was 
later collected by Chu Hsi into a book, called Yen-p* ing- 
ta-rven.
While Chu Hsi was carrying out the duties of his 
official post on the one hand, and studying the Confucian 
Classics on the other, he already regarded these two types 
of activity as similar kinds of moral discipline. The 
common element they shared was that both were related to 
daily life. His official duties could be regarded as the 
daily regimen of moral practice in the socio-political 
sphere, just as after his retirement there would be the 
daily regimen of moral practice in the family environment. 
As regards study, in the period under discussion, Chu Hsi 
concentrated on the Lun-yu and the both of which
are concerned primarily with practical and daily affairs 
rather than with abstract speculation. It was natural that 
a study of these works should lead to the attempt to find 
truth in daily life and to put it into practice there.
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This devotion to daily life was an extension of the 
orientation of Li T'ung, Li T’ung leading a hermit’s life, 
was able to dedicate himself completely to the practice of 
ordinary life, He was not a man of erudition, and limited 
himself to a few Confucian Classics including the Lun~yut 
the Meng-t&u, and the Tso-chuan, which are concerned 
mainly with concrete facts. He was "as plain as an old 
farmer, writing neither books nor essays. What was of
importance to him was to study the sayings of the sages in 
great detail and to actualise them in daily life. Another 
aspect of this tendency was his lack of interest in 
abstract thinking, This is why Li T’ung did not like his 
students to study such speculative works as the Cheng-meng 
[ Correcting Youthful Ignorancel of Chang Tsai and the
Chth-yen I Knowing Words3 of Hu Hung <1105?-1161). 30
From his discussion with Li T’ung we can see how Chu 
Hsi developed his philosophical foundation for moral 
practice. He used the phrase "the oneness of principle and 
the distinctiveness of particulars" ili-i fen-shu'). This
term was originally invented by Ch’eng I, and was 
elaborated considerably further by Chu Hsi. And, because 
this elaboration is in the direction of Immanent Vitalism, 
it therefore became the means through which Chu Hsi
adopted Northern Sung Neo-Confucian philosophy,
Chu Hsi made a clear exposition of this concept in a 
piece of correspondence preserved in the Yen-p* ing ta-wen. 
Concerning "the oneness of principle," he says:
All creatures come from the same source. All men,
animals, and plants possess this source as their
principle, This is the reason why they perfectly 
form one body with all other creatures, and they 
can continue their living breath. <Chu Hsi adds a
footnote: "The master comments here: 'You
mentioned only living creatures, but there are
also lifeless beings. *") This is Humanity. ■5I'1
It seems clear that by "principle" Chu Hsi means the
principle of life, and by "the oneness of principle" he is
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referring to ”a singular cosmic life-principle,” of which 
all the variety of creatures are 1 the distinctive 
particulars,” Even lifeless things, as suggested by Li 
T’ung’s comment, should be interpreted as latent lives and 
thus included into this living totality. At this point we 
should take notice of the relationship between the one and 
the many. Although each individual derives its particular 
life from the cosmic life-principle, it does not share the 
cosmic life as a part, but contains in itself the 
completeness of the life-principle, just as the tree bears 
seeds, and each seed contains, no less than the mother 
tree, the fullness of life.
It now becomes clear that in the concept of ’’the 
oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of 
particulars” Chu Hsi inherited the Immanent Vitalism of 
Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism. This concept was essential 
to discovering the crucial significance of the particular, 
and in Chu Hsi’s case it may explain the meaningfulness of 
the practical details of daily life. For instance, in the 
correspondence cited above, Chu Hsi went on to expound the 
significance of particulars. He says:
The concept of "the oneness of principle and the 
distinctiveness of particulars” justly describes 
the real nature of principle. . . . The universe
as a whole is no more than this principle, 
however, the universe contains all of the 
separate things and thus all of the differences. 
Turning to the numberless separate and interwoven 
things, enumerate any two tiny bits, and they 
manifest at one instant their sameness and their 
differences. This is ’’the oneness of principle 
and the distinctiveness of particulars.”^^
Thus for Chu Hsi, while the multifarious world is
regarded as the realization of the singular cosmic life- 
principle, the distinctiveness of each individual must at 
the same time be fully acknowledged, The whole and its
parts exist interdependently. Neither can claim its 
authenticity by obscuring the other.
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After the concept of "the oneness of principle and 
the distinctiveness of particulars*’ is formulated, 
morality may also be defined. According to Chu Hsi, 
awareness of this Immanent Vitalism is the beginning of 
morality. The knowledge that every individual thing 
possesses the same principle and forms one body with all 
others is the necessary condition for the practice of 
Humanity (Jen) . The knowledge that each thing remains 
particular, and is distinct from the others, is the 
necessary condition for the practice of Righteousness <i). 
Humanity and Righteousness are moral principles, but they 
are based on the understanding of Principle <Ii) and its 
particulars. £*3
4. The Political Practice
Hsia Hsin’s fourth category refers to Chu Hsi’s political 
ideas. Li T'ung was a typical Confucian hermit in that, 
being disillusioned with an age in which frank and upright 
men were rejected, he chose to live a poor and. a secluded 
life, without ever losing his concern for society and 
public morality.3^ In 1162, Hsiao-tsung <r. 1163-1189)
succeeded to the throne. Hsiao-tsung was ambitious to 
recover the territory lost to the Chin invaders, and so 
rehabilitated many officials banished in the previous 
regime. Chu Hsi approved of this new policy and submitted, 
in 1162 and 1163, two memorials to the throne, which he 
had composed in consultation with Li T'ung. These 
memorials, therefore, represented the political ideas of 
both thinkers. I shall consider only those ideas in them 
which related to their philosophy.
Both memorials contain three proposals: in both
cases, the first concerned the education of emperors; the 
second, the determination to retaliate against the Chin
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invaders and to recover the lost territory; and the third, 
the employment of upright and capable officials. The third 
set of proposals will not be discussed here, In the first 
set Chu Hsi says that despite Hsiao-tsung’s interest in 
literature and Ch'an, Confucianism alone should be the 
basis of the education of emperors, The essentials of 
Confucian learning are the Investigation of Things Ciro-wu) 
and the Extension of Knowledge (.ohih-chili) , According to 
Chu Hsi, it is through the practice of these that the 
ancient emperors obtained knowledge. Only thereby was the 
significance of the things of which they became aware 
perfectly illuminated, so that, of themselves, their wills 
became pure, their minds freed from error, and their 
management of affairs of the world became as easy as 
counting and as discriminating between black and white.33 
It is noteworthy that in the above argument Chu Hsi is 
applying his understanding of "the oneness of principle 
and the distinctiveness of particulars" to politics. The 
particulars here are concrete political affairs, which 
should be studied in order to discover the oneness of 
principle. And when by such investigation an understanding 
of both oneness and distinctiveness is attained, that is, 
when knowledge of correct moral behaviour is acquired, it 
then becomes easy both to cultivate personal morality and 
to settle political problems.
In the second set of proposals, the renunciation of 
peace with the Chin invaders, Chu Hsi emphasises once 
again that knowledge of px-inciple is the prerequisite of 
moral practice. He says that if an emperor understands the 
principle, he will do what he should and reject what he 
should not, magnanimously fallowing the natural course, 
without any selfish intentions and expectations, But how 
does knowledge of principle apply to the situation of 
avenging the Chin invaders? Chu Hsi quotes the I chlng- and 
the T* ai-ohi t*u shuo which say that the Way of Heaven is 
Yin and Yang, the Way of Earth is the Weak and the Strang,
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and the Way of Man is Humanity <Jen) and Righteousness 
(1). He points out that in Humanity nothing is more 
important than the attachment between father and son, and 
in Righteousness the relationship between sovereign and 
subjects. The attachment springing from these principles 
is the most real and universal. This proves the moral 
necessity of retaliation against Chin, who were guilty of 
capturing Hui-tsung <r, 1101-1125) and Ch'in-tsung (r.
1126), the last two emperors of the Northern Sung.~je
From the above description we know how Chu Hsi 
applied the concept of "the oneness of principle and the 
distinctiveness of particulars" to politics. It may be 
noted that Chu Hsi's reasoning in this period was from the 
"Investigation of Things" to the knowledge of both oneness 
and distinctiveness, and then application of that 
knowledge to moral practice. And with regard to morality, 
Chu Hsi was most concerned with those of the Essential 
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Hsia Hsin’s fifth category is Li T*ung’s method of 
IrIf-cultivation (hang—yang) ; his sixth and last category 
is meditation or "quiet sitting" iching-tBo) , These two 
doctrines influenced Chu Hsi only after the death of Li 
T’ung, and thus will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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C. CHU HSI* S CRITICISM OF ECLECTICISM
C1166)
1. The Relationship Between the Way and Concrete Things
We have seen that through his extension of the concept of 
"the oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of 
particulars” (li-i fen-shu) , Chu Hsi placed himself in the 
tradition of the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo- 
Confucianism. But, although this concept expresses the 
essential characteristics of Immanent Vitalism, it needed 
to be expressed in more general terms in order to satisfy 
the requirements of an all-embracing metaphysics, We find 
that after Chu Hsi accepted Northern Sung Neo- 
Confucianism, he often used a pair of general terms very 
common in the metaphysical tradition, namely, the pair: 
"the Way” (tao) and "Concrete Things" Coh’ti). It is with 
these two concepts that he consolidates his metaphysical 
position in the first period after his acceptance of Neo- 
Confucianism.
I shall now give a brief account of the metaphysical 
issues faced, and the solutions proposed, by Chu Hsi in 
this and his later periods. It may be noted that both the 
concept of "the oneness of principle and the 
distinctiveness of particulars" and the doctrine of "the 
Way and Concrete Things" are composed of pairs of 
contrasting terms. This binary structure would appear to 
originate from the fact that the basic problem of 
metaphysics, for Chu Hsi and for most other Chinese 
philosophers, concerned the relationship between the 
metaphysical and the empirical worlds. The term, "the 
oneness of principle," refers to the metaphysical 
foundation, while "the distinctiveness of particulars" 
refers to things in the empirical world, And since Chu Hsi
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maintains that the oneness of principle is the cosmic 
life-principle which creates and permeates the 
particulars, I shall call his metaphysics at this stage 
Immanent Vitalism. His doctrine of "the Way and Concrete 
Things" may be understood in a similar fashion. The Way, 
as the metaphysical foundation, only exists in, and is 
manifested by, Concrete Things, And since Chu Hsi regards 
the metaphysical and empirical worlds as identical, the 
Way should be regarded both as the totality and as the 
cause of the existence of the Concrete Things, while the 
existence of the Concrete Things is partial, and 
conditioned upon, the Way.
Beyond this point the development of Chu Hsi’s 
metaphysics goes through two further stages. In the first 
of these (from the age of forty to about sixty) , he 
inclined towards explaining the Way through the idea of 
"law," In the second, after the age of sixty, his 
metaphysics was developed to its final stage, in which the 
doctrine of "Principle (ii) and Material Force (cA'i)" 
replaced the doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things" as 
his central organising concept,
In the history of Chinese philosophy, Chu Hsi is 
famous for his doctrine of "Principle and Material Force." 
Although he did not devise these two terms, he was the 
first to use them conjointly, and in doing so he summed up 
the theories of his predecessors. Within the concept of 
Principle (li) (first used by the two Ch’engs and Chang 
Tsai), Chu Hsi included Chou Tun-i’s concept of "the
Ultimate of Mon-being and the Great Ultimate" (wu-chi erh 
t'ai-cAi), Chang Tsai’s concept of "the Great Void" (t'ai-
Ast/i) , and Shao Yung’s concept of "the Way," The concept
of Material Force (cA'i) is more traditional and had been 
widely used by Chang Tsai and the two Ch’engs; Chu Hsi
used it to include Yin and Yang, and the Five Agents.
However, Chu Hsi himself did not use these two 
concepts in this way until his sixties. Comparing his late
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metaphysics with those of the earlier two stages, we find 
that the concept of Principle may be identified with that 
of the Way, but the concept of Material Force has acquired 
a different import from that of Concrete Things. The 
concept of "Concrete Things" (eh'ii) is mainly one of 
empirical things, while the concept of "Material Force" 
Cch'i) refers to the material basis of Concrete Things. It 
seems natural, therefore, that his concept of "Material 
Force" should have grown out of the earlier concept of 
"Concrete Things." This distinction between Material Force 
and Concrete Things seems rarely to have been understood 
by contemporary scholars, but I believe to be of crucial 
importance for a proper understanding of the development 
of Chu Hsi’s metaphysics.
In this section my main concern will be Chu Hsi’s 
early doctrine of "the Way and Concrete Things." As Chu 
Hsi formulated this doctrine in the process of his 
renunciation of Ch'an, analysis of his position in this 
period requires an understanding of his criticism of the 
theories of contemporary Eclectics. We shall approach his 
critique by analysing the relationship between the Way and 
Concrete Things in the theories of a number of prominent 
Eclectics.
2. The Criticism of the Theory of Su Shih
At the age of thirty-seven Chu Hsi wrote his Tsa-hsiiah 
pien in which he criticised four Eclectics, whose theories 
were characterized by a conjunction of the Taoist or Ch’an 
conception of substance with the Confucian conception of 
function.
Chu Hsi’s first target is Su Shih*s I chieh [the 
Commentary on the Book of Changes] . The cosmology of Su 
Shih is a combination of the Lao-tzu and the I ching and
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so is an "Evolutionary Vitalism" according to my 
classification. His concept of the Way derives from the 
Lao-tsu, Although it is the primodial substance and the 
origin of the world, it is in itself absolutely mysterious 
and unknowable, This is evident from his commentary on 
the following text of the I c h i n g "The state of one Yin 
and one Yang is called the Way," According to Su Shih, 
"one Yin and one Yang" indicates the state wherein Yin and 
Yang, the two formative principles of the world, have not 
yet interacted. Hence it is a state of non-being. But he 
goes on to say that even such a state of one Yin and one 
Yang is merely "similar to” the Way, meaning that, 
strictly speaking, the Way is utterly beyond description 
or imagination, As for the process of creation, "the 
myriad things" are born as the result of the interaction 
of Yin and Yang. Of these the first is water which comes 
at the brim of non-being and being, the other categories 
of things then follow. After things have been created, Yin 
and Yang, the principles of creation, become 
imperceptible. Therefore, Yin and Yang may be said to
transcend things, as the Way itself transcends Yin and
Yang,Sn|5!
Criticising this theory, Chu Hsi argues that Yin and 
Yang have never existed in isolation; they have always 
been in constant interaction and circulation, and are
immanent in the things they create, Chu Hsi says further 
that, as Yin and Yang, the principles of creation, are 
immanent in things, so the Way as the cause of the 
interaction and circulation of Yin and Yang is also 
Immanent in those two principles, He even asserts that 
the Way is nothing other than the totality of this
interaction and circulation. This critique reveals clearly 
the immanent nature of Chu Hsi's metaphysics, In Chu Hsi’s 
system, Yin, Yang, and the myriad things fall under the 
concept of "the Concrete Things." Therefore, one and the 
same universe, when considered as a whole, is called "the
Way," while from the partial and individualised point of 
view, it is called "the Concrete Things. " From the 
standpoint of this Immanent Vitalism Chu Hsi attacked Su 
Shih for separating the Way from Yin and Yang merely on 
the grounds that he did not know what the Way was, and 
accused him of merely playing with the concepts of 
Hothingness and lirvana. 33
But what Chu Hsi is most concerned about is Su Shih's 
ethical theory, which is analogous to his metaphysics. Su 
Shih regards Mature (i.e. , Human lature, hsing) as the 
direct receptacle of the Way for Man, and therefore as 
equally mysterious and intangible as the Way itself,'100 As 
a consequence, he dismisses Mencius’s saying that "Mature 
is good" as superficial, because Mature will be lost after 
goodness is produced.101 Accordingly, in his view the 
position of goodness in the world will be as follows: 
"When goodness is established in this world, the Way is 
lost, just as after things have been created Yin and Yang 
are hidden.”10-3 Goodness is therefore not only worldly but 
also exists by sacrificing the Way. Su Shih’s theory is 
also evident from his interpretation of another text from 
the I ching:
The man of Humanity sees it (the Way) and calls 
it Humanity, the man of Wisdom sees it and calls 
it Wisdom, and the common people act according to 
it daily without knowing it,103
Su Shih reads this text to mean that a man looking into 
nothingness sees no more than the reflection of what he 
has in his own mind. Although the Way is in itself 
nothingness, the man of Humanity regards it as Humanity 
because of his own concern with Humanity, and the man of 
Wisdom regards it as Widom because of his own concern with 
Wisdom. Su Shih then goes on to say that since the wise 
have a vision of the Way obscured by their intentions, and 
since the' foolish know nothing of it, even though they act
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according to it everyday, eo very few can ever realise 
what the Way really is.10 -^ From Su Shih’s interpretation 
of this text, it seems clear that he is inclined to regard 
’’the good” in this world, that is to say, Humanity and 
Wisdom, as debased coinage in comparison with the Way, 
Consequently, his method of self-cultivation relies not on 
the practice of moral discipline, but on transcending 
morality. He expounds this idea in a complicated 
interpretation of yet another I ching text, ’’The way of 
ch'Ien is to change and to transform, so that everything 
will comply with its correct Nature and Destiny (ming')” 1 C,,B 
Su Shih explains this by saying that although things 
flourish under the influence of ’’the way of cA'iejj, ” 
nevertheless, their goal should be to return to the 
correctness of their Nature (i.e., their natural state) 
and further to that inexplicable origin of their Nature, 
namely, their Destiny,1os From this we can see that for Su 
Shih the goal is not morality, but the state before 
morality appears.
Chu Hsi, in his refutation of Su Shih, argues for the 
value of the good in this world. While Su Shih's negation 
of the good is based on his Evolutionary Vitalism, Chu 
Hsi’s affirmation is founded an his Immanent Vitalism. In 
Chu Hsi's view, goodness does not merely mean morality in 
the human world, it is itself also the life-principle of 
the universe. That is why he says that goodness is the 
process of ’’continuation” (.chi') of the Way, and that 
because things emerging from this process of continuation 
acquire goodness, they have latent within each of them the 
correctness of their Nature and Destiny, According to Chu 
Hsi, this continuation is the thread linking Heaven and 
Man, the hidden and the manifest. ‘ ^  The Way is thus 
present in Nature, so acting according to Nature may be 
looked upon as the manifestation of the Way. It is because 
of this continuation that the human ’’goods” - Humanity and 
Wisdom, which arise out of human Nature, cannot be the
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result of obscured vision. 10ES In addition to asserting the 
reality of the human ''goods,” Chu Hsi goes on to deny Su 
Shih’s claim that one must cultivate a "return to the 
mysterious Mature." Mature is immanent in every creature 
and is not mysterious. Since every creature is the 
manifestation of the Way, it contains the correctness of 
its Hature and Destiny within itself, and therefore 
preserves the great harmony. It follows therefore that 
there is no necessity, as Su Shih proposes, to strive for 
the goal of returning to lature. 'I09
3. The Criticism of the Theory of Su Ch*e
The second target of Chu Hsi's criticism is Su Ch'e’s Lao- 
tzu chleh C the Commentary on the Lao-t&ul . Su Ch’e’s 
thought also belonged to Evolutionary Vitalism, although 
he had a more positive attitude toward the World.
Su Ch’ e quotes from the I ching two sentences which 
he believes can exemplify the difference between Lao Tzu 
and Confucius. He regards the first sentence, "What exists 
before Physical Form [and is therefore without it] is 
called the Way," as the focus of Lao Tzu's teaching; and 
the second, "What exists after Physical Form [and 
therefore has it] is called a Concrete Thing," as 
expressing what Confucius is devoted to. According to Su 
Ch’e, these two schools represent different but valuable 
points of view. Confucius orders the world with such 
Concrete Things as Humanity, Righteousness, Ritual, and 
Music. He shows people Concrete Things but hides the Way 
from them, since mediocre men may still become Gentlemen 
by devoting their attention to Concrete Things without 
being confused by the Way. But Lao Tsu aiming at the Way 
was eager to enlighten their minds, and shows people the
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Way by despising Concrete Tilings, Thinking that the mere 
knowledge of Concrete Things makes the Way invisible, Lao 
Tzu expounds the Way by means of the rejection of the 
Confucian world of Concrete Things, '1'10
From this description, we see that by "Concrete 
Things" Su Ch1e means human morals and social norms, whose 
social value he fully acknowledges. This is an advance on 
Su Shih’s theory, which tends to negate them. However, Su 
Ch’e still divided the Way and Concrete Things into two 
levels, obviously placing greater value on the former, 
thinking the latter beneficial only to the worldly order. 
Su Ch’ e did, however, recognise the ideal of combining 
these two levels. He said that although there is only one 
Way, in order to govern the world other things are 
required, such as rites and laws, without which there 
would be disorder between sovereign and subordinates, and 
fathers and sons. He then distinguished two kinds of 
wisdom. Those scholars are worthless who, though they have 
a thorough knowledge of the rites and laws, yet know 
nothing of the Way, But those who lead the life of a 
recluse and have attained to the highest Way are also 
insufficient, because though capable of teaching Hen and 
Spirits, they would bring chaos to the world if assigned 
political duties. Su Ch'e concludes that only the ancient 
sages combined both kinds of wisdom, practising the Way 
within their minds while not destroying the worldly 
law. 1 1 '
Chu Hsi’s criticism of Su Ch’e’s separation of the 
Way and Concrete Things is similar to his criticism of Su 
Shih's separation of the Way and the good, and need not be 
repeated here in full. But Chu Hsi makes the point that Su 
Ch’e's manner of combining the two levels is incorrect. He 
says that although Su Ch* e proposes only one Way, in the 
differentiation between the highest Way and the worldly 
law, he has in fact advocated two ways. And because there
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are two ways, tlie Way is useless to the world, in so far 
as the world follows its own way, taking nothing from the 
Way. 'l 1
4. The Criticism of the Theory of Chang Chiu—ch9 eng
Chu Hsi’s third critical target in his Tsa-hsueh pien is 
the Chung-yung chi eh [the Commentary on the Doctrine of 
the Mea.nl by Chang Chiu-ch’eng, who was the outstanding 
representative of Eclecticism in the Southern Sung, just 
as the Su brothers had been in the Northern Sung. Chang 
Chiu-ch'eng studied both with Yang Shih and with Tsung- 
kao. The former was a disciple of Ch'eng I, while the
latter was a leading Ch'an master in the beginning of the 
Southern Sung. Chu Hsi accused Chang Chiu-ch'eng of being 
inclined to Buddhism and charged him with secretly 
smuggling Ch'an ideas into his Confucian exegesis, on the 
instructions of Tsung-kao.113 But it seems to me fairer to 
say that Chang Chiu-ch'eng owed a primary debt to the
Immanent Vitalism of lorthern Sung Neo-Confucianism, to 
which he tried to graft the Ch’an conception of Nature. 
This tendency is an indication of the strength of Ch'an in 
the early Southern Sung. Chang Chiu-ch'eng was, according 
to my classification, an Idealistic Vitalist. I shall 
analyse his ideas concerning the relationship between the 
Way and Concrete Things.
The Chung-yung opens with the words:
Heavenly Destiny is called Nature. To follow
Nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is
called Education. '■ 1 A-
Chang Chiu~ch’ eng interprets the first sentence as merely 
admiring the excellence of Nature before Man's 
participation in it. The second sentence, he says, refers
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to Man's awn experience of Mature and Mis entry thereby 
into the Way of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and 
Wisdom, before he has yet put the Way into practice. At 
this stage there is as yet no discrimination between 
fathers and sons, sovereign and subordinates, and so on.
The third sentence, in his view, indicates the final step,
in which Humanity functions in the relationship between 
fathers and sons, Righteousness between sovereign and 
subordinates, Propriety between hosts and guests, and 
Wisdom is practised by the virtuous. So it is not until 
the third stage that the distinctions of the Way 
emerge, -1 1 ®
Based on this text of the Chung~yungt Chang Chiu- 
ch’eng formulates three stages of development from Mature, 
through the Way, to Education. His Ch' an Idealism is
evident from his description of the first stage. For in
treating the term "Heavenly Destiny" as a mere epithet for 
the excellence of Mature, he is considering Mature as 
substance of the first order, and is rejecting the 
objectivity of Heaven. Though he is Confucianist in 
deriving the Way from Mature, and Education from the Way, 
yet even here the Ch’an influence can be detected in his 
devaluation of morality as mere expedient. It seems clear 
that for him Mature, which is amoral, is prior to the
moral principle, namely the Way, and to the Essential
Relationships ijen—lun) in the sphere of Education.
There is another passage in Chang Chiu-ch*eng’s work 
on the Chung~yung which demonstrates his linking of Ch’an 
and Confucianism. In contrast to Su Ch'e’s view that 
different disciplines are needed to satisfy the
requirements of the Way and of the worldly law, Chang 
Chiu-ch’eng proposes a single discipline containing 
different stages. According to Chang Chiu-ch’eng, Man
should initially approach his Mature through the
techniques of caution and apprehension, so that he may 
penetrate deep ' into the source of Mature and thus be at
one with his Heavenly Destiny. Thereafter he can move to 
the stage of benefiting the world by ordering the 
relationships between sovereign and subordinates, fathers 
and sons, brothers, and husbands and wives. At this point 
he is able to perform the functions of the sages. 1 1 In 
addition to this, Chang Chiu-ch*eng also believed that 
there was a mysterious connexion between substance and 
function. He maintained that the successful practice of 
"returning to Mature" would simultaneously produce moral 
effects. The singleness of this mystical discipline
appears in his interpretation of another Chung-yung text:
Love of learning is akin to Wisdom (chili). To
practise with vigour is akin to Humanity. To know 
shame is akin to Courage (yung) . ... There are
nine standards by which to administer the empire, 
its states, and the families. ‘ 1 ^
Chang Chiu-ch’eng says that in this text what is important 
is not the endeavour "to love learning," "to practise 
vigorously," or "to know shame," but the consciousness of 
the underlying real self performing these three kinds of 
activities. Through consciousness of the real self, one 
will naturally possess the virtues of Wisdom, Humanity, 
and Courage. It is the same he says with the nine
standards of socio-political activity. We do not have to 
make special effort to act in accordance with these nine 
standards; the acquisition of the virtues of Wisdom, 
Humanity, and Courage will by itself result automatically 
in their successful application.11e
Chang Chiu-ch'eng is Confucianist in advocating a 
single discipline of self-cultivation and in maintaining a 
direct connexion between substance and function, but in
both these aspects of his philosophy there remains an 
esoteric Ch’an element. In his critique Chu Hsi paints out 
the error of Chang Chiu-ch*eng’s connexion between 
substance and function. According to Chu Hsi, Chang Chiu- 
ch’ eng still separates Mature and Education when he says
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that after Man arrives at the source of Mature, at his 
Heavenly Destiny, he benefits the world by Educating 
people in the Essential Relationships, Chu Hsi remarks 
that by this saying Chang Chiu-ch*eng implies that until 
the sages arrive at their Mature there can be no Education 
in the Essential Relationships, and also that the sages do 
not arrive at their Mature through the means of the 
Essential Relationships, Chu Hsi concludes that this is 
Buddhistic nonsense rather than the Confucian truth,11^
5. The Criticism of the Theory of Lu Pen-chung
In the last part of the Tsa~hsiieh pien Chu Hsi refutes Lu 
Pen-chung’s <1084-1145) theory of the Investigation of 
Things (Iro-ivi?) . The relevant text in the Ta-hsueh reads: 
*'The Extension of Knowledge consists in the Investigation 
of Things. When things are investigated, knowledge is 
extended. *’ Lu Pen-chung, a Meo-Confucianist also 
influenced by Tsung-kao, interprets this passage in the
following manner. ** Knowledge** means a degree of 
enlightenment equal to that of the ancient Emperors Yao 
and Shun. When the principle of things is investigated, 
this enlightenment reveals itself in a sudden intuition, 
to which we yield wordlessly. '1^-0
Chu Hsi makes the criticism that the method of
Extending Knowledge and Investigating Things is for 
novices. It is a gradual practice in that investigating 
one thing merely results in one piece of knowledge. The
far-reaching penetration into the Principle can result 
only after a gradual accumulation of knowledge. Only then 
can a man be confident of his moral position, and then 
*'his Will will be Purified and his Mind Rectified’* <i-
ch'eng' hsin-chenff) . Given this fundamental Confucian 
principle of the gradual accumulation of knowledge, how is
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it possible, be asks, that while studying a single 
’’thing,** we may suddenly achieve enlightenment equivalent 
to that of Yao and Shun? This is the nonsense of Buddhism 
that ** a single hearing results in a thousand 
understandings,” and that ”a single jump leads directly to 
the substance."'13'1
Since the Investigation of Things is a Confucian 
method of learning, in the sense that the Way is only 
approachable through Concrete Things, it was necessary for 
Chu Hsi to isolate the Ch’an element involved in Lu Pen- 
chung's interpretation. In the above criticism, what Chu 
Hsi points out is that the Investigation of Things not 
only starts from Concrete Things, but also investigates 
them from both the objective and the moral points of view. 
The real connexion between the Way and Concrete Things can 
be established only in this way. And only with such a 
connexion may Concrete Things, including natural phenomena 
and human morals, be regarded as the manifestation of the 
V/ay.
From the above description of the basic ideas of 
Eclecticism and Chu Hsi*s criticism of them, it should be 
clear that Chu Hsi’s metaphysics in this period was a form 
of Immanent Vitalism, in which substance and function are 
directly connected. The Way, as substance, functions 
through the ’’Concrete Things.** Morality is conceived as 
the most important of these Concrete Things, and the Way 
can be achieved by no other means than through a life-long 
dedication to morality.
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUGGLE FOR A STEW METAPHYSICS
SUMMARY
This chapter presents Chu Hsi's philosophical 
development from the age of thirty-seven to forty-four 
<1166-1173), during which period he gradually abandoned 
the Immanent Vitalism of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, 
and eventually constructed the basic doctrines of his own 
metaphysics.
Chu Hsi’s so-called ’’old theory of Equilibrium and 
Harmony" [cluug'-lo chiu-shua] represents his philosophy in 
the years 1166 and 1167, when he attempted a subjective, 
introspective approach to the Vay. But this approach, 
still based on Immanent Vitalism, resulted in the neglect 
of the self and of self-cultivation. Therefore, in his 
fortieth year, after a year’s transition period, Chu Hsi 
propounded his "new theory" of Equilibrium and Harmony.
In this new theory, Chu Hsi claimed that Man as a 
conscious subject was not merely a function of the Vay as 
the cosmic life-principle, but also a microcosm of the Vay 
which possessed its own substance and function. Given this 
understanding of Man, the rationale is provided for moral 
self-cultivation,
In the following four years Chu Hsi engaged in two 
kinds of work. He applied the new substance-funetion <t'i- 
yung) pattern which he had developed for Man, as 
microcosm, to Heaven, as macrocosm. At the same time he 
also devised categories for the contents of substance and 
function, both with respect to Heaven and with respect to 
Man. His two most important conclusions are 1) that Heaven 
and Man are now seen to stand in a parallel relation, and 
2) that the idea of law takes precedence over the concept 
of life.
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A. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE WAY
(1164-1166)
1. The Influence of Li T1ung*s Method of Self-Cultivation
According to Hsia Hsin, the fifth category of Chu Hsi’s 
thought developed under the influence of Li T’ung is 
concerned with Inner Cultivation., and the sixth category 
with the technique of ’’quiet sitting" by which this 
cultivation is practised. These two categories evince the 
subjective approach to the conformity of substance and 
function, and I shall discuss them together, emphasising 
their philosophical significance. (By "subjective 
approach" I mean the method in which Man, regarding 
himself as a function of the cosmic life-principle (i.e., 
the substance, the Way), experiences the latter through 
some introspective cultivation, and thereby achieves a 
conformity between substance and function.)
But before discussing these two categories, we must 
examine Li T'ung’s inclination toward the subjective 
method. Although Chu Hsi followed Li T*ung’s advice to 
read the Confucian Classics and to pay attention to daily 
life, his approach originally differed from that of his 
teacher. Chu Hsi’s approach was abjective, regarding the 
Classics and daily life as of value in themselves. For Li 
T’ung the important thing was that these activities could 
lead to cultivation of the mind, and development of 
character within daily life. With regard to book study Li 
T ’ung was neither interested in speculative thinking, nor 
in broad reading, but was eager to follow the example of 
the sages as set out in the Classics. Li T’ ung, as is 
evident from his comments on the Lun-yii, reported in the 
Yen-p* ing" ta-wen, regarded the sayings and the actions of
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Confucius as niani festal Ions of a moral mind. The purpose 
of studying the Lun-yu is to so immerse oneself in its 
sayings that one will reach into the mind of the sage, 
Confucius, and to attain the wisdom he manifested. This 
approach is advantageous in coping with ever-changing 
problems within society, for it is not always right simply 
to stick to moral rules without considering the particular 
conditions of individual cases. The correct way of living, 
as is suggested by Li T'ung’s comments on the Lun-yu^ is 
neither to follow blindly the actions and words of the 
sage, nor to induce moral rules from them, but to raise 
one’s mind to the level of the sage’s. In such a state 
one’s heart will be magnanimous and one’s mind all- 
comprehensive, and one’s practical behaviour will become 
the manifestation of the moral principle, 133 In his letter 
to Chu Hsi, Li T ’ung referring to the sage's effect on 
human problems frequently uses such terms as Jung-shih, 
ping—chleh tung-shili (’’dissolution or disintegration like 
melting ice” > , and describes the manner of the sage in 
such terms as sa-lua, sa-Jan (’’casual but elegant”).'133 
What Li T* ung tries to convey is that by achieving the 
mind of the sage, which is the state of perfect conformity 
between substance and function, one can deal with the
affairs of the world correctly and fluently.'13"1-
ETow we return to those two categories defined by Hsia 
Hsin, namely, Inner Cultivation, and the technique of
"quiet sitting.” It seems correct to say that while Li
T’ung felt both the cultivation of the mind (substance) 
and the proper conduct of daily life (function) were 
important, he gave priority to the former. In addition to 
the cultivation of the mind through book study, Li T'ung 
strongly believed in the practice of meditative 
discipline,
Li T’ung was a disciple of Lo Ts’ung-yen (1072-1135), 
and since studying with him in his youth Li T’ ung had
devoted himself to self-cultivation through quiet sitting.
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The significance of this method was described by Chu Hsi 
in his informal biography of Li T'ung:
The master (Li T'ung) studied under Master Lo. 
Besides discussing and reciting the Confucian
Classics, he (Li T’ung) spent hours in the
practice of quiet sitting. His purpose was to 
search for Equilibrium (chung) by experiencing 
the spiritual state before the Feelings of 
pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused. He 
practised for such a long time that he truly
comprehended it (the state of Equilibrium) as the 
great foundation of the world. For, it is the 
source whence all the principles of the world 
flow out. Because he was able to reach the
source, he could take hold of all the matters 
flowing from that source, however complicated and 
changeable they were, and dissolve them 
gradually, and put them into order and harmony, 
as in a drainage basin each stream follows its 
natural course, All the matters in the world, 
from the magnificence of Heaven and Earth, to the 
minuteness of the birth and growth of creatures, 
from the implications of the sages’ scriptures, 
to the trifling affairs of daily life, all these 
matters, he could assess by the source, and grasp 
their proper measure. With this method he 
cultivated himself to a high level. His mind was 
purified and illuminated. He comprehended 
whatever he encountered, and responded to each 
matter with propriety, 1
Li T’ung's wisdom as described here is almost a copy, or 
better, a realisation, of the following principles from 
the Chung-yung\
The state before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, 
sorrow, and joy are aroused is called Equilibrium 
(chung) , When these Feelings are aroused and each 
and all attain due measure and degree, it is 
called Harmony (.ho') . Equilibrium is the great 
foundation of the world, and Harmony its 
universal path. When Equilibrium and Harmony are 
realised to the highest degree, Heaven and Earth 
will attain their proper order and all things 
will flourish. 1 ,3
Both passages deal with the conformity of substance 
and function. In the universe this conformity is natural,
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for the Way (which is the substance) manifests itself
without difficulty in the creatures of the universe (which 
are the function). Consequently no effort is needed, But 
in the human world, in order to guarantee this conformity, 
it is necessary either to cultivate the mind which is the 
realm of substance, so as to experience the original state 
of mind, or to exercise in the realm of function, so as to 
arrange properly the daily affairs. Li T’ung chose the 
former kind of practice through quiet sitting, in the hope 
of experiencing the original state of the mind. By such an 
experience the function in daily life will automatically 
be accomplished. It is needless to point out that such
conception springs from IGO-Confucian Immanent Vitalism, 
in which the Way as the cosmic 1ife-principle is already 
present in the mind of the individual.
The subjective approach to the conformity of 
substance and function on Li T ’ung’s part had little 
influence on Chu Hsi until after the death of the former. 
Li T’ung died in the winter of the year when Chu Hsi was 
thirty-four. The informal biography quoted above would 
have been written by Chu Hsi shortly thereafter. In my 
opinion the writing of this biography was the occasion for 
an assessment by Chu Hsi of the philosophy of his mentor,
through which he realised the importance of the subjective
approach. But whatever the effect on him of this 
assessment, there is evidence that he was beginning to 
become dissatisfied with objectively oriented approach 
which he had previously followed. This anxiety was 
expressed in a letter, written when he was thirty-seven, 
in which he recollected Li T’ung's advice that “if one 
experiences the original state of the mind by oneself, one 
can easily manage things and respond to affairs in proper 
measure.” He then went on to regret that at that time he 
had rather been greedy for theoretical discussion, and 
fond of interpreting the Classics. 1 ::s">v This letter was 
written during the period when Chu Hsi had adopted
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Immanent Vitalism, and was engaged in his critique of 
Eclecticism, and shows that he already recognised the need 
to find a subjective method of experiencing the Vay, over 
and above his theoretical approach to the conformity of 
the Vay and Concrete Things.
But Chu Hsi differed from Li Tf ung's in his 
understanding of the subjective experience of the Vay. 
Although Chu Hsi felt the importance of experiencing the 
"state of Mind before Feelings emerged," he felt that 
there was no practical way of separating the Mind from 
Feelings, just as in his metaphysics of that period, there 
was no theoretical means to separate the Vay from Concrete 
Things. Therefore Chu Hsi found difficulty in 
understanding what Li T ’ung really meant by "seeking for 
the Unaroused Equilibrium.” Consequently, he turned to the 
philosophy of the Hunan School, in order to solve the 
problem of the subjective approach to the Vay, and the 
theoretical problem of interpreting the concept of 
Unaroused Equilibrium.
2. The Reaction to the Method of Chang Chiu—chseng
From his thirty-seventh year Chu Hsi endeavoured to figure 
out the meaning of the "Unaroused Equilibrium" (.wei-fa 
chih chung') and the "Aroused Harmony" (i— fa. chih ho), a 
pair of terms in the Chung-yung, because their correct 
interpretation would result in the correct subjective 
approach to the Vay. But there seems to be another 
motivation underlying this endeavour: that is, through it
Chu Hsi intended to refute the subjective method proposed 
by Chang Chiu-ch’eng.
- Ve have seen that Chang Chiu-ch1 eng’s Chung-yung 
chi eh is based on a combination of Ch’an substance and 
Confucianist function. His method of approaching
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Equilibrium and Harmony is therefore based on the 
supposition that Mind is the ultimate substance.
Chang Chiu-ch'eng consequently regards the "caution 
and apprehension" t(chieh~sheng- k ! ung—chu) of mind as a 
necessary effort to achieve the Way. In interpreting the 
text: "Before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and
joy are aroused it is called Equilibrium," he says:
Before these Feelings are aroused, be cautious 
and apprehensive so that there is not a bit of 
selfish desire,
to which Chu Hsi adds the criticism:
Before they are aroused, there is only the 
Heavenly Principle <t'ien-Ji> complete and 
Intact. If there is caution and apprehension, 
then Feelings have already been aroused. 'I::2S
Elsewhere Chang Chiu-ch* eng says:
We cultivate pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy by 
means of caution and apprehension, making them 
Equilibrial and Harmonious, so that Heaven and 
Earth will be properly placed and all things will 
be cultivated.
Chu Hsi comments;
Before pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are 
aroused, there is natural Equlibrium, When these 
Feelings are aroused and attain due measure and 
degree, there is natural Harmony. They are not of 
our making. And it is according to Principle (li) 
that Heaven and Earth attain their proper order 
and all things flourish. His interpretation is 
not right, 1 33
And as to Chang’s saying that "The superior man with 
caution and apprehension slowly brews the ’ Way of the 
Mean,’" Chu Hsi criticised that:
The Way of the Mean is a Principle of Mature; it 
does not result from fermentation, like wine.130
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The reason that Chang Chiu-ch* eng adopts mental 
activities of caution and apprehension as his method is 
that he has an idealist view of ultimate substance. He 
believed that the application of this method could give 
full scope to substance and function, at all levels from 
the appropriate adjustment of the Feelings, to self- 
examination before the rise of Feelings, even to the 
proper ordering Df Heaven and Earth. Chu Hsi’s criticism 
is directed entirely against the Idealistic basis of this 
position, in so far as he says that Chang Chiu-ch* eng is 
making an sartificisil Equilibrium and Harmony, and has 
reversed the true direction of the Chung-yung\ For Chu 
Hsi, as an Immanent Vitalist, the universe has abjective 
reality, independent of our moral effort. Therefore the 
subjective approach to the Way should be an effort to 
reflect its objectivity, without, as is implied in Chang 
Chiu-ch’eng’s method, distorting it by subjective 
intention. To challenge Chang Chiu-ch’eng’s subjective 
approach, Chu Hsi had to discover the correct method to 
experience the Way, which he believed to be natural and 
abjective. He presents this method through his 
interpretation of the meaning of ’’Equilibrium" and 
’’Harmony. '*
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B. THE OLD THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM AMD HARMOMY
<1166-1167>
1. Hu Hung’ a Theory of Mature and. Mind
Corresponding to his subjective approach to the Way, Chu 
Hsi formulated a theory of Mind, which took shape during 
the period from the autumn of his thirty-seventh year to 
the summer of his thirty-eighth,'131 and which he was to 
abandon when he was forty. He himself called it ’’the old 
theory of Equilibrium and Harmony” C Chung-ho ohiu-shua] ,
Through pandering Li T’ung's teaching Chu Hsi 
discovered the importance of the subjective approach, but 
he made little use of Li T ’ung's methods whether oflnner- 
cultivation or of "quiet sitting.” This may have been 
because he thought that since the Way is the cosmic life- 
principle itself and is embodied in Concrete Things, it 
would not be appropriate to leave Concrete Things and to 
retreat to quiet sitting. But the method of Chang Chiu- 
ch' eng was, for him, still worse, for it proposed an 
artificial approach through caution and apprehension, and 
so tampered with the natural progression of the Way, It 
would appear that the only alternative open to Chu Hsi 
whould be a theory in which, the Mind, without any 
intention, can both reflect the natural progression of the 
universe, and be at one with the natural feelings arising 
from its own nature. It was precisely such a theory 
propounded by Hu Hung which came to have an important 
influence on Chu Hsi at this period of his life.
This influence was first felt through Chang Shih 
<1133—1180), whom Chu Hsi first met in the autumn of 1164, 
the year after the death of Li T’ung, at a critical moment 
in his transition to the subjective approach. Chang Shih,
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who had been a disciple of Hu Hung, discussed with Chu Hsi 
his understanding of philosophy, won Chu Hsi’s admiration 
and became a close and lifelong friend. 133 In the years to 
follow Chu Hsi kept in correspondence with Chang Shih and 
studied the works of Hu Hung, in the hope that the 
philosophy of Hu Hung would help him to understand the 
’’original state of the Hind," and consequently the 
teaching of Li T'ung.'33 "The old theory of Equilibrium 
and Harmony" which I shall discuss below grew out of this 
exercise and is preserved in a group of letters to Chang 
Shih written between the autumn of 1166 and the summer of 
1167. In order to grasp the gist of this theory it is 
helpful to look first at the philosophy of Hu Hung.
According to Hu Hung, the "subject" consists of 
Mature and Mind, enabling it to embrace, reflect, and 
dominate the objective world. He offers definitions of 
these two concepts, Mature and Mind, Mature is the 
principle of existence;
That which exists and cannot not exist, is what 
is meant by Mature!1
So he sees the Mature of the subject as simultaneously 
embracing the whole abjective world. Therefore he says:
All things are in Mature. The sage fully exerts 
his Mature, so that he neglects nothing.13S
Mind is the subjective faculty, but expresses itself in 
the objective world:
That which is living and which dominates things, 
is what is meant by Mind! 13e
Elsewhere Hu Hung states that the Mind possesses a mirror­
like reflectiveness like water, so his use of "dominate" 
must mean that in the act of reflecting the Mind masters 
external things according to their own nature,137
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But what of the moral life of the subject? Morality 
does not consist in adhering to one’s own subjectivity, 
but, because of the reflectiveness of Mind, it must rather 
consist in the knowledge and practice of the objective 
Way. He makes a distinction between things and the Way: 
things (including Man) are those which have finite form, 
and which will come to an end, but the Way, having no
finite form, is that which creates and is endless. '* 33
Obviously he is suggesting that the Way, as transcendent 
life-principle in which all created things find their
proper place, should be the abjective standard which the 
Mind of Man reflects in his moral practice. He also 
defines two virtues of Mind - Humanity (Jen) and Wisdom 
(.chih). When the Mind, in quietitude, learns the principle 
of all things, and is filled with joy, it is called
’’Humanity” ; when in activity the Mind responds to thing's 
as it should, this is called ” Wisdom, ”133 The latter 
virtue is difficult to attain, because it lies in knowing 
the contexts of things in the objective world: an
illumination of the relationship of particulars to the
whole. The Buddhists miss this point, so although they 
pacify their minds, their actions are often inappropriate. 
But Confucianists can both settle their minds and manage 
affairs properly, so that they have the capacity to 
participate in the creation of Heaven and Earth.140 Times
and situations are everchanging, but the man of Humanity
(embued also with Wisdom) , can both be in accord with the 
Way and successfully respond to the world.141
2. The Concepts of Mature and of Mind in the Old Theory
Mow we turn to Chu Hsi’s ’’old theory of Equilibrium and 
Harmony,” Literally, this theory was intended to interpret 
a pair of concepts, the "Unaroused Equilibrium” (wei-fa
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chih chung, literally, not-yet-aroused Equilibrium) and 
the "Aroused Harmony" <i-fa chih ho), whose locus 
classicus is the passage in the Chung-yung quoted earlier, 
and which I repeat here:
The state before the Feelings of pleasure, anger, 
sorrow, and joy are aroused is called 
Equilibrium. When these Feelings are aroused and
each and all attain due measure and degree, it is
called Harmony.
According to Li T ’ ung,. the attainment of the Unaroused 
Equilibrium is crucial to the correct understanding of the 
sayings of the sages, and to right behaviour on our part, 
therefore we should "seek for" it,1'*"’5 But for Chu Hsi this 
state is impassible to "seek," because in his view at that 
time the Mind was merely a constant flow of consciousness, 
just as in the objective world there was only a succession 
of Concrete Things. In this critical period through
consulting the philosophy of Hu Hung and Chang Shih, Chu
Hsi developed his "old theory of Equililbrium and 
Harmony. ” The main point of this theory is that there is a 
living force, of which the substance (the living force 
itself) is the Unaroused Equilibrium, and of which the 
function (the created concrete things) is the Aroused 
Harmony. The significance for Chu Hsi of this conception 
of the "living force" was that it provided him with a 
means of unifying substance and function, thereby allowing 
access to the Equilibrium through the Harmony. The 
formation of his '‘old theory” was the result of a 
combination of theorethical exploration and practical 
engagement. He appealed to his own experience of the inner 
life to serve as an exemplification of the living force, 
and of the unity of substance and function. He believed 
that if an enlightened understanding of such a unity was 
reached, then, the state of the Unaroused Equilibrium 
would be attained, to the great benefit of the moral life.
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The "old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony” is set 
out in four letters written to Chang Shih.1*1-3 The first 
two were written in the autumn of 1166 when Chu Hsi was 
thirty-seven. In the first letter, Chu Hsi says that from 
the moment of our birth to the moment of our death, we are 
busy responding, by some faculty of knowledge, to the 
affairs which incessantly throw themselves upon us. 
Therefore throughout our lives, our consciousness is in 
constant flux, Where can we find the Unaroused Equilibrium 
which is essential to our moral life? The answer lies in 
the fact that since we feel, perceive, and are aroused by, 
things without effort; there must be in us a ”wholeness” 
<hun-Jan ch'uan-t*i) which ceaselessly responds to the 
clamour of affairs. That ’’wholeness” is "the natural 
unfolding of Heavenly Destiny" it1 ien-ming liu-hsing) and 
of "the perennial living force” isheng-sheng pu-i chih 
chi'). The still substance of that "wholeness” is always 
still, even though the "wholeness" consists of a perpetual 
flux of emerging and submerging objects of consciousness, 
This substance is the Unaroused Equilibrium. This 
"wholeness" manifests itself in its interaction with the 
endless round of affairs, but it cannot be stopped by 
them. Therefore no selfish desire attaching- to some 
particular affair can completely block or extinguish it. 
Beneath such selfish desires the "wholeness” continues to 
exists and to put forth new sprouts of moral 
consciousness, Moral effort consists in finding and 
cultivating these sprouts of moral consciousness, through 
which the original "wholeness" may be recovered, 14,4
The second letter immediately followed the first. In 
it Chu Hsi attempted to define Mind and Mature in terms of 
these new concepts. The outline of the letter is as 
follows. The whole world is nothing but a single unified 
living force, which is ceaselessly issuing forth and 
manifesting itself in Concrete Things. In this living 
force, Mind ihsin) is the Aroused (manifestation,
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function) ( and Mature ihsing-') is the Unaroused (living 
force in itself, substance), That is why Mind and Mature 
contain everything. Mind and Mature da not refer to
particular things restricted to certain times and places, 
but to the complete and endless ’'wholeness1' which is
revealed in daily life, and sweeps along like the flow of 
a river and the evolution of heaven. Therefore there is 
not the least gap between substance and function, 
subtleness and crudeness, quietude and activity, and root 
and tips, 1
In the autumn of his thirty-seventh year, perhaps 
immediately after the second letter, Chu Hsi composed two 
poems to express his understanding of Mature and Mind, and
of how they related to daily life,'1 The first is
concerned with a pond, and may be paraphrased as follows. 
A small pond is as open as a mirror, in which one can see 
reflected the brightness of heaven, and the shadows of 
wandering clouds, Why is the pond so clear? Because it 
contains not dead water but a living spring. The second 
poem is a description of a river. It says that last night 
the spring flood inundated the river, and the great 
stranded ships now float and drift light as feathers. 
Those ships had been difficult to move even by dragging 
and pushing, but now they glide freely out in mid-river. 
In these two poems the spring and the flood are the
metaphors of the living force, of which the substance is 
Mature, and the function (reflecting and responding to 
external things) is Mind, The other images are the
metaphors of daily affairs. These two poems evoke Chu 
Hsi’s ideal of the living force. The first poem focuses on 
the capacity of Mind to reflect the objective world, the 
second on its capacity to carry out daily affairs 
effortlessly. Both poems make it clear that this capacity 
is rooted in the living force.
In the third letter Chu Hsi attempted to give an even
greater role to the living force. This opinion was
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reinforced by Chang Shih's reply to Chu Hsi’s first 
letter. Chang Shih pointed out that, in his first letter, 
Chu Hsi had failed to unify substance and function 
completely. I suggest that Chang Shih. meant that Chu Hsi’s 
concept of ’’wholeness” was inadquate for this purpose, 
because his usuage of the term ’’wholeness” implied a 
reference to existing entities, for which substance and 
function are two aspects. My interpretation is based on 
the fact that, in the third letter, Chu Hsi avoids the 
term ’’wholeness,” rather he offers an example of a small 
period of the living force, in which substance and 
function are unifiable. In this letter he says:
In a flash of thought there is contained 
substance and function. The Aroused passes by and 
the Hot-yet-aroused is coming forward. There is 
no interval separating them. . . . The word "not- 
yet” expresses life. There is no stopping, even 
in a breath. Because there is the ceaselessly
coming forward, there is the Iot-yet~aroused.1^
In these sentences Mature or substance is regarded as the 
living force, and function as that which it creates. The 
unity of substance and function consists here in all 
thoughts of Mind being the created crystallizations of the 
living force.
The most characteristic feature of the above
quotation is the emphasis on the term ”yet.” The Chinese
word wei literally means ”not-yet,” but in the earlier
letters Chu Hsi had not exploited the potential of this 
”yet, ” In this letter, Chu Hsi’s notice of this word 
reflects the fact that he now defines ’’substance” directly 
and emphatically as the living force, without the 
intervention of the concept of ’’wholeness.” This substance 
is regarded not only as existing in the created, but also 
as the creating force itself, It is the Mot-yet-aroused 
which must unceasingly issue forth.
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At the age of forty-seven, when Chu Hsi had already 
abandoned his "old theory" for some time, he read the 
following passage in the Lieh-tziv,
In the stream of life <sheng'') , the created things 
(suo-sheng—che, literally, that which is born) 
are dead, but the creating force (sheng—sheng- 
che, literally, that which gives birth to the 
living) will never come to an end. In the 
concrete world (.hslngt literally, forms) , the 
particular things (.suo-hsing~~chet literally, the 
formed) are materialised, but the particularizing 
principle (hsing-hsing'-che, literally, that which 
forms the forms) never has existence.
To this passage he adds the note that this creating force, 
or particularizing principle, corresponds with his earlier 
understanding of the Hot-yet-aroused. 1 In his note, the 
Hot-yet-aroused is treated exclusively as the creating 
force, which is yet to come, and will bring out all new 
things. This incidentally shows that the "old theory" had 
been fully developed in the third letter.
But when the "old theory" had reached its full 
development, its deficiency was also revealed. In the 
fourth letter, although his ideas remained generally 
unaltered, he managed to make up the deficiency in a way 
which would, a year and a half later, lead him to forsake 
the old theory.
The fourth letter was probably written in the summer 
of 1167 when he was thirty-eight, just before he was 
leaving for T ’anchou (in Hunan province) to visit Chang 
Shih.‘^  In it he pointed out the difficulty in the "old 
theory"; the problem did not consist in theory itself, but 
in practice. The theory left no room for self-cultivation. 
In adopting this theory, he says, his daily life took on 
the form of a scene in a deluge or tidal wave gushing 
forth from the great living source. In daily life he felt 
himself driven along by the great force, caught up in the 
furious waves, without possibility of respite. In his
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response to daily affairs, he found himself becoming more 
brutal and crude, but totally lacking in magnanimity and 
graciousness. Chu Hsi suggests that this fault was a 
result of his failure to grasp the importance of the 
phrase "actualise Equilibrium and Harmony" (chih-chung—ho') 
in the Chung'-yung. "Actualise" refers to an act of self-
cultivation on the part of the self as subject. By 
emphasising the importance of this cultivation, Chu Hsi 
gradually became aware that the individual subject should 
occupy an independent place in the cosmic living force. 
The former view of Mind as a group of thoughts in the flux 
of the living force came to appear inadquate. Chu Hsi then 
concludes that there should be a sanctuary <that is, the 
Mind itself) for each person in the constant flux of the 
great force. It is where the subject rests itself, 
acknowledges Heavenly Destiny, and achieves a mastery over 
consciousness, It is the essential point where the great 
foundation is established and the starting point of the 
great journey. Only here may we find the unity of 
substance and function, of the hidden and the manifest,'11*0 
The significance of the fourth letter consists in the 
discovery of the subject. With it the "old theory" is 
completed, but at the same time it is about to be 
superceded. While Chu Hsi was under the tutelage of Li 
T ’ung, he began to pay attention to the Confucian Classics 
and to daily affairs, and looked on them as part of the 
sphere of moral practice. He began to develop the "old 
theory," which was a subjective approach to the 
metaphysical foundation of moral practice, after the death 
of Li T ’ung. In his "old theory" Chu Hsi was deeply 
influenced by Hu Hung and Chang Shih, whose view regarded 
Mind as an agent reflecting the Way, or more concertely, 
as knowing and responding to the objective context of the 
world. Though accepting their philosophy, Chu Hsi differed 
slightly from them in that he emphasised the "living 
force" in which he searched for the foundation of moral
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practice. Chu Hsi tried to immersing himself in the Way, 
that is, the living force. The result, however, turned out 
in effect to be a cancellation of one’s subjectivity, for 
one would feel oneself carried away by the great flood of 
the living force. Therefore, one may say that the
subjective approach to the Way resulted in the sacrifice 
of the subject, But at this moment Chu Hsi' s original
motive of searching for a foundation for moral practice 
asserted Itself again. The result was that at the 
culmination of the ’’old theory,” in the third letter, Chu 
Hsi still was not completely satisfied. The moral ideal of 
magnanimity and graciousness, found in the Confucian
sages, could not be achieved through submerging oneself in
the movement of the living force, Therefore, in the fourth
letter, Chu Hsi affirmed the subjective endeavour, and
proposed the importance of Mind. In the third letter, the 
unity of substance and function was exemplified in a 
"flash of thought,” but in the fourth letter it was rather 
to be found in the Mind as such. This insistence on the
role of the Mind reflected Chu Hsi’s awareness of the
importance of Man as subject, Chu Hsi had discovered that 
the commitment to moral practice required that Man should 
regard his own subjectivity as a unity of substance and 
function, rather than merely as a reflection of the cosmic 
living force.
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C, SELF-CULT I VAT ION BY MEANS OF EXAMINING THE SUBSTANCE
<1168)
In August of 1167* Chu Hsi, at the age of thirty- 
eight, visited Chang Shih at T’anchou. He stayed for three 
months, and returned home at the end of that year, the 
journeys there and back taking one month each.1S1
One of the reasons for this visit was to discuss the 
difficulty with regard to moral cultivation which he 
encountered in the philosophy of Hu Hung and Chang Shih. 
As a result of this meeting they reached a compromise. 
Chang Shih, while confirming that substance is the living 
force itself, painted out its implied moral character, and 
Chu Hsi emphasised the necessity of subjective effort. 
Based on their common understanding, they proposed a 
method called self-cultivation by Examination (ch 'ashih') 
of Substance, Chu Hsi held to this new theory and practice 
for about a year until the spring of 1169, when he 
developed a "new theory” of Mind. This position, work out 
with Chang Shih, is therefore significant as a transional 
link between his old and new theories.
In the "old theory,” Mature, the substance, was 
regarded as the living force itself, But there was always 
the problem of its moral character, Chu Hsi was more 
inclined to regard Nature as moral, while Hu Hung tended 
to view it as supra-moral. In his first letter setting out 
the ”old theory,” Chu Hsi described the function of the 
living force in contrast to the selfish attachment to 
particulars as ”the burgeoning of conscience.” And in the 
second letter, when he described the living force itself 
as Nature, he revealed his suspicion of the opinion of Hu 
Hung and Chang Shih that Nature cannot be defined either 
as good or as svil. 1 s::s
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The main achievement of his meeting with Chang Shih 
was in the clarification of the moral implication of the 
substance. Substance in itself should be regarded as 
supra-moral. In the poem he composed for Chang Shih on his 
departure, Chu Hsi describes the Great Ultimate 
(substance) as an invisible mystery, revealing itself only 
in the response to daily affairs. The Great Ultimate is 
therefore the starting paint for the multifarious world, 
and the common fountain of virtue for the thousand sages. 
In its function it reaches the farthest places, yet as 
source it is the purest and therefore the simplest.'1**3 In 
this description, the substance is the great living force 
which is supra-moral. But this great living force is also 
the source of morality from the point of view of Man. This 
conception can be found in another piece of literature, At 
about that time Chang Shih wrote a piece, called Gen-cAai 
wing- ["the Gen-chai Inscription”3, which was praised by 
Chu Hsi and adapted by him as an aid to self- 
cultivation, 'IS4- It begins with the following words: "The
Mind of Heaven is pure, and contains the fullness of 
morality. " The concept "the Mind of Heaven” must not be 
identified with the concept of God, for the Heo- 
Confucianists were never theists, It refers, rather, to 
the constant and creative living force, which is regarded 
and received, by its creatures, as a benevolent force. In 
this sense, though the living force remains supra-moral in 
itself, it appears as "containing the fullness of 
morality” from the point of view of creatures. The method 
of self-cultivation consists in recognizing and developing 
the moral revelation of this substance.
The following is an outline of the ideas in Chang 
Shih* s Inscription. The Mind of Heaven is the highest good 
and the fountain of the multifarious world. Since it 
already exists within myself, I should not seek for it 
externally. Rather, in the course of responding to daily 
affairs I should simply Examine the four moral Feelings
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through, which it is revealed.133 I should not only examine 
those Feelings, but also encourage their growth in the 
context of my daily life. If such practical application 
is diligently performed, ray Mind, which is the same as the 
Mind of Heaven will be illuminated. This process is not 
one of acquisition of external things, but a natural 
growth like that which takes place in the spring. Since 
knowledge of these moral Feelings is so important, all 
moral cultivation must start from it. I must be alert at 
every moment, in order to maintain this moral knowledge. 
With such cultivation, the affairs of my daily life, 
though manifold and diverse, will all follow their due 
order. This order is none other than the reality of my 
Mature. 1 3,3
Chu Hsi recommended the method suggested in the "Gen- 
chai Inscription” to his friends. In other letters he 
wrote in this period we also find descriptions of the 
method of Examining Substance:
Only when one devotes oneself to moral 
cultivation, can one find in the course of 
walking, staying, sitting and lying, ”the minute 
revelation of substance;” this is what one should 
hold fast to and preserve to the utmost. Only 
then may one really possess the substance. '13'7'
In daily life, inspect the ceaseless unfolding of 
the substance: this is how to start moral
cultivation.13e
This method of Examining Substance is coherent with 
Immanent Vitalism, and also does justice to Chu Hsi’s 
emphasis upon moral cultivation by the subject. Although 
the method advocates adhering to the natural expression of 
the living force, to follow it as a constant discipline 
implies that Man occupies a distinctive moral position in 
the universe. This must have played same part in 
influencing Chu Hsi to accept Chang Shih*s basic ideas of 
Examining Substance. It should, however, be noted that
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where Chang Shih stresses the achievement of an 
"enlightened" understanding of the substance, for Chu Hsi 
the importance lies in the moral effort which this method 
demands. For example, in a letter to Chang Shih believed 
to be of this period, Chu Hsi said:
Feelings are rooted in Mature and are controlled 
by Mind. While Mind is in control, the activity 
of the Feelings follows in due course, and there 
will be nothing like selfish desires. Only those 
Feelings which operate on their own without the 
supervision of Mind easily cross over into 
selfish desires, ,,S9
In this paragraph Chu Hsi points out the danger of the
natural expression of Feelings without the control of
Mind,
In another letter to Chang Shih, in contrast to the
opinion of the latter that the selfish Human Mind (Jen-
hsiny may itself become the Moral Mind (tao-hsin) when it 
is enlightened, Chu Hsi suggests that there must be an 
effort "always to be doing something" to reach the Moral 
Mind, This effort refers to the effort of the Mind to 
cultivate itself and to develop its knowledge of 
substance. He says that since effort is involved, the 
process is not natural and and takes place at the level of 
the Human Mind, but that it is nevertheless the only way 
to approach the Moral Mind. (SO It may therefore be 
concluded that for Chu Hsi, the method of Examining 
Substance involves subjective endeavour rather than a mere 
enlightened understanding of substance.
Chu Hsi’s emphasis on moral effort was to be 
developed even further under the concept of Attentiveness 
(ching) , which eventually was to replace the idea of 
Examining Substance in the method of moral discipline. In 
a letter to another friend written at about this time, he 
says that the importance of Examining Substance lies in
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its ability to improve the quality of the practice of 
Attentiveness,
From the above, it may be concluded that the method 
of Examining Substance is a combination of the supra-moral 
living force and the subjective moral effort, and that Chu 
Hsi was primarily influenced by the latter in his adoption 
of this method. In the fallowing sections we shall see 
that he continued to affirm the importance of the subject, 
and indeed the discipline of Attentiveness, until he 
realised that some modification of Immanent Vitalism, his 
metaphysical foundation of moral cultivation, was 
necessary.
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D. THE SEW THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM ASH HARMGMY
(1169)
1. A Hew Explanation of bhe Aroused and the Unaroused
In the Spring of 1169, when Chu Hsi was forty, he revised 
his explanation of the Unaroused Equilibrium and the 
Aroused Harmony of the Chung-yung. According to his own 
account, his friends had difficulty in understanding the 
"old theory." In the Spring of that year, while he was 
explaining it to his friend Ts*ai Chi-t'ung, he was 
overcome by the doubt that his entire understanding might 
be wrong. He felt that this distinction between the 
Aroused and the Unaroused which was an authoritative 
statement from the Classic ought not, if properly 
understood, to be so difficult and obscure. He confessed 
that he then reread the relevant interpretations made by 
Ch’eng I, which helped him to resolve his doubts, and to 
understand the reality of Man and the secrets of the 
Sages, 1 e:;-
This new understanding was incorporated in his essay 
" I-fa wei-fa. shud' ["An Explanation on the Aroused and the 
Unaroused"], which he wrote the same year. In it Chu Hsi 
says;
As to the meaning of the Unaroused and the 
Aroused in the Chung-yung, I used to be content 
with the explanation that Mind is the Aroused and 
Mature is the Unaroused, for I had recognized the 
"flawing substance of Mind" (i.e., Mature), and 
in addition Master Ch'eng had said that Mind 
signifies the Aroused. But recently I have found 
inconsistencies in many of Master Ch1eng1s works. 
After careful consideration, I realised that in 
my earlier explanation, although the reality of 
Mind and Mature was apprehended correctly, the 
denomination of the Unaroused and the Aroused was 
inappropriate, and that no provision was made for 
the fundamental techniques of self“cultivation in
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daily life. This lack, I realised, was not merely 
a matter of textual exegesis.,,,
The state of unaroused pleasure, anger, sorrow, 
and joy, refers to the time before there is any 
sign of thought and deliberation, and also before 
the encounter with external things. At that time, 
it is the state of absolute quiet and inactivity 
in the constant flux of the substance of the 
Mind. In it the Mature which is endowed by Heaven 
is completely manifest. Because this state is 
neither excessive nor insufficient, neither 
unbalanced nor one-sided, it is called 
Equilibrium. nevertheless, because this
Equilibrium is seen in the flux of the substance 
of the Mindt we cannot simply call it lature.163
To summarise, in the "old theory," Chu Hsi ascribes the 
Unaroused Equilibrium to Mature (regarded as substance), 
and the Aroused Harmony to Mind (regarded as function), 
but in the "new theory" he associates Equilibrium and 
Harmony with the tranquil and active states of Mind 
respectively.
In the development of bath the old and the new 
theories, Chu Hsi claims to have found support in the 
sayings of Ch'eng I. In my opinion this is because Ch*eng 
I himself was ambivalent with regard to the concept of 
Mind. Chu Hsi ’ s "old theory" received some support from
some of Ch’eng I’s sayings in which Mature and Mind are
identified. For instance, Ch'eng I says:
Mencius said, "He who exerts his Mind to the
utmost knows his Mature." Mind is Mature. That 
which is in Heaven is called Destiny. That which 
is in Man is called Mature. And in the sense of 
being the master it is called Mind. In reality 
they are [different names of] one Way,‘ie^e
The origin of Mature is called Destiny. The 
naturalness of Mature is called Heaven. The
concrete aspect of Mature is called Mind. And the
active aspect of Mature is called Feelings. All 
of them are one. 'l e£,!B
Therefore for him Mind is the aspect of Mature from the 
concrete point of view, and is thus related to the latter
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as the physical to the metaphysical. Chu Hsi’s conclusion 
in his "old theory" that Mind and Mature should be 
designated the Aroused and the Unaroused respectively, 
could easily have been directly influenced by these views.
On the other hand, in the process of establishing his "new
theory," Chu Hsi also could find support from some other 
sayings of Ch'eng I, to the effect that the Mind has an 
Unaroused state in the temporal sense. For instance, 
Ch'eng I says:
Someone said: Before the Feelings of pleasure,
anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, would you 
call it active or quiet? He said: You could call
it quiet, but you must allow that there is 
something in the quietness.'* &"<s
The Mind is originally good. As it gets aroused
and expresses itself in thoughts and ideas, there
is good and evil. When the Mind has been aroused, 
it should be called Feelings, and can no longer 
be called Mind. ■|S”/
It should be noted that in the first saying, Ch’eng I is 
reluctant to admit that there is a temporal quietness, and 
in the second saying, the originally good Mind (which is 
unaroused) may only have metaphorical meaning. However, it 
makes sense of these sayings to maintain that there is a 
state of the Mind before Feelings are aroused. It was from 
such an interpretation that Chu Hsi developed his new 
theory. But why did Chu Hsi choose to bring out this view 
which at best is only implicit in Ch’eng I’s thought? In 
my opinion the reason lies in the fact that Chu Hsi was 
more concerned than Ch* eng I with the problems of Mind, 
the subject, and moral practice.
2. Moral Practice Based on the Mew Theory
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Perhaps the most important reason for this theoretical 
revision was the need to find a satisfactory method of 
moral cultivation. The formulation of Chu Hsi * s whole 
philosophy, like that of all other Meo-Confucianists, was 
based on his understanding of the Confucian Classics. But 
his interpretation of the Classics in turn depended an the 
moral image he had of the Confucian sages. Chu Hsi was not 
satisfied with his "old theory," because it could not 
sustain a moral regime through which one might develop the 
traits of magnanimity and graciousness. He therefore 
combined it with the method of Examining Substance, 
thinking that the latter put more weight on subjective 
moral practice. But before long Chu Hsi found that that 
method was effective only in encountering external affairs 
(when the "sprouts" of substance first emerge). One is 
then led to be concerned merely about external activity, 
and in consequence Inner Cultivation (han-yangy will be 
lacking, and one will lose _ the qualities of depth and 
purity. When expressing oneself in conversation and in 
affairs, one will always be hurried and superficial, 
without "the air of the ancient s a g e s e?,a It may 
therefore be concluded that Chu Hsi's image of the sages 
was the motive force towards the formulation of a new 
theory, which might provide the foundation for an adequate 
method of moral cultivation.
In the "new theory," since the Unaroused is regarded 
as the tranquil state of Mind, the Aroused has to be the 
active state of Mind, The Mind is therefore regarded as in 
alternating between the state of tranquility and activity, 
depending on whether it is left to itself or is responding 
to external affairs, The most important consequence of 
this theory is that it enhances the necessity for Inner 
Cultivation. Since the Unaroused is the state of Mind 
before interacting with external affairs, there should be 
a moral discipline corresponding to this state. The 
relevant practice then is Inner Cultivation, aiming at the
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state of Equilibrium. The deficiency of the Substance- 
Examining method, which starts from the interaction with 
the external world and encourages haste and 
superficiality, may therefore be avoided.
But the discipline which the "new theory" suggests is 
more than a set of practices suitable for the tranquil
period of Mind. It aims rather at establishing a 
completely new method called Attentiveness (ching'), which 
is applicable to both states of Mind, and is intended to 
replace the method of Examination of Substance. Chu Hsi 
says in the " Yi~fa wei-fa shud':
The Unaroused Equilibrium is the natural state of 
substance, and does not need to be sought. In 
that state the only effort required is
Attentiveness which will preserve (or contain, 
ts'un) that atmosphere. If this is done, the
Aroused starting from there will certainly attain 
due measure and degree. Therefore, this is the 
essential task in everyday life, As to [Master 
Ch’eng’si saying, "Examine the Aroused," he meant 
by that to examine the activity of the sprouts of 
substance and to extend them. Far if they don’t 
attain due measure and degree, the original
Mature cannot remain, and the Way of Mind will 
almost be extinguished. Therefore Master Ch'eng 
always described that effort as "Attentiveness 
without negligence," 1
Thus Attentiveness becomes the only method. If, through 
Attentiveness, Equilibrium is preserved, the Aroused will 
achieved Harmony naturally. Although the discipline of 
Examination is not abolished, it is reinterpreted as 
constant Attentiveness during the period of the Aroused.
3. A Hew View of Mature and Mind
The "new theory" in the beginning was intended only as a 
redefinition of the Unaroused and the Aroused in order to
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provide the framework for a more concrete and 
comprehensive method of moral cultivation. But while 
trying to clarify his understanding Chu Hsi gradually 
changed his conception of the Mind,
From this period we have three documents written by 
Chu Hsi in close succession, which supply important 
evidence for these changes in his thought. These documents 
in the order in which they were written are 1) " I-fa wei- 
fa. shuOf ” 2) " Yu Hunan chu-Hung lun chung— ho t i -  i shu"
["The First Letter to the Hunan Gentlemen on Equilibrium 
and Harmony"], 3) " Ta Chang Ch* in-fu" ["Reply to Chang
Ch’in—fu"]. By examining the slight differences exi st i ng 
between these three documents, we find that Chu Hsi 
attempted to show the independence of "Man as subject" 
from the constant flux of the cosmic living force. As a 
result, in his "new theory," Man as subject is no longer 
regarded merely as reflection of the living force alone, 
but as containing substance and function in his own right. 
The construction of a metaphysical basis for morality, 
which began with the philosophy of Chou Tun-i, reached its 
conclusion only with this proposal,
Chu Hsi1s descriptions of the state of the Unaroused 
differ slightly between these three documents. The 
following passages are taken in order from each of the 
documents respectively,
(!) At this time, it (the Unaroused) is a state 
of absolute quiet and inactivity in the constant 
flux of the substance of the Mind. In it the 
Mature which is endowed by Heaven is completely 
manifest.
(2) At this time, it (the Unaroused) is the 
absolutely quiet and inactive substance of the 
Mind, In it the Mature which is endowed by Heaven 
is completely manifest as substance.171
(3) In the tranquility of the Mind, things have 
not entered and thinking has not begun, yet in it 
is present the whole of undivided Mature, 
containing the totality of moral principles.'1'^"
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In the first document, the concepts of Mature and of Mind 
remain the same as in the "old theory." Therefore in it 
the substance of Mind is the underlying "constant flux", 
and Mind is the totality of function. The difference 
merely consists in the ascription of the Unaroused 
Equilibrium and the Aroused Harmony to the two states of 
Mind. However, in the second document, Chu Hsi no longer 
speaks of the substance of Mind as "constant flux", on the 
contrary, he described it as "absolutely quiet and 
inactive." This change, in my opinion, has no ontological 
significance. Chu Hsi never denied that the universe is 
constituted by a creative living force and is in constant 
flux. The point is that, in the first document, the 
"substance” of Mind is the same as that of the universe, 
but in the second, it is indifferent to the "substance" of 
the universe. The substance and function of Mind have 
become independent of the universal flux and are related 
to Man alone. There is still a connexion between Man and 
the universe. But the connecting point is the "Mature 
which is endowed by Heaven;" it is no longer the substance 
of Mind. The advantage of this independence in terms of 
moral cultivation is that the Mind now wins a position of 
self-determination. It is no longer subordinate to the 
universe, no longer a stream of thoughts reflecting the 
constant cosmic flux. The sentence "in it the Mature which 
is endowed by Heaven is completely manifest as substance" 
indicates that the "substance of Mind" and Mature are no 
longer the same thing, as they were in the "old theory," 
Although Mature is the endowment of Heaven, the Mind is 
self-determining, and so has the capacity to possess 
Mature. The Mind in tranquility expresses its own 
substance, which naturally possesses the Heavenly Mature, 
and can Contain (or preserve, ts'uc) it with the practice 
of Attentiveness, In other words, in the sphere of Man, 
Mind can play a positive role in nourishing its own
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metaphysical ground. Provided with this ground, Man can 
claimed himself as an independent subject in the universe. 
This is the contribution of the "new theory" to
metaphysics.
Mow we turn to the third document. What is
characteristic of Chu Hsi's formulation there is the idea 
that in the tranquility of the Mind "the totality of moral 
principles” is embodied within "undivided Mature." I think 
the development of this idea is as fallows. Because of the 
independence of the subject, the tranquility or activity 
of the Mind is no longer interfered with by the universal 
flux, but rather depends on whether the Mind encounters 
external things or not. While it responds to the external 
world, it must behave in accordance with moral principles 
in order to achieve Aroused Harmony, Since Chu Hsi has
said that the Unaroused Equilibrium results from the 
practice of Attentiveness, and that this is the necessary 
condition of Aroused Harmony, he would naturally infer 
that in Mature, which is manifested in the Unaroused 
Equilibrium, all the seeds of morality are contained. The 
development from the Unaroused Equilibrium to Aroused 
Harmony, or in other words from the substance of Mind to 
its function, is no more than the unfolding from the moral 
seeds to moral behaviour. Although Mature is the 
representative of the cosmic living force, and therefore 
the metaphysical ground for Man, it must be contained and 
activated by the subjective capacity, the Mind. This 
constituted a great advance for Meo-Confucianism, for 
although all of Chu Hsi’s predecessors had attempted to 
establish the foundation of morality, they had always 
proposed the cosmic living force, or, at best, Mature. 
Only with Chu Hsi is this foundation to be placed within 
the Mind of "Man as subject."
In his "new theory" of Equilibrium and Harmony, Chu 
Hsi established the independence of Man, Morality had 
found a new foundation in Man as subject, and in place of
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Examination of Substance the method of Attentiveness was 
adopted. We may therefore say that with his "new theory" 
not only did Chu Hsi establish his own philosophy, but 
Heo-Confucianism itself, had advanced to a new stage.
Ill
E. A HEW RELAXIOMSHIP BETWEEH THE WAY AMD CQHCRETE THIMGS
(1170—1173)
1. From Subjective Approach to Objective Enquiry
The "old theory" was an attempt to approach the Way 
subjectively, and the "new theory" was its unexpected 
ontological result, revealing a new relationship between 
Mind and Mature. In this section we shall see how the 
ontological reasoning of the "new theory" was extended to 
the objective world, until a new relationship between the 
Way (tao) and Concrete Things CcA'ii) was reached.
In his first letter setting out the "old theory," Chu 
Hsi quotes the following passage from Chou Tun-i’s T’ai- 
cht i'u shuoi "The Five Agents constitute a single system 
of Yin and Yang, and Yin and Yang constitute one Great 
Ultimate. The Great Ultimate is fundamentally the Mon- 
ultimate." He also cites the following from the I-t'ung- 
[Comprehensive Treatise on the Book of Changes, commonly 
called T* ungshul by the same author; "Tranquility is the 
state of non-being, and activity is the state of being. " 
Chu Hsi uses these quotations to justify his opinion that 
what we reveal to ourselves by the subjective approach is 
a constant flux, and in that flux the substance is the 
living force itself. This relationship between substance 
and function, he suggests, is that of a unity, just as 
that between the abstract "Great Ultimate" and the 
concrete "Yin, Yang, and Five Agents."
The "new theory" implies a new understanding of Mind 
and Mature, and of Attentiveness as the method of self- 
cultivation, But in order to legitimate this new 
understanding, Chu Hsi had to look beyond Man as subject.
When Chu Hsi was forty and shortly after formulating 
his "new theory," he says in a letter to Lin Tse-chih:
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The Mind includes the Aroused and the Unaroused, 
just as the Great Change, the creative living
flux embraces the movement between activity and
tranquility. '’>"3
It is evident that Chu Hsi, hitting on his new concept of 
Mind, sought support from a parallel view of the natural 
world. In the " I-fa rvei-fa shuc?’ we see that, in order to 
argue that the Unaroused is not "Mature" but rather "Mind 
in tranquility," Chu Hsi supported the idea that Mature in 
itself is unknowable by citing Chou Tun-i’s saying "The 
Ultimate of Mon-being is also the Great Ultimate!"
together with Ch’eng Hao’s saying that "It is impossible
to speak of the quietness before Man is born."r7d The
point here is not whether he understood the earlier Meo-
Confucianists correctly, but rather that he needed some
cosmological conceptions to consolidate his "new theory”
which had been derived from his experience of moral life. 
It is clear that in order to establish objective reality 
in this theory, he had to extend the role of Man into the 
sphere of Heaven.
2. The Reappraisal of the Relationship Between Heaven and 
Man
After proposing his "new theory," Chu Hsi was faced with 
the problem of the relationship between Heaven and Man. 
In his "old theory," Chu Hsi not only, presupposed the 
unity of Heaven and Man, in which Man as creature is the 
manifestation of, and is infused with, the cosmic living 
force, but he also took that unity as an ideal for self- 
cultivation: Man should seek to Identify himself with the
natural order of Heaven. But the "new theory" demanded a 
reappraisal of that relationship. Once Man is aware of his
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position as subject, be can no longer unite with Heaven 
through a complete compliance with the cosmic living
force. Thus, Chu Hsi felt it was necessary to establish a 
new mode of unity between Man and Heaven. In order to do 
so, he first compared the similarities and differences 
between Heaven and Man.
From the time of his "new theory" Chu Hsi’ s 
philosophical writing was dedicated primarily to
commentary. His output included commentaries on Chou Tun-
i's T’&i — chi t'u shua and his T’ung—shUi and on Chang 
Tsai’s "Hsi-ming" ["Western Inscription"], The first two 
commentaries were completed in April 1173 when he was
forty-four, The third was finished earlier, in October 
1172 when he was forty-three. 1 The works of these two 
scholars were significant to Chu Hsi because both Chou 
Tun-i and Chang Tsai, like other lorthern Sung Heo- 
Confucianists, examined Man and Man’s role from the
cosmological point of view. Hence, Chu Hsi appealed to 
their theories at a time when he was eager to extend his 
understanding of Man and to enquire into the relationship 
between Heaven and Man. But these commentaries are not
wholly reliable for the purpose of studying Chu Hsi’s 
philosophical development in this period, because he had 
the habit of continually revising finished works. These 
commentataries remained in manuscript for many years, the 
first editions not appearing until February 1188, when he 
was fifty-nine, 1 Fortunately another relevant work
survives, the "T'ai-chi shud’ [’’On the Great Ultimate"], 
which Chu Hsi intended as preliminary notes to his 
commentary to the T*ai-chi t*u shuo. I shall use this
dateable material in my discussion of Chu Hsi’s treatment 
of the relationship between Heaven and Man,
The first point Chu Hsi makes in the T'ai~chi shuo is 
the parallel between the Way of Heaven and that of Man, in 
terms of the relation to tranquility and activity. The Way 
of Heaven consists in the constant alternation of
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tranquility and activity, the perpetual interchanging of 
Yin and Yang, without beginning or end. But the Way Man 
takes is different. First, speaking of his creation, Yang 
(the flow of the cosmic living force) is his beginning, 
and Yin (the crystallisation of the cosmic living force 
into the individual spirit and body) is his completion. 
Secondly, as subject, he is embedded in tranquility (i.e., 
the Unaroused) and is inclined toward activity (i.e., the 
Aroused) . This is the Way of Man. But however different 
the individual person may be from Heaven, Yin within him 
animates Yang, and activity again brings out tranquility. 
Therefore in Man also there is the constant alternation
between tranquility and activity, the perpetual 
interchanging of Yin and Yang. Here we find the similarity 
between Heaven and Man. 1 '/7
The unity between Heaven and Man, is reached through 
a comparison of their similarities after they have been 
distinguished. Consequently, although this relationship is 
one within the cosmic living force, the unity is sought
for not in the cosmic living force itself, as it was in
the "old theory," but rather in the resemblances between
the pattei-'ns of Man and of Heaven: the dynamic alternation
between Yin and Yang, tranquility and activity. In this 
way Chu Hsi gradually departed from the Immanent Vitalism 
of the Northern Sung. Another noteworthy point is that the 
achievement of this unity requires effort on Man’s part. 
Man must bring his tranquil state into Equilibrium and his 
active state into Harmony, thus ensuring the fluent 
alternation between these two states. Mind, as the moral 
capicity of Man, is in this way elevated to an 
unprecedented position.
With this new conception of Man, Chu Hsi was in a 
position to interpret Chou Tun-i’s saying that "The sage, 
regarding tranquility as fundamental, establishes himself 
as the ultimate standard for Man. " Chu Hsi suggests that 
Inner Cultivation of the tranquil state is fundamental.
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The following is a summary of his comments on this 
passage. In the sphere of Heaven, there is the virtue of 
Constancy <Chen). This is a natural virtue of Heaven’s 
tranquil state, and it is due to this virtue that the 
myriad creatures are crystallized out of the cosmic life, 
and are given the potential of subsequent activity. So, 
from the perspective of Man, the ultimate standard must 
also be established in tranquility. Man should give 
priority to his tranquility and exercise Inner 
Cultivation. His activity will then attain due degree and 
measure. ' '7'e
Since Man’s unity with Heaven requires self- 
cultivation during tranquility, it is Mind, as the 
dominant element in Man, that carries out this task. In 
the ’’new theory," Chu Hsi had touched on the point that 
tranquility is the substance of Mind and activity its 
function, and that Nature is revealed in the substance of 
Mind, and Feelings in its function. 173 In the ’’ T’al-chl 
shuot’’ Chu Hsi clarified again the relationship between 
Nature, Feelings, and the Mind. There he describes Nature 
as the Unaroused Feelings, the Equi 1 ibrium, the great 
foundation of the world, while characterizing Feelings as 
the Aroused Nature, the Harmony (as long as they attain 
due measure and degree) , and the true process of the 
world. By this description it is clear that Nature and 
Feelings are the natural alternation between tranquility 
and activity in Man, corresponding to that of Heaven. But 
he also says that Mind is the master who realises and 
controls this natural alternation - Mind is that which 
realises Equilibrium and Harmony, establishes the great 
foundation, and carries out the true process.130
3. A New Concept of the Relationship Between the Way and 
Concrete Things
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I hope the above description has made clear that Heaven 
and Man are alike in their pattern of alternation between 
tranquility and activity, but different in that Man as 
subject must make a moral effort in order to secure his 
unity with Heaven, and that therefore in Man Mind has a 
predominant place. Now Chu Hsi’s theory of the 
metaphysical structure of Heaven may be investigated by 
considering what we know of the Nature of Man as an 
analogy. In this consideration we must omit Mind, which is 
specific to Man in so far as its essential purpose is the 
focussing of moral effort.
At first we find that Chu Hsi, in his concentration 
on the concept of Nature, has advanced his understanding 
of it in terms of a two-dimensional substance-function 
relationship. This may be seen in his interpretation of 
the opening phrase of the Chung-yung, "Heavenly Destiny is 
called Nature”:
Tranquility is that which occurs when Nature 
establishes itself, and activity is that which
occurs when Destiny moves along (i.e., is carried 
out). But in fact tranquility is the cessation of
activity. Therefore the whole process of the
alternation of activity and tranquility may be
regarded as the moving along of Destiny, and the
truth of Nature may be regarded as that which
travels along with activity and tranquility. 
Therefore we say that Heavenly Destiny is called 
Nature. -1 3 ‘
In the beginning of this paragraph Chu Hsi associates
tranquility with Nature and activity with Destiny. In this
context Destiny is equivalent to "Feelings," But he goes
on to say that since tranquility is no more than the
cessation of activity, the alternation of these two states 
in itself may also be called Destiny, and that its
metaphysical aspect (i.e., that which "travels" along with 
this alternation) may be called Nature, Now we have two 
simultaneous kinds of substance-function relationship 
between Nature and Destiny. One is that between
117
tranquility and activity, the other that between the 
metaphysical and the physical.
Now, by substituting the terms "Great Ultimate" for 
"Nature," and "Yin and Yang" for "tranquility and 
activity," we uncover the metaphysical structure of Heaven 
as expounded in Chu Hsi’s T‘ai-chi t*u shuo chieh 
[ Commentary on Chou Pun-i's T> ai-chi t'u shuo] . In it Chu 
Hsi interpreted the relationship between the Great 
Ultimate and Ying and Yang as follows:
The Great Ultimate is the original wonder; ''33 Yin 
and Yang are the vehicles133 on which it rides. 
The Great Ultimate is the Way above Physical 
Form; Yin and Yang are Concrete Things with 
Physical Form. Therefore, from the viewpoint of 
manifestations, although activity and tranquility 
emerge at different times, and Yin and Yang are 
located at different positions, the Great 
Ultimate is in each of them. And from the 
viewpoint of the hidded, even while no sign 
exists in the void, there is already the totality 
of principles for activity and tranquility, for 
Yin and Yang. Nevertheless, however far back one 
searches, it is impossible to find the time when 
the Great Ultimate and Yin and Yang began to 
combine. And however far forward one peers, it is 
impossible to see their division,'13-"1
There is striking similarity between this quotation and 
the preceding one. Therefore, although the T’ai-chi t ‘u 
shuo chieh might subsequently have been revised, this 
passage must have remained as it had been written in his 
early forties.
In this passage the Great Ultimate (corresponding to 
the "Nature" in the earlier quotation) is regarded as an 
"abstract regulative principle," and "Yin and Yang" 
(corresponding to "Destiny") as "actuality proceeding in 
accordance with the principle." In this sense the Great 
Ultimate is the reason both for the existence and for the 
movement of Concrete Things. The Great Ultimate, as the 
fundamental law, is the reason for the perpetual 
alternation of Yin and Yang, or of tranquility and
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activity. It is not a concrete thing and therefore is 
neither tranquility nor activity. However, as the abstract 
principle it dwells in both tranquility and activity 
simultaneously, and contains in itself the potential to 
bring about their alternation, That is why Chu Hsi calls 
the Great Ultimate "the original wonder." But because the 
Great Ultimate is no more than the reason for the 
existence and the alternation of Yin and Yang, it has no 
other abode than in Yin and Yang. That is why Yin and Yang 
are called "the vehicles" on which the Great Ultimate 
rides.
Since the Great Ultimate dwells in tranquility and 
activity (that is, in Yin and Yang), it may be examined in 
the alternation of the latter. Activity is the operation 
of the Great Ultimate, and is also the process in which 
the Great Ultimate creates the myriad things. Tranquility 
is the self-preservation of the Great Ultimate, and is 
also that within which the myriad things are crystallized 
and acquire their Nature,13® In this way, tranquility 
(Yin) manifests "the Great Ultimate in itself" and
activity (Yang) manifests "the Great Ultimate in 
operation, " Therefore it is proper to say that on the 
level of Concrete Things, tranquility may be regarded as 
substance, and activity as function.
The life of Man, in the context of the universe, may 
be interpreted as follows. In the Tranquil state (Yin) of 
the cosmic porcess he is created, and his Nature (which is 
the same as the Great Ultimate) is then complete. After 
his creation, his Activity (Yang) is the functioning of 
his Nature, as Feelings, in his actual life. Man’s
superiority to other creatures consists in his having 
Mind, allowing him to nourish his Nature in Tranquility 
and control his Feelings in Activity.
In this way, Chu Hsi discovered a new relationship 
between the Way and Concrete Things. If we compare this
theory with his earler Immanent Vitalism, we see that both
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maintain a permanent combination between the Way and 
Concrete Things, but that they differ in their account of 
the manner of this combination. In the earlier theory the 
manner was a vitalistic one; the Way is the cosmic life- 
principle itself and Concrete Things are the manifestation 
of the cosmic life—principle. But now Chu Hsi describes 
their relationship in terms of law. This relationship 
contains within itself two further levels of relationship 
between substance and function. The first level is that 
between "the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang," in which 
the metaphysical May activates the whole world of Concrete 
Things. The second level is that between Yin and Yang, in 
which the Concrete Things are created, acquire and fulfill 
their Nature.133 The most significant point at this second 
level is that a creature is no longer regarded merely as a 
function of the Way, but also contains within itself both 
substance and function. It is needless to emphasise that 
the independence of Man as subject, which Chu Hsi reached 
in the "new theory" by reflection on his moral life, is 
confirmed by this metaphysical structure. A comparison of 
this two-dimensional substance-function relationship with 
that in the "old theory" may be facilitated with the aid 
of the following diagram.
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The "old theory" - the substance-function relationship in 
terms of life
THE WAY the Great Ultimate Substance
(operate through) (from the point of
view of the whole)
CONCRETE Yin -----> Yang-- > Yin— ***** Function
THINGS
T* ai-chi t'u shuo chieh - the two-dimensional substance- 
function relationship in terms of law
THE WAY the Great Ultimate Substance
(dwells in) (operates through) (from the point of 
\ view of the whole)
CONCRETE Yin-----  ^Yang > Yin— Function
THINGS
Substance—^Function 
(from the point of view of the creatures)
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F. THE CONTENT OF SUBSTANCE AND FUNCTION 
(1170-1173)
1. The Means of Acquiring Humanity: Observing Faults or 
Se 1 f—Cu 11 i vat i on?
From the time of the formation of his "new theory," one of 
Chu Hsi’s philosophical projects was to enquire into the 
meaning of, and. the method of acquiring, Humanity (Jen). 
His views on this subject are expressed in a number of 
letters and in two treatises, called the "Jen shuo" ["On 
Humanity"] and the " Kuan-kuo shuo" ["On Observing 
Faults"]. Although a number of studies of this aspect of 
Chu Hsi’s thought have been written,'13'^ it is hoped that 
the present contribution will be useful by putting Chu 
Hsi’s view on this subject into the context of his
philosophical development and by relating it to other 
important theories in his work,
In general terms, this enquiry took shape through 
his debates with the Hunan School in 1172 and 1173, when 
Chu Hsi was forty-three and forty-four, and was completed 
in the "Jen shuo," in the winter of 1173.133 It takes the 
achievement of the T#ai-chi t'u shuo chieh a step further 
by showing how the Great Ultimate and Nature may be
absolutely good, and by comparing them at the cosmic and
human levels seeks to establish the fundamental similarity 
of Heaven and Man,
The concept of Humanity had always had an important 
role in Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy. Humanity was taken by 
him as the chief human virtue, rather than as trait of 
character, so that its significance varied with the
development of his metaphysics. Before the formation of 
his "new theory," Chu Hsi had taken this virtue to 
represent Man’s attainment of Substance, When, for
instance, he first developed the conception of "the 
oneness of principle and the distinctiveness of 
particulars," in his discussions with Li T' ung, Chu Hsi 
regarded knowledge of the "oneness of principle" as the 
beginning of Humanity, in contrast to knowledge of the 
"distinctiveness of particulars" which was the beginning 
of Righteousness. This approach may be characterized as an 
objective enquiry into the relationship between Humanity 
and Righteousness. Later when working on his "old theory," 
he regarded his subjective pursuit to the cosmic life- 
principle as "Seeking for Humanity" <ch'iu-jen), and his 
whole scheme of moral discipline at that time he described 
as "Seeking far Humanity and Investigating Things,"133 
(The latter half of this slogan shows that Chu Hsi never 
abandoned the habit of objective study that he had 
established.) In both of these stages of his thought, 
Humanity was thought of as related to the attainment of 
the cosmic life-principle, but when in his "new theory," 
Man as subject was made independent from the cosmic life- 
principle, his chief virtue, Humanity, required a new 
interpretation,
This new enquiry into Humanity started from a debate 
on the exegesis of a passage in the Lun-yii. When Chu Hsi 
was forty-three, he argued against the Hunan School, the 
followers of Hu Hung, 130 on the interpretation of this 
problematical text:
The Master said, "The faults of men are 
characteristic of the category to which they 
belong. By observing a man’s faults, it may be 
known that he is Humane (Jen)."13'1
The Hunan scholars interpreted these "faults" as the 
faults of the observer himself. Therefore their 
interpretation was as follows;
No sooner is a man able to reflect upon his own 
moral faults, than he has in his breast the 
growth of the sprouts of goodness, Confucius
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points this out in order to urge man to reflect 
upon what he already has in himself. Man must 
have such consciousness and knowledge as a 
prerequisite before he is able to practice 
Hu ma n i t y. 1 3 3
Chu Hsi's interpretation is different. He regards 
"observing faults" as observation of the failings of 
others. In order to support his interpretation, Chu Hsi 
quotes Ch’eng I, "The faults of man are different with the 
type of man: the superior man is too lenient and the
inferior man is too acrimonious;" as well as Yin Ch’un, 
"Observing this, you can judge whether he is Humane."133
At first their controversy was only on the correct 
interpretation of Confucius’ saying, but it soon developed 
into a debate on the means of acquiring Humanity.
According to Chu Hsi, the Hunan School devoted 
themselves only to knowledge (i.e. observation) of 
Humanity, but were lacking in its cultivation. Arguing
that their emphasis on observation would increase the 
instability of Mind, Chu Hsi says in his "Ta Vu Hui-shu":
The Mind has already committed a fault. 
Instead of discarding the fault, that Mind 
causes another Mind to observe that fault. 
Having observed that fault, there emerges
another Mind which knows that the observing 
Mind is Humane. If the explanation is that
there are three Minds observing one another,
then this is confusing and makes no sense. If 
there is only one Mind which emerges with three 
functions in an instant, this would result in a 
disturbed and hasty Mind. 1 3j;|-
In this argument Chu Hsi’s main point is that mere 
knowledge of one’s own faults does not enhance one’s 
Humanity, and may even result in its destruction.
In the "Kuan-kuo shuo" where he addresses this 
question directly, Chu Hsi argues the inefficacy of the 
method of "cultivation by knowing one's own faults." He 
says that if one observes after one has committed a fault,
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the fault is already there. All one feels is remorse which 
is harmful to the cultivation of Mind. If one observes 
one's tendency to faults before the fault is committed, 
one loses the opportunity to cultivate the Mind in 
tranquility. The sages never taught such a method for 
cultivate the Mind or acquiring Humanity. 133
In order to follow this debate, it is helpful, I 
believe, to look at how Mou Tsung-san defends the doctrine 
of the Hunan School. Mou Tsung-san contends in his Hsin- 
t'i yii hsing— t ’ i [Mind Substance and Mature Substance] 
that the Hunan School successfully sustains a concept of 
the moral mind. His argument is as follows. In the theory 
of the Hunan School there are two minds, the realistic 
mind and the moral mind, not three, as Chu Hsi alleges; 
and the observation of faults by the moral mind is not a 
cold-hearted look, as Chu Hsi suggests, but includes the 
power to correct those faults. The concept of the moral 
mind is significant for moral practice. ¥e as creatures 
are supported by a constant flow of the cosmic living 
farce, yet we tend to degenerate because of the harmful 
influence of our "sensibility,” by which Mou Tsung-san 
means the tendency toward self-interest. If we want to 
practise morality self-consciously and autonomously, we 
must realise that we also have a moral mind rooted in the 
cosmic living force. For the discovery of this inherent 
moral mind, it is sufficient to reflect upon the sense of 
anxiety which we may have in response to our fallible 
existence. If we pursue this sense, we will eventually 
experience and recognize the moral mind which exists 
within us. But we should note that knowing of its 
existence is in itself no more than prerequisite for moral 
behaviour. A positive effort is required to actualise that 
moral mind through correcting and improving our behaviour 
in real life,133
To summarise, Mou Tsung-san defends the Hunan School 
by interpreting their doctrine as follows: 1) everyone has
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an inherent moral mind; 2) the observation of one’s own 
faults can evoke the self-awareness of this moral mind; 
and 3) this moral mind can correct those faults and become 
actualised in real life, If we compare Chu Hsi's criticism 
of the Hunan gentlemen with Mou Tsung-san*s defense, I 
suggest that Chu Hsi may have been wrong in accusing them 
of proposing three minds, and in denying the relevance of 
the awareness of the moral mind to the correction of
faults. But from this comparison it should in fact be
evident that Chu Hsi maintained the existence of a single 
Mind, concrete and actual, which until it is well- 
cultivated, cannot be called the moral mind. Therefore
moral discipline should be a cultivation of this actual 
mind, including Inner Cultivation during its tranquility 
and correction of moral faults during its activity.
We can see then that Chu Hsi ’ s proposal that there 
is only one actual Mind is related to the practice of 
cultivation which he advocates. For if there is in
addition to the actual Mind there is a moral Mind, one can 
become aware of the latter only through some kind of 
enl ightenment.
These two views of Mind are related to different 
kinds of moral discipline. Chu Hsi insisted that there is 
only one actual Mind, and so he advocated the cultivation 
of that Mind, The Hunan School proposed an inherent moral 
Mind as the condition for moral practice, so that they 
focussed on its enlightenment through observation of their 
own faults. Once again we see how Chu Hsi’s theoretical 
investigation and moral practice work together, Chu Hsi' s 
criticism of the method of "observing one’s own faults” is 
in reality an opposition to the practical method of 
"enlightenment.” He admitted that one should know one’s 
own faults, but Insisted that the practice of the 
cultivation of Mind, which includes the correction of 
faults, is crucial to the acquirement of Humanity, In his 
"Ta Hu Po-feng” Chu Hsi says:
126
It is right to say that having consciousness 
and knowledge provides us with the ground for 
moral cultivation. "Consciousness and
knowledge” may be either shallow or deep. When 
shallow, it is consciousness of the distinction 
between Heavenly Principle and Human Desire. It 
is right to say that after one is conscious of 
the distinction between Heavenly Principle and 
Human Desires, one has the basis for "mastering 
oneself and returning to propriety.” 1 It is 
with such knowledge that one cultivates 
Humanity. . . , But now what you mean by 
’’consciousness and knowledge” is that one has. 
already acquired Humanity in oneself. In that 
case ’’consciousness and knowledge” is of a deep 
kind, which in fact can be acquired only after 
long-term practice. It cannot be that one, 
suddenly and effortlessly, acquires such a 
consciousness. Hor could it be that it is only 
after one has acquired this consciousness, that 
one has the pre-condition for moral 
practice, 1 s"s'
This paragraph shows that Chu Hsi acknowledges only actual 
Mind, whose ’’consciousness and knowledge” is that of the 
distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desires, 
and is the starting point for the cultivation of Humanity, 
Chu Hsi’s purpose, needless to say, was to replace the 
impractical enlightenment (i.e., consciousness and 
knowledge of a deep kind) with moral cultivation, which he 
believed to be the right way to acquire Humanity,
2. The Content of Substance and Function
In 1172 in a letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi attempted to 
define Humanity in terms of love. This was a return to the 
generally accepted Confucian definition prior to the two 
Ch'engs. In this letter Chu Hsi says:
Before the two Masters, scholars, not 
understanding Humanity, simply interpreted 
’’Humanity” in the sayings of the sages as
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’’love.” But after the two Masters,'1-'-’ they 
began to question the meaning of Humanity, and 
no longer dared to regard it merely as love. 
Nevertheless, there emerges another error. They 
pander too much, and so neglect the necessary 
practices of self-containment (ts'ao-ts'^) and 
inner-cultivation (han-yang) . In their
behaviour they do not display ’’elegance and 
contentment,” nor do they show ’’mastery over
themselves and a return to propriety,”'-00
In this passage, Chu Hsi is, as he had done in the past, 
criticising the moral method of the Hunan School, and he 
proposes that Humanity can be achieved only through moral 
practice rather than through knowledge. But now in
addition, he ascribes their error to a misunderstanding of 
Ch’eng I’s comment on Humanity. In order to interpret
Ch'eng I correctly, and to emphasise the importance of
practice, he feels an accurate definition of Humanity was 
necessary. Therefore, Chu Hsi continues:
If one wishes to understand the definition of 
Humanity, the best way is to infer from love. 
If one can see that love derives from Humanity
and yet is not the whole of Humanity, then one
will see clearly the meaning of Humanity. ::s:0 1
Here Chu Hsi is making use of the substance-f unction 
pattern, in which Humanity is substance, and love is its 
function. In my opinion, two factors contributed to this 
definition. The first was the authority of Ch’eng I.
Because Ch* eng I had said that Humanity was Mature and
love Feeling, it was not contradictory to link them in
this pattern, and so to find a proper definition of
Humanity. The second factor was that it could provided a 
basis for self-cultivation. Because if one recognized that 
the function of Humanity was a kindness and concern for 
others, one would pay more attention to cultivating one’s 
own mind and to eliminating Human Desires CJen-yu").
In another letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi paints out 
that the Hunan School failed to discriminate between
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Humanity and Wisdom. He also says that although "knowledge 
of goodness'* (Wisdom) is conducive to Humanity, it does 
not constitute the meaning of that concept, and this 
explains why Confucius often contrasted Humanity with 
Wisdom. Chu Hsi goes on to say that the confusion of these 
two Virtues by the Hunan School has not the least 
similarity with the usage of Confucius. :;5:0::s
Sometime after the writing of this letter Chu Hsi 
worked on the ” Jen shuo,” in which the substance-function 
pattern is fully extended to the definition of the human 
virtue. In the "new theory” Chu Hsi reached the conclusion 
that while the Mind is in tranquility, all moral 
principles are contained in, and are identified with, 
Mature, and while Mind is active, Mature develops into 
Feelings, Mow because he had established the link between 
Humanity and love, and had distinguished between Humanity 
and Wisdom, Chu Hsi regarded Humanity and Wisdom as the 
Virtues (te, the fundamental moral principles of Mature), 
and love as the Feeling corresponding directly with 
Humanity. Chu Hsi found it necessary to add several more 
categories in order to complete a system of corresponding 
Virtues and Feelings, Chu Hsi appealed to Mencius and 
proclaimed as the Four Virtues, Humanity, Righteousness, 
Propriety, and Wisdom, of which Humanity, being the most 
fundamental, embraces the other three. As for the 
functions of these Four Virtues, he also adopted Mencius' 
Four Feelings, namely, compassion (love), shame and 
disgust, respect and reverence, and right and wrong, of 
which compassion encompasses the other three.203 The two 
Ch’engs regarded Mencius as the inheritor of Confucius, 
but it is Chu Hsi who elevated Mencius' Four Virtues to 
the level of substance. These Four Virtues satisfied Chu 
Hsi's requirements both by providing a table of the 
fundamental moral principles and so concluding the 
construction of the "new theory,” and by defending his own
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position against the Hunan School through matching 
different Virtues to their corresponding Feelings.
In this theory of Virtues and Feelings, Chu Hsi both 
maintained the distinction between substance and function, 
and emphasised the link between them.204 His conception of 
this relationship can be seen in the " Jen siiud' where in 
explaining the Confucian axiom "master oneself and return 
to propriety" he offers in effect a new formula for moral 
cultivation. This passage from the " Jen shucf1 goes as 
f o i l o w s :
Therefore Confucius required students to seek 
for Humanity assiduously. Confucius has said, 
"master oneself and return to propriety," 
meaning that if one can overcome and eliminate 
selfishness and return to the Heavenly 
Principle, then the substance of one's Mind 
will be always present and its function will 
always be operative.208
What Chu Hsi implies in this passage is that substance and 
function, although distinct, have a natural and dynamic 
link between them. Therefore when the obstruction of 
selfishness is removed, the Virtues will necessarily 
manifest themselves as Feelings. Chu Hsi knows that self- 
cultivation is a constant self-restraint, so that in his 
discussion he mentioned no expansion of the Feeling of 
compassion, nevertheless through self-cultivation positive 
results are brought out, because the removal of 
selfishness enhances the natural process of the moral 
principles inherent in Mind.::;;:oe
As against the Hunan School, who "explained Humanity 
in terms of the possession of consciousness by Mind," Chu 
Hsi contended:
From what they call the Mind's possession of 
consciousness, it can be seen that Humanity 
Includes Wisdom, but that is not the reason why 
Humanity is so called.
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That Humanity includes Wisdom, is based on Ch’eng I's 
teaching that Humanity, when spoken of separately, is one 
of the Four Virtues, but when spoken of collectively, 
embraces the other three, We shall discuss later how
Chu Hsi interpreted this relation. "To regard Mind's
possession of consciousness as Humanity" is the doctrine 
of Hsieh Liang-tso, a prominent disciple of the two
Ch'engs. Chu Hsi understood consciousness as a faculty of 
knowledge. Although it is a "characteristic of life," it 
is "cold-hearted" rather than "gentle-hearted."-"0'9 As 
regards the meaning of consciousness, in his "Ta Chang 
Ch'in-fu" Chu Hsi says:
By "consciousness" Shang-ts*ai (Hsieh Liang- 
tso) means that which knows cold, warmth, 
surfeit, and hunger, It is still the same 
consciousness while extending to the practice 
of social life and sacrificial ceremony. ... It 
is the function of Wisdom. In the sense that 
only the man of Humanity can have Wisdom, we 
say that his mind possesses consciousness. But 
we do not define Humanity in terms of the 
possession of consciousness,210
In this way, to regard consciousness as Humanity is not
only a mismatch of a Feeling with an irrelevant Virtue, 
but also an error- in taking function to be a substance.
The result is more a moral defect than a mere theoretical
error, for in the ’* Jen shucJ Chu Hsi makes the accusation 
that the method of "seeking for Humanity in consciousness" 
will "lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of 
any quality of depth, and even to regard desire as
principle."--'1'1 Chu Hsi means by this that Feelings can
never be prerequisite for moral cultivation.
Shortly after, Chu Hsi, in his reply to Hu Kuang-
chung, clarifies this position. The Four Feelings are
good, but Feelings in general may be either good or bad, 
This is because the arising of Feelings from Mature, being 
a natural process, has the tendency of becoming
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uncontrollable. Therefore a mastery of them by some 
subjective capacity is necessary. Such capacity is the 
Mind, The Mind comprises both Mature and Feelings, and so 
is characterized as "through the hidden and the manifest, 
across the above and the below, existent everywhere, and 
confined to neither place nor shape.":s 1 3 On the other 
hand, it is that which in its tranquility masters Mature, 
and in its activity masters Feelings.-*'13 The cultivation 
of Mind with a view to increasing its capacity, is 
therefore fundamental to moral life.
3. The Parallel Between Heaven and Man
Having ascertained the range of meanings of both substance 
and function in Man, Chu Hsi then engaged himself in a 
search for their conterparts in Heaven. He fulfilled this 
task easily by appealing to the I chlng. He listed the 
Four Qualities (ssirte) , Generation (.yuan') , Flourishing 
(heng-) , Advantage (li), and Constancy (chen) , of which 
Generation embraces the other three. For their functions 
Chu Hsi assigns the Four Seasons in which the living force 
of Spring penetrates the other seasons,2'14
Chu Hsi took this parallelism a step further by 
reinterpreting the cosmic 1ife-principle as the "Mind of 
Heaven and Earth." This parallel is made from the point of 
view of life. The Mind of Man shows the sign of life in 
its being perceptive, active, dominant, and intentional. 
The cosmic living force is a pure intention to create 
beings, so that it can be regarded as "the Mind of Heaven 
and Earth." In fact, such terms as "the Mind of Heaven" or 
"the Mind of Heaven and Earth" were frequently used by 
former leo-Confucianists.21s But Chu Hsi, of course, had 
new reason for developing this parallelism as a response 
to his post "new theory" identification of the cosmic
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living force with the totality represented by the Four 
Qualities and the Four Seasons.
The following is a putative reconstruction of the 
line of thought which led to the formulation of Chu Hsi ’ s 
concept of "the Mind of Heaven and Earth." In the "old 
theory," Chu Hsi regarded the universal living force as 
Substance, and all beings and affairs as Functions. This
was a continuation of Northern Sung leo-Confucianism. 21G 
In the "new theory," Man as subject acquires independence 
from the cosmic living force, and establishes in himself 
the substance of the Four Virtues and the functions of the 
Four Feelings. The Mind of Man is that which embodies the 
Four Virtues and the Four Feelings. This new pattern was 
then extended to Heaven, and Chu Hsi devised as the
content of the substance and function of Heaven, the Four
Qualities and the Four Seasons respectively. According to 
this pattern, the original cosmic living force is 
identifiable with the totality embodying the Four 
Qualities and the Four Seasons, and so became the
counterpart of the Mind of Man. Therefore it may be 
properly called "the Mind of Heaven and Earth."
I shall now discriminate between the various role 
played by the concept of life (sijeng') at different stages 
of Chu Hsi' s philosophy. Both before and after the "new 
theory," the concept of life was that by which Heaven and 
Man were united. The Chinese word sheng' may be used to 
refer to that which gives lives, or that which lives, 
therefore this concept may serve to unite creative Heaven 
and created Man, The opening passage of the " Jen shuo, " 
reads as follows:
The Mind of Heaven and Earth is to "produce" 
(sheng) things. In the "production" (sheng) of 
Men and things, these things receive the Mind 
of Heaven and Earth as their Mind, Therefore, 
with reference to the character of Mind, 
although it embraces and penetrates everything 
and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless,
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one word. will cover all of it, namely, 
Humanity,
The unity of Heaven and Man under the concept of life in 
this passage is compatible with his "old theory." but it 
seems to me that their manner of unification is different. 
In the "old theory," (based on Immanent Vitalism,) the 
cosmic living force is substance and therefore is the 
dominant concept. Man as creature is a function and 
therefore his Way (Humanity) consists in experiencing, and 
merging with, the cosmic living force. But in the "Jen 
shuo, " since Man as subject is independent from Heaven, 
his Mind has its own substance and function, just as the 
"Mind of Heaven and Earth" has its own. Therefore Heaven 
and Man are involved in a parallel relationship, and not 
simply a substance-function relationship. It follows then 
that although the concept of "life" still plays a role in 
uniting Heaven and Man, the attention is drawn to the 
similarity of the "pattern" for Heaven and Man 
respectively
The basic pattern which Chu Hsi proposes is one in 
which life is seen as a circulating process of opposing 
forces. First we see the life of Heaven, which is 
expressed in the function of the Four Seasons. It is a 
continuous process, alternating between opposites. The 
life of Heaven grows from Spring to Summer, and dwindles 
from Autumn to Winter. But this growth is at the same time 
an emission of energy which entails the subsequent period 
of dwindling; while the dwindling is at the same time a 
conservation of energy which prepares for the next period 
of growth. Only by the alternation of opposites can Heaven 
have a constant life. The Four Seasons constitute a model 
for the concept of life. The other categories may be 
understood in the same manner. The Four Qualities are the 
cosmic principles and the reason for the circulation of 
the Four Seasons. These Four Qualities are a set of
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opposing-circulating principles. The life of Man may be 
analysed in the same way. The Virtue of Humanity and its 
corresponding Feeling of compassion, and the Virtue of 
Propriety and its corresponding Feeling of respeet-and- 
reverence, are the substances and functions in the growth 
phase. The Virtue of Righteousness and the corresponding 
Feeling of shame-and-disgust, and the Virtue of Wisdom and 
the corresponding Feeling of right-and-wrong, are the 
substances and functions in the phase of limitation.
Thus, Chu Hsi viewed the basic pattern of life as a 
process of the circulation of opposites. Substance 
constitutes the fundamental principle of this pattern, 
which I have called "the abstract regulative principle." 
In Heaven it is the Great Ultimate which is composed of 
Four Qualities, while in Man it is Mature which is 
composed of Four Virtues. Function is the actual process 
of that pattern: in Heaven it is the Four Seasons, and in
Man it is the Four Feelings, It seems that Chu Hsi derived 
this pattern from observing general phenomena of life, 
that is, life as a process from birth to death; and that 
although all kinds of death form the limitation of life, 
they themselves are the condition of subsequent lives. 
Only by including the negative element (i.e. limitation of 
life), can the circulation of life be complete and 
eternal.
Since Chu Hsi took this circulation of opposites as 
a living process, the positive element (the growth of 
life) can represent the orientation of the whole process. 
Therefore, Generation (yuan) as the first Quality of 
Heaven is regarded as embracing the other three Qualities, 
and represents the character of Heaven; Humanity (Jen) as 
the first Virtue of Mind emcompasses the other three 
Virtues, and represents the character of Man.
In this chapter, we have seen how Chu Hsi gradually 
established the independence of Man as subject, 
reinterpreted Heaven to parallel Man, and systematized the
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basic pattern of life. The final outcome of his
philosophical enquiry in this period was his total
abandonment of Immanent Vitalism, and his increasing
concern with the concept of an "abstract regulative
principle."
4. Why Mature is Good
Although Mencius had been greatly admired by Meo- 
Confucianists, his doctrine that "Mature is good," had 
received little support before Chu Hsi' s composition of 
the Jen shuo.
The question whether Mature is good was a source of 
controversy between Chu Hsi and the Hunan School. Hu Hung, 
the founder of this school, said in his Chih-yen that 
Mature cannot be defined either as good or as evil. This 
book had a great influence on Chu Hsi in the period of his 
"old theory," but even at that time Chu Hsi was not 
satisfied with the concept of Mature in the Chih-yen. He 
discussed this with Chang Shih in the second letter of his 
"old theory" period. Hu Hung's argument, according to Chu 
Hsi, is that Mature is that which has the capacity of 
liking and disliking, whereas goodness consists in likes 
and dislikes fallowing the right course,
How should we understand Hu Hung* s concept of Mature 
as described by Chu Hsi? It seems to me that Hu Hung 
regarded Mature as identical with the cosmic living farce 
itself, that, as a pure capacity, transcending moral 
value. Goodness was the evaluation of things in the actual 
world, and so did not belong to Mature in itself. Mow, 
since morality for Hu Hung consisted in compliance with 
the natural flow of the cosmic living force, that "liking 
and disliking" may be called good which follows the right 
(i.e., natural) course of the cosmic living force.
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During the period of his "old theory" Chu Hsi 
accepted Hu Hung’s metaphysics, so what he questioned was 
limited to Hu Hung’s definition of "goad." Chu Hsi 
proposed that "good" means "having no evil." His argument 
is that Mature can like and dislike, only because it likes 
the good and dislikes evil. Therefore Mature, having no 
evil, can be called good. Chu Hsi also argued that Hu Hung 
made an unnecessary distinction between Mature and the 
right course. He quoted the Chih-yen to the effect that 
the Mind of Heaven and Earth is the pure and contains the 
fullness of morality. ~ Why, then, should it not be called 
good?3 1 m We see, then, that Chu Hsi at that time, though 
an adherent of Hu Hung’s metaphysics, differed from Hu 
Hung in characterising Mature as good.
While working the "Jen shuo," Chu Hsi engaged in 
several debates with the Hunan scholars about the moral 
value of Mature. 3:13 But it was not until he had completed 
the " Jen shucf* that he had a metaphysical solution to this 
question. In his "Ta Hu Po-feng" Chu Hsi explained 
Mencius’ teaching about Mature as follows:
Mencius’ teaching of the goodness of Mature is 
about Substance, meaning Humanity,
Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom before the 
Arousal of the Feelings. His other saying that 
"Clf you let people follow their Feelings,] 
they will be able to do good," is about 
Function, namely, the Four Feelings aroused and 
attaining due measure and degree. For, although 
Mature and Feelings differ in regard to either 
the Unaroused or the Aroused, in respect of 
goodness they are continuous and therefore the 
same. This is what Mencius meant when he said
that Mature was good, and is what was
transmitted without change by the Ch’eng 
School.
Chu Hsi ’ s point here is that Mature is good because it
consists of the Four Virtues. These are the substance of 
the Four Feelings, through which men can do good. Chu 
Hsi’s criticism here is that the good should not be
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ascribed only to the Aroused Feelings, but should also be 
ascribed to their root, the Four Virtues of Mature.
Mot until Chu Hsi had arrived at this conclusion, 
was the Neo-Confucian enterprise, which aimed at providing 
a metaphysical basis for social and moral values, 
complete. From the beginning of the Sung dynasty, scholars 
had been eager to reconstitute Confucian morality and the 
Confucian social order, and at the same time to provide 
for it a metaphysical basis. Succeeding to the Taoist and 
Buddhist traditions of the earlier period, the first form 
of this attempt was made by the Eclectics, who combined 
directly Tao or Ch’an substance with Confucian function. 
But their conclusion was that substance is transcendent 
and natural, while morality and social order are secular 
and artificial. In opposition to them there arose the 
Northern Sung Meo-Confucianists, who taught an Immanent 
Vitalism. By applying the substance-function pattern to 
the relation between Heaven and Man, they were able to 
supply a metaphysical basis for morality. They regarded 
the cosmic living force as substance, and human society as 
function. Morality found its basis in the cosmic living 
force, and its practice enabled Man to transcend his 
particularity in order to unite with the cosmic living 
force. Motwithstanding their efforts, the difficulty of 
Eclecticism could not be avoided, because Heaven, as well 
as Mature, was regarded as supra-moral, while morality was 
regarded as merely a posteriori, That is why, in Hu Hung’s 
theory, Mature transcends goodness, while the latter 
belongs merely to the level of function. Morality then has 
no sufficient reason in substance, and merely has a 
worldly value. Chu Hsi had been unsatisfied with this 
theory for a long time, but he was unable to solve the 
problem until he defined Substance as an ’’abstract 
regulative principle,” in such a way that Substance itself 
became a moral concept, rather than a supra-moral one.
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In addition, another factor in Chu Hsi ’ s conception 
of Substance helped to provide a metaphysical foundation 
for social and moral values. His "abstract regulative 
principle” governed a process of the circulation of 
opposites. In this process the "negative” or "limiting” 
elements functioned as restraints. In personal cultivation 
this restraint was interpreted as "mastery of oneself," 
and in social practice as "execution of law or justice." 
In the philosophy of the earlier Meo-Confucianists, 
because their Immanent Vitalism did not include this 
negative element, these restraints which were essential 
underpinnings of a responsible ethis and social philosophy 
were seen merely as contingent functions. At this stage in 
Chu Hsi's philosophy they were given sufficient reason in 
substance and finally provided the justification for 
morality which Confucianists have been seeking.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESHAPING OF THE NEW METAPHYSICS IN TERMS OF 
PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE
SUMMARY
This chapter describes the process through which Chu 
Hsi * s doctrine of "the Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin 
and Yang (Concrete Things)” became the doctrine of 
"Principle (li) and Material Force (ch.’i)." The reason for 
this transformation will also be investigated.
I interpret this transformation in general terms as 
the process by which Chu Hsi modified his conception of 
Man. He recognized that Man had to be regarded as a 
creature, in addition to being treated as a subject, 
because Man, however superior to other creatures, is 
ultimately limited. Chu Hsi then emphasised that Man 
should strive to transcend these limitations and reach 
universality,
Section A describes how Chu Hsi adapted and modified 
the traditional concept of Material Force.
Section B describes the development of Chu Hsi's two 
methods of moral cultivation. These were Attentiveness, a 
discipline aimed at the "containment” (.ts'un) of Mind, and 
the Investigation of Things, a technique designed to aid 
the quest for universality and to extend the capacity of 
the Mind.
Section C describes Chu Hsi’s development during his 
fifties. The interaction with Lu Chiu-yuan and Ch*en Liang 
farced Chu Hsi to reflect on his awn position, as a result 
of which he elevated Principle to be the universal moral 
standard.
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A. MATERIAL FORCE AS THE BASIS OF CONCRETE THINGS
<1172-1174)
1. Chu Hsi*s Adoption of the Concept of the Body
The concept of the Body (shen) or Physical Form (.hsing) 
entered into Chu Hsi's philosophical system after his 
debate with the Hunan scholars during 1172-1173, his 
forty-third and forty-fourth year.
Earlier in his "new theory," Chu Hsi incorporated 
Ch* eng I's suggestion that Mind is the master of the 
Body, 1 but his purpose was rather to explore the 
character of Mind than the concept of the Body.
During the debate between Chu Hsi and the Hunan 
scholars, their attention turned to the problems of 
interpreting such terms as Mature, Feelings, tranquility, 
and activity as they occurred in Ch'eng I's treatise " Yen- 
tzu suo-hao ho-hsijeh luri’ C"0n What Yen-tzu Loved to 
Learn"] and in the " Yueh-chiu C"A Treatise on Music"] of 
the Li-chi [the Records of Fites'] . 333
The relevant paragraph in Ch*eng I's treatise is:
From the essence of life accumulated in Heaven 
and Earth, Man receives the Five Agents (Water, 
Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth) in their highest 
degree. His original Mature is pure and tranquil. 
While unaraused, its five moral principles, 
Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, Wisdom, and 
Faithfulness, are all present. As his Physical 
Form also appears at his birth, external things 
may stimulate it, through which his Nature is 
aroused from within. As it is aroused from 
within, the seven Feelings, pleasure, anger, 
sorrow, joy, love, hate, and desire, ensue. As 
Feelings become strong and increasingly reckless, 
Man* s Nature becomes damaged,
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Chu Hsi argued in his "Ta Hu Kuang-chung" that what Ch*eng
I meant was the same as the paragraph from the " Yueh-chi"
quoted below:
Man is born with tranquility, which is Heavenly 
Nature. Provoked by things he is active 
(aroused), as is the inclination of Nature. In 
confrontation with things the faculty of 
consciousness is aroused, and responds with like 
or dislike. If there is no regulation of like and 
dislike from within while consciousness is lured 
by things without, such a lack of reflection will 
result in the extinction of Heavenly 
Principle,
Both treatises are concerned with the tranquility of 
Nature, and the possibly damaging activity of Feelings. In 
Ch'eng I's treatise the concept of Physical Form is 
important in explaining the arising of Feelings. Although 
Chu Hsi did not elaborate this concept in that letter, 
from that time the concept of the Body and of Physical 
Form was to attract Chu Hsi’s increasing attention. This 
attention is seen in his " YUeh-chi tung-ching shutf* ["On 
Tranquility and Activity in the Treatise on Music"3, which 
appears to have been composed shortly after the 
controversy with the Hunan School. In this work he 
incorporates this concept into his system. He writes:
Man is born with the essence of Heaven and Earth.
While he is not aroused, he has the pure goodness
and in that goodness all the principles (li) are
present. That is what we call Nature. But as he
has Nature, so he has Physical Form. And as he
has Physical Form, so he has Mind, which cannot
but be aroused by external things. When it is
aroused by external things and moved, the 
inclinations of Nature emerge and the good and 
the evil flow apart. The inclinations of Nature 
are called Feelings.
It is interesting to see how Chu Hsi introduces the 
concept of the Body into his system. Nature has the 
metaphysical priority, the Body is secondary. But Nature
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does not create the Body. Just as the Great Ultimate is 
actualised only in Concrete Things, so wherever there is 
Nature, the Body must also exist. In this passage, the 
concept of Mind is introduced after the Body, and is 
regarded as arising with the Body. At the same time it is 
identified with Nature and the Feelings, of which it is 
also master.
The implication in Chu Hsi's formulation of the 
relationship between Nature, the Body, and the Mind is 
that Man, although he may be an independent subject, is 
still a creature among others in the universe. The 
development of Chu Hsi’s thought in the following years 
was to focuss on this aspect of Man and was to lead to a 
revision of his metaphysics in terms of "Princeple <li) 
and Material Force (cli'i)".
2. The Mortality of the Individual Mind
After the establishment of the "new theory" Chu Hsi 
discussed the faults in the philosophy of Hu Hung with 
Chang Shih and Lu Tsu—ch'ien. Their discussions were 
recorded in a long essay, " Hu-tsu chih-yen i-i" ["Critique 
of Hu Tzu* s Knowing Wordd'^^ completed in 1172, when Chu 
Hsi was forty-three years of age.
One of Chu Hsi’s concerns in this essay is the status 
of the individual Mind. In Hu Hung’s Chih-yen there is an 
argument that for the Mind there is neither birth nor 
death, Hu Hung* s initial argument is that because Man can 
think of his death, his thinking Mind must extend beyond 
death. This reasoning develops thereafter to the 
contention that, if the Mind is considered not from the 
aspect of Physical Form, but from the aspect of Mind, its 
permanence will be apparent,3-20 It seems to me that the 
argument implied here is as follows. Hu Hung* s method of
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self-cultivation, based on Immanent Vitalism, is aimed at 
cancelling the individuality and immersing the self into 
the cosmic life-principle. Such a method may succeed only 
on condition that the Mind is as reflective as a mirror,
not attached to the self but reflecting the objective
unfolding of the cosmic life-principle. Hu Hung would then 
be led to think that the reflectiveness of the Mind is due 
to its springing from a source different from the 
individual Body. In that case the individual Mind is
derived from, and is in fact identical with, the Mind of
Heaven and Earth. Therefore it neither comes nor goes with 
the individual corporeal life,
Chu Hsi's critique is as follows:
To say that the Mind has neither birth nor death 
is almost the doctrine of Buddhist 
transmigration. Heaven and Earth give birth to 
the myriad creatures. Man is the most favoured of 
these, and has the capacity for intelligence and 
awareness, just as the ears and eyes have the 
ability to see and hear. The Mind of Heaven and 
Earth may exist throughout the past and present, 
without growing or perishing. But the Mind of Man 
and Creature following their Physical Form and 
Material Force has beginning and end.3:27
Whatever superior qualities the Mind may have, Chu Hsi is 
saying, it still arises from the Body. Therefore, just as 
the reason that the Mind of Heaven and Earth may exist 
without growing or perishing is that the Body of Heaven 
and Earth is eternal, so the reason that the Mind of Man 
must have beginning and end, is that Man has a limited 
Body.
The reason for Chu Hsi’s careful separation of the
individual Mind from the Mind of Heaven and Earth, evident
from this criticism of Hu Hung's theory, was to avoid the 
position of Buddhist Idealism, There is no doubt that Hu
Hung was in favour of Confucianism, or that what he
advocated was a merging of one's self with the great 
cosmic life-principle, yet in so far as he maintained that
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the individual Mind was subject to neither birth nor 
death, he was in danger of elevating the status of that 
Mind to the level of Ultimate Principle, and to that 
extent appearing to be something of a Buddhist Idealist. 
In order to distinguish his own doctrine, then, from that 
of Buddhist Idealism, Chu Hsi was obliged to propose his 
concept of the Body, and to concede the nature of Man as 
creature.
Although this was, I believe, one motive for Chu 
Hsi’s adoption of the concept of Man as creature, his
underlying motivation was undoubtedly his deep concern 
with morality. Those who raise Mind to the level of
eternal Substance, tend in their moral practice to pursue 
the goal of enlightenment, Buddhism in China is a 
conspicuous expample of this tendency. One who wishes to 
promote a practical discipline of moral cultivation needs 
a theory of a finite Mind whose very limitations supply 
the necessity for the discipline. This finitude is 
supplied by the dependence of the Mind on the Body as 
creature among the myriad things of the Universe.
It should be noted that this explanation of Man as
creature requires the complementary docrine of Man as 
subject, because it is only by being a creature with the 
special endowment of subjectivity that ensures to Man the 
capacity as well as the necessity of engaging in the 
pursuit of morality.
3. The Introduction, of the Concept of Material Force in 
the Trai—chi T'u Shuo Chieh
The concept of Material Farce Cch'i), as the material 
foundation of Concrete Things (eh'li), was adapted by Chu 
Hsi in his T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh} which was written in 
1172. In the previous chapter, I discussed the two­
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dimensional substance-function relationship, between the 
Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin and Yang (Concrete 
Things), which is presented in the T'ai-chi t'u shuo 
c2iieht and compared it with that of his earlier Immanent 
Vitalist conception. Although in the new pattern the idea 
of abstract law has replaced the idea of life, it is still 
the same as the old pattern insofar as the Great Ultimate 
is completely immanent in Yin and Yang and in the things 
they generate. Therefore the old relationship between the 
One and the many remains. But since the Great Ultimate is 
no longer regarded as the cosmic life-principle itself, 
comprising and generating all of the separate lives, this 
immanent relationship requires another explanation.
The new metaphysics is characterised by the fact that 
the Great Ultimate is an abstract regulative principle, 
and is the reason for the existence and movement of Yin 
and Yang, whose interaction produces the myriad things. 
The indivisible Great Ultimate is therefore simultaneously 
immanent both in the totality of Yin and Yang and the 
myriad things, and in each of them individually. But this 
kind of One-many relationship is possible only on 
condition that there is another source for the many. In 
the T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh, in reference to Chou Tun-i's 
text, "When the reality of the Ultimate of Non-being and 
the essence of Yin, Yang, and the Five Agents come into 
mysterious union, integration ensues", Chu Hsi wrote the 
following commentary:
Under Heaven nothing is beyond Nature (i.e., the 
Great Ultimate), and Nature is in everything. 
Therefore we say that the Ultimate of Non-being 
(an epithet of, and so here equivalent to, the 
Great Ultimate) mixes completely with Yin and 
Yang and the Five Agents. This is "mysterious 
union". "Reality" describes Principle (i.e., the 
Great Ultimate), because of its non-illusoriness, 
"Essence" describes Material Force, because of 
its substantiality. "Integration" means gathering 
together. Material Force gathers itself together 
and becomes Physical Form. It seems that under
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the dominance of Nature, Yin and Yang and the 
Five Agents enter into a complicated process of 
mixture, and, according to each species, they 
integrate and became Physical Form.
In this paragraph the concept of Material Force is 
introduced. It seems to me that Chu Hsi's reasoning is as 
fallows. While the one Great Ultimate (Nature, which may 
also be described as the Ultimate of Non-being) causes the 
existence of Concrete Things, there has to be another 
source, that is, Material Force, to provide the matter for 
their formation, Yin and Yang, and their myriad offspring, 
exist owing to the Great Ultimate, but their
actualisation into Concrete Things is due to Material 
Force. Only with such a proposal, does it make sense to 
say that the same Great Ultimate may both be in each and 
in all Concrete Things. The Great Ultimate, as the reason 
for the existence of Concrete Things, projects itself in 
its entirety onto the other source, Material Force, and 
then Concrete Things are actualised. Under these 
circumstances, the Great Ultimate may exist in completion 
not only in the totality of Concrete Things, but 
separately within each Individual, A metaphor Chu Hsi 
often used is that of the one moon, becoming ten thousand 
moons when reflected in ten thousand rivers.33-9 This 
metaphor reveals to us that there must be a separate 
material source for the many, just as in order to reflect 
one and the same moon there must first be water to form 
the ten thousand rivers. In short, with the concept of 
Material Force, not only the source of matter for Concrete 
Things, but also the relationship between the One and the 
many, may be satisfactorily explained.
4. The Change of Meaning in the Concept of Material Force
147
We have seen how Chu Hsi added into his system the concept 
of Material Force during the development of his thought. 
Material Force is a concept he adopted from the Chinese 
philosophical tradition, but in his usuage he had given 
the term a new meaning. In order to understand this new 
meaning it will be necessary to trace that concept back to 
the tradition before Chu Hsi.
Goto Toshimizu, in his Shushi no hontairon i Ontology 
in the Philosophy of Chu Hsil , at first studied the 
ontologies of earlier Confucianists and Taolsts. The 
following is an account of the conclusions of his study. 
He finds that philosophical Taoism consistently reveals a 
monistic materialist ontology.330 The religious branch of 
Taoism from its beginnings appealed to the Lao-t&u and the 
I ohingt and dedicated itself to the search for the elixir 
of life which would enable men to return to the yuan ch'i 
(primitive undivided ether). Its practices presupposed a 
monistic materialism.331 With regard to Confucianism, he 
claims, the ontology of the I ching is a monism of the 
Great Ultimate. As to the nature of the Great Ultimate, 
Confucianists before the Sung dynasty, such as Cheng Hsuan 
and K’ung Ying-ta, thought of it as ch'i, According to 
these Conf ucianists, from the monistic ch* i of the Great 
Ultimate, the two ch'i of Yin and Yang evolved, and from 
them the myriad creatures were born,333
Goto also studied the concept of "order" and "law" in 
these branches of traditional Chinese thought. He 
maintained that the concept of a monistic materialistic 
substance was in neither of these schools purely material, 
but also contained within it the causal elements of law 
and of order. Nevertheless, as the materialistic character 
was the fundamental element for these schools, they were, 
after all, never able to escape their materialism. 
Traditional Chinese belief was therefore essentially 
materialist, though it allowed for a conception of law and 
of order. Differences among the schools merely reflected
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differing emphases on various aspects of the same kind of 
materialism. For example, religious Taoism pursued 
corporeal immortality by seeking for the elixir of life. 
As the yuan ch'i was for them the fundamental element of 
life, they were inclined to emphasise the material aspect, 
On the other hand, the Confucianists were devoted to 
morality and politics, as well as the ideal of unifying
with Heaven by following the law and the order of the
latter. Naturally, they were inclined to emphasise the 
aspects of order and law, When we reach the Sung dynasty, 
the challenge of Ch’an Idealism entered the philosophical 
arena, and so encouraged a rethinking of the traditional 
materialism. Chu Hsi inherited traditional Confucianism, 
after having had a profound Interest in Ch’an, so it was 
predictable that he would be inclined to emphasise the
non-materiallstic aspects,333
Goto ’ s study is very useful for a background to the
ontology of Chu Hsi, but some revision is required. In the
first place, to regard Taoism as materialistic is
problematic. Goto believes that since "Non-being" in
Taoism means "without form," it should be regarded as pure 
matter, whether considered as the primordial substance or 
as the origin of the universe. However, "Nan-being" in 
Taoism is commonly interpreted as the "absolutely void." 
If this is correct, Taoism is ultimately not
materialistic. But the second and more important question 
is that of the significance of the term "materialism," 
Goto is correct in maintaining that the ontology of both 
schools was based on the concept of ch'i (ether) or yLian- 
ch'i (primitive ether), but he is too hasty in 
categorizing it as materialism. For that reason, although 
in Chu Hsi the concept of ch'i was used in a materialistic 
sense, this is not the case with regard to its use before 
him. In traditional Confucianism and Taoism ch'i is the 
source of both matter and form, and "gives birth to" the 
myriad creatures, and so is vital rather than material. So
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the traditional ontology would be better classified as 
"vitalism," rather than as "materialism." Julia Ching 
argues that ch'i should be translated as "Vital Force" 
rather than "Material Force".234 In ray opinion, she is 
right if her recommendation is limited to the traditional 
use of the term before Chu Hsi. But the result would be 
misleading if this were applied to the usage of Chu Hsi 
and subsequent philosophers.
With this clarification, I suggest that it is 
appropriate to regard Chu Hsi as an advocate of an 
ontology based upon the conceptions of "law" and of 
"order," and also as the medium through which the concept 
of ch'i became modified from a vitalist to a materialist 
one. In the following section I shall investigate the 
process of this modification.
5, Vital Principle and Material Force
The place of Principle (Ii>, and of Material Force (ch'i), 
in the context of life was interpreted further by Chu Hsi 
in a letter written in reply to Liao Te-ming. I date this 
letter to the period 1173-1174 when Chu Hsi was forty-four 
or forty-five.330 The topics discussed in the letter
include eternal life and ancestral worship, but our
concern is only with the part discussing Principle and 
Material Force. Here Chu Hsi says:
Nature is Principle, Heaven and Earth change and 
the myriad creatures receive their life. Although 
I am endowed with Nature at birth, it is a
Principle not private to me.... Nature is
Principle, which neither is generated nor 
perishes. That which gathers Itself together into 
life, and disintegrates in death, is Material 
Force. The so-called Ghost (p'o) and Soul (hun) 
(equivalent in Chu Hsi to the Mind) which are 
conscious and perceptive are made of Material
Force, and consequently come and go with the
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assembling and disintegrating of the individual 
Body. But Principle is eternal.23e
In this passage Chu Hsi merely stated his opinion of the 
mortality of the individual Mind ("the Ghost and the Soul'' 
in this passage) as we have seen in his criticism of Hu 
Hung. But he extends the context of his discussion to the 
universe in the same letter;
Where there is Principle, there is Material 
Force. Where Material Force gathers together into 
creaturehood, the latter is endowed with 
Principle. The analogy of water and foam is not 
appropriate. -H3:ir
In order to understand the analogy referred to, we must 
examine Chu Hsi*s conception of Material Force. The 
Physical Form of an individual, according to Chu Hsi in 
the earlier quotation, passes through stages from 
formation to disintegration. After disintegration, it no 
longer exists. What’s more, it is implied in that 
quotation that what comes and goes is not merely the 
individual Body and Mind, but also the material basis of 
both of these, that is, Material Force. It is evident that 
Chu Hsi believed that the Material Force of an individual 
is in a constant process of coming into being and 
perishing, in total contrast, incidentally, with the 
modern conception of the conservation of matter. What is 
created with the new entity is the matter itself, and when 
the individual dies, the matter also vanishes with it 
forever. This explains Chu Hsi’s saying that the analogy 
of the relationship between water and foam is unsuitable, 
because when foam disintegrates, it returns to water, and 
so its matter remains. Extending this conception to 
Material Force in general, in the same letter Chu Hsi 
says:
The disintegrating Material Force vanishes 
forever, but the continually becoming Material
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Farce, which has its source in Principle, emerges 
without exhaustion.s®33
In this passage, Material Force emerged from nowhere, and 
then vanished forever. It may be said that Principle is 
the source of Material Force, but not in the sense of
creating the latter. It is rather that Principle, as the
reason for the existence and movement of creatures, 
requires that there be Material Force to actualise the
creatures. But since Principle is eternal and is the 
Principle of life, correspondingly Material Force emerges 
and perishes continuously, and the creatures which contain 
Principle are incessantly coming into being and dying.
The transformation of the conception of ch*I from
vitalistic to materialistic, tooh place not only in virtue 
of the transience of ch'i, but also because of the 
degeneration of ch * i into the secondary and material 
element of life. Principle then becomes the first and 
dominant element; and despite its being abstract and 
having nothing to do with consciousness or perception, it 
is properly called "Vital Principle" (sheng—Ji') .
What is the nature of Vital Principle? It is eternal, 
in contrast with the temporality of Material Force. It is 
the unique Great Ultimate, and can perhaps be thought of 
as the "immovable mover," It causes the evolution of 
Material Force in a circulating pattern of opposing 
forces, and therewith the myriad creatures are born and 
die. Because of the Vital Principle, from the very first 
moment of the inception of the universe Material Force has 
been dividing into Yin and Yang, the two opposite and 
interacting material forces. Then there is the circulation 
of the four seasons, and the life and death of the myriad 
creatures. The Vital Principle, as the abstract regulative 
principle, brings about, and then exists within, the 
evolution of the whole universe. Therefore it is proper to 
say that the world is made of law and matter, Vital
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Principle and Material Force being their respective 
sources.333
6. The Concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities"
Chu Hsi regarded the Mind of Heaven and Earth as the 
intention to create the myriad creatures. The opening 
sentence of the "J&n-shuo," quoted in the previous chapter 
makes this clear. This concept in fact plays the role of 
linking the Vital Principle and Material Force.
Chu Hsi interpreted the Mind of Heaven and Earth as a 
constant Intention to create in accordance with the Vital 
Principle without preference or capriciousness,2/10 For him 
another way of refering to "the Mind of Heaven and Earth" 
was "the Spirits Ckuei) and the Divinities (shen)." This 
concept, when adopted to his new metaphysics, was given a 
role as the highest level of Material Force, This
adoption, to my knowledge, was first made in his "Ta Liao 
Te-ming," where he says;
"The Spirits and the Divinities" are analogous to 
"the Ghost Cp* a) and the Soul Oilin') . " Master 
Ch*eng called this the function of Heaven and
Earth and the signs of creation. Master Chang
called it the inborn capacity of the Two Forces
(i.e. , Yin and Yang). It does not belong to 
Nature Cbut to Material Force].241
In this passage, Chu Hsi explains "the Spirits" and "the 
Divinities" in terms of their counterparts in Man, "the 
Ghost" and "the Soul." By Ghost Cpfo) Chu Hsi means the 
essence of human substance (t*i-chih-shen), and by Soul 
Chun) he means the essence of human breath (.oh'i-chih-
sfen) .a/JS: Through this analogy, "the Spirits and the
Divinities" are classified into the category of Material 
Force. Chu Hsi quotes Chang Tsai and Ch’eng I in order to
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support this opinion particularly for the association of 
the Spirits and the Divinities with the constituent parts 
of Material Force, namely, Yin and Yang respectively, r:'M-3
In his "Ta Liao Te-ming" Chu Hsi turned his attention 
to the meaning of ancestral worship, so that the 
ontological significance of the argument was not fully 
developed. We can only say that in his forty-fifth year, 
Chu Hsi had successfully divided Principle and Material 
Force, and had touched upon the ontological significance 
of the concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities," But in 
order to complete the exposition of Chu Hsi*s ontology it 
will be necessary to give a brief account of the later 
development of this concept in his system.
The advantage of the separation of Vital Principle 
from Material Force is that it produced a reverence for 
Principle, which is eternal and dominant in contrast with 
Material Force which is temporal. A consideration of the 
problem of immortality leads us to the conclusion that we 
should pay attention not to our transient personal lives, 
but to the eternal moral Principle. However, so long as 
the Vital Principle was elevated above Material Force, 
another problem was bound to arise. In such a dichotomous 
system, Vital Principle, the mover, belongs to 
metaphysical level, so can neither be divided nor move the 
real world; Material Force, the object moved, is oriented 
toward the myriad things and dynamic. Moreover, even if 
Material Force were set in motion, that motion would be 
mechanical rather than vital, Ch’ien Mu, in his Chu~tsu 
hsin-hsueh-an [ A Mew Anthology and Commentary on Chu Hsi 's 
Philosophy! , makes this point clear; "If the universe is 
understood only in terms of Principle and Material Force, 
it would lack vivacity and vitality, In order to
escape this paradoxical result there needs to be a third 
element acting as medium, having the characteristics of 
both Principle and Material Force, In Chu Hsi’s system, 
"the Divinities" (when mentioned singly, it can include
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the notion of "the Spirits"), or "the Spirits and the 
Divinities," serves this function.
In a conversation held after 1196, Chu Hsi says;
The Spirits and the Divinities exist on the level 
of Material Force, so it is physical (hsing-erh~ 
hsia) . However, in contrast to Things, the 
Spirits and the Divinities, being on the level of 
Material Force, are the substance of Things. 
Things exist on the level of Physical Form, and 
actually come into existence only given the 
existence of Material Force, The Spirits and the 
Divinities are the quintessence of Material 
Force,
"The Spirits and the Divinities" as opposing-and- 
circulating forces dominate the aggregation and separation 
of matter and may be regarded as the substance of Things. 
On the other hand, insofar as it is dynamic it belongs to 
the level of Material Force. Although the Vital Principle 
dwells in Material Force, it can activate the latter only 
by way of the forces of "the Spirits and the Divinities." 
However, from the point of view of Things, during the 
evolution of Material Force it is the forces of the 
Spirits and of the Divinities that we encounter as the 
most universal, and so it is from them that the working of 
Vital Principle may be inferred. "The Spirits and the 
Divinities" are therefore the representative of Vital 
Principle in the realm of Material Force. The ontology of 
Confucianism and Taoism before Chu Hsi was basically 
vitalist, While Chu Hsi for the purpose of emphasising 
morality elevated the Vital Principle and let Vital Force 
degenerate into Material Force, he had to add a medium 
between Vital Principle and Material Force, lest the 
universe should become unmovable, or move merely 
mechanically.
The concept of "the Spirits and the Divinities" is 
also advantageous for explaining consciousness. In 
appearance all things are separated, but they are in
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substance interconnected into a whole by the underlying 
opposlng-and-circulating forces of "the Spirits and the 
Divinities, " And because the Spirits and the Divinities 
are the substance of everything, each thing is 
interconnected with all the others. The means of connexion 
is consciousness. In physical objects and inferior 
creatures consciousness is latent or feeble; while in Man 
it is fully developed. The counterpart of "the Spirits and 
the Divinities" in Man is "the Ghost and the Soul," 
another name for the Mind. Through his consciousness Man 
can embrace the whole universe. In this way Chu Hsi found 
place for the subjective Mind in the objective context of 
the universe. With the theory of "the Spirits and the 
Divinities," Chu Hsi had elucidated the existence of a 
world of consciousness for Man within the dichotomous 
world of Principle and Material Force. It is noteworthy 
that the simultaneous insistence on the doctrine of "Man 
as subject" and "Man as creature," referred to previously, 
is provided with a systematic justification by this 
metaphysical position.
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHU HSI’ S METHOD OF 
SELF CULTIVATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
<1170-1177)
1. The Re1aticrash!p of the Two Methods, "Holding Fast to 
Attentlveness" and "Investigating Things,” to the 
Tranquil and Active States of Mind Respectively
The Investigation of Things Cka-wu) was an enterprise Chu 
Hsi had been dedicated to for most of his life, Since 
childhood, he had been devoted to broad and deep reading, 
While studying with Li T’ung, he regarded this enterprise 
as having its basis in the metaphysics of "the oneness of 
principle and the distinctiveness of particulars," During 
his "old theory” period, his method involved the 
combination of two kinds of discipline, "Seeking for 
Humanity," and "Investigating Things," of which the former 
was fundamental, while the latter was a subsidiary 
practice. However, with the establishment of the "new 
theory" and thereafter his new metaphysics, "the 
Investigation of Things" was placed on a par with "Holding 
Fast to Attentiveness" (.chu ching> which replaced the 
earlier discipline of Seeking for Humanity.
Not long after the formulation of the "new theory" 
in which Mind alternates between tranquility and activity, 
Chu Hsi allocated the practice of Attentiveness to the 
tranquil state of Mind, and added the Investigation of 
Things as a discipline for the regulation of the active 
state of Mind. As these are practised together, they make 
possible moral cultivation of the whole Mind. Chu Hsi said 
at that time that these two practices Included the 
practices of both substance and function, the fundamental 
and the minute, the internal and the external,246
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Since then Chu Hsi had regarded these two methods as 
complementary to one another, so that even when he was 
sixty-five he still described them as the two wheels of a 
cart or the two wings of a bird, 38 “V7’ However, a careful 
examination shows that there was a gradual change in their 
significance; they no longer matched the tranquil and 
active states of Mind respectively, but became unified as 
a daily regimen of moral cultivation.
2. The Establishment of the Stages of Elementary Learning 
and Great Learning
The famous division of Elementary Learning (hsiao-hsiieh) 
and Great Learning (ta~hsiieh) , which is crucial to the 
development of Chu Hsi’s method of moral cultivation, was 
made during his debate on the problem of Humanity with the 
Hunan School. The Hunan scholars argued that the
"knowledge and consciousness" of Humanity should precede 
moral practice. Chu Hsi reversed this procedure so that 
Attentiveness preceded knowledge, In their debate, Chu Hsi 
tried to support this sequence of moral disciplines by 
appealing to the classical authority of the Li chi. 
Although in his youth Chu Hsi had touched on the idea of 
Elementary Learning based on that Classic, it is
through that debate that he ascertained its position in 
the whole education, as well as its philosophical 
significance,
There is an interesting dialectical process in Chu 
Hsi’s reconstruction of the ancient theory of education. 
In the "old theory" Chu Hsi’s thought was close to that of 
the Hunan School, teaching that knowing Humanity is the 
premise of moral practice. But after establishing the "new 
theory" he argued that self-cultivation must precede the 
"knowledge and consciousness" of Humanity, It seems,
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Inferred from Chu Hsi’s reply, that the Hunan scholars 
fought against Chu Hsi by appealing to the authority of 
the Ta-hsueh, in which ’’the Investigation of Things” (ko~ 
wu> and ’’the Extension of Knowledge” (chih-chlh> come 
before moral practice. Reacting to this challenge, Chu 
Hsi, appealing to another authority, the Li-chit added a 
stage of Elementary Learning antecedent to the 
Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowlege. The 
Elementary Learning of the ancients had the purpose of 
teaching children under fifteen the familial requirements, 
such as hygiene and manners, and those of society such as 
rites, music, archery, and charioteering. It was not only 
a means of socialization, but was also a discipline for 
the composure and firmness of Mind through habitual 
practice. Although the Ta-h&Ueh I the Great Learning! 
starts from the Investigation of Things and the Extension 
of Knowledge, these disciplines are subsequent to the 
habitual practice started in the Elementary Learning.
In contrast to the opinion of :the Hunan School that 
according to the Ta-hsueh acquisition of knowledge should 
precede practice, Chu Hsi argued that the order of those 
two displines should be decided in the context of the 
whole process of learning. This process, according to Chu 
Hsi, is as fallows. Ear each item to be inculcated, a 
knowledge and understanding of it should precede any 
practice of it. So in the stage of Elementary Learning, 
while teaching children the virtues of filial and 
fraternal piety, Purity (ch'eng) and Attentiveness, and 
familiarizing them with the texts of the Classics, we must 
explain to them the significance of each item of these 
disciplines before requiring the children to practise 
them. Such learning is called ’’shallow” knowledge and 
’’small” practice. Coming into the stage of Great Learning, 
students are taught to extrapolate from what they already 
know toward the unknown, and so to broaden their knowledge 
until it comprehends all the principles of Heaven, Earth,
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and the myriad things. And it is not until such time that 
the Way, including Purification of the Will < ch' eng-i > , 
Rectification of the Mind (cheng-hsin), Personal 
Cultivation (hsiu-shen) , Regulation of the Family (ch'i- 
chla), Bringing Order to the State <ch'ih-kuo), and 
Bringing Peace to the World (.p* ing-t * len-h&ia) , may be 
completely fulfilled. This completion of knowledge is what 
Chu Hsi called "deep" knowledge, and the fulfillment of 
the Way is what he called "great" practice. Chu Hsi 
concluded that for every item, at each stage, knowledge is 
required before practice is possible, yet the totality of 
learning is itself a dialectical development between 
knowledge and practice, such that shallow knowledge and 
small practice must be attained before their deep and 
great counterparts, 2E1°
Chu Hsi could defend his position that the practice 
of Attentiveness must precede the knowledge of Mind by 
formulating the relationship between these two in terms of 
the distinction between Elementary and Great Learning. The 
practice of Attentiveness then could be categorized as 
Elementary Learning, for the latter does in fact aim at 
acquiring the habit of Attentiveness during the course of 
learning. But the knowledge of Mind is of a deep kind, and 
so must be subsequent to the practice of Attentiveness.
The formulation of the teaching of Elementary and 
Great Learning also prompted a new phase in Chu Hsi’s
method of self-cultivation. The practice of Attentiveness 
and the Investigation of Things were no longer assigned to 
particular states of Mind, but were simply treated as 
daily moral disciplines. One reason might be that once
these practices are thought of as the school curriculum, 
they would inevitably lose any sense of "inner"
cultivation and became formal disciplines, More
significantly, although Chu Hsi proposed a two-staged 
course of education, his students were in fact adults who 
had missed their Elementary education, and had long since
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entered the proper time for Great Learning. Therefore Chu 
Hsi required them to practise both the Elementary and the 
Great Learning concurrently, They had to devote themselves 
to the Investigation of Things, while at the same time 
practising Attentiveness in order to compensate for having 
missing the opportunity in childhood.
In this way, in Chu Hsi’s assessment, the two 
methods became a daily regimen of moral practice, not 
necessarily assigned to different states of Mind; while 
the Investigation of Things, as it belonged to "Great 
Learning," became increasingly important.
3. Holding Fast to Attentiveness for the Containment 
of Mind
Since the establishment of the "new theory," Attentiveness 
had been regarded as the fundamental method of self- 
cultivation. But because the purpose of Attentiveness was 
the cultivation of Mind, its significance would not be 
ascertained until the character of Mind was understood. We 
have seen that Chu Hsi accounted the essential character 
of Mind as a pure capacity, independent from, and able to 
dominate, such elements as Nature, Feelings, and the Body. 
But the question of how Mind could be moral still had to 
be answered. Chu Hsi’s opinion on this matter was 
formulated around 1174, at the age of forty-five, through 
discussing a paragraph of the ffeng—t&u with a few of his 
friends.3®3 The relevant Meng—t&u text is, "Confucius 
said, 'Hold it fast (ts’ao) and you contain <.ts*un) it. 
Let it go and you lose it. It comes in and goes out at no 
definite time and without anyone’s knowing its direction,’ 
He was talking about Mind.*’3®3 Chu Hsi interpreted this as 
follows:
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The substance of Mind is originally tranquil, 
yet it cannot but move. Its function is 
originally goad, but it may also drift into
evil. That which drifts into evil may not be
called the original [function of] substance of 
Mind, nevertheless it must be called Mind, 
albeit under the spell of external things. Thus 
the sage (i.e., Confucius) only says, "Hold it 
fast and you contain it (Chu Hsi appends a 
note: the Mind while contained is tranquil, and
all its activities will be good); let it go and 
you lose it (note: Therefore the active Mind
drifts into evil); it comes in and goes out at
no definite time and without anyone’s knowing
its direction (note: ’go out’ means ’lose’ and
’come in’ means ’contain.’ There is neither
definite time nor definite place [as regards 
the Mind's being contained or lost], but all 
depends on whether man holds it fast or lets it 
go)." These four sentences included all that 
may be said of Mind: substance, function,
beginning, end, reality, illusion,
righteousness, and perversion. And there are 
only two alternatives for the placing of Mind; 
either hold it fast, and it "comes in," or let
it go, and it "goes out;" there is no other
place to locate Mind.
This exposition is a continuation of his "new theory," in
which, with the effort of Attentiveness (i.e., the
"holding fast" in this passage), Mind may contain itself 
in tranquility, so that its activity (function) may fallow 
due course and degree. An examination of Chu Hsi’s 
criticism of his friends’ interpretation of this text will 
clarify Chu Hsi’s opinion on the character of Mind, and 
the role of the practice of Attentiveness.
There are three other interpretations and therefore 
three more views of Mind:
(1) Ho Hao and Shih Lei held that the substance of
Mind is transcendent. They maintain that the substance of
Mind cannot be described in terms of "containing" and
"losing." Chu Hsi retorted that if this were so, what is
held fast and contained is not the substance. But in that
case, what is it and why bather to contain it?3®® It 
becomes clear that Chu Hsi held a realistic view of Mind,
162
contrary to the Idea that there might be a pure
transcendental Mind beyond our reach and therefore 
impossible to be cultivated.
(2) Yu Chiu-yen thought that the correctness of Mind 
lies in its coming in and going out at the right time, 
Against this view Chu Hsi argued that Confucius did not 
consider it an affliction of Mind that it should come in 
and go out at no definite time.3®3 It seems that,
different from Chu Hsi, Yu Chiu-yen used "come in" and "go 
out" to mean the "tranquility" and "activity" of the Mind, 
But here I analyse only Chu Hsi’s opinion. Chu Hsi’s
criticism is important in deciding the relation of Mind to 
morality. Chu Hsi meant, I suggest, that the character of 
Mind as such consists in spontaneity rather than in 
morality, Mind may spontaneously be moral, but not 
necessarily so. Therefore the "going out" (which means
"acting and drifting into evil") of Mind cannot be called 
the affliction of Mind. If preceded by the practice of 
Attentiveness, Mind will spontaneously be moral. If there 
has been no such practice, the drifting of Mind into evil 
will still be a result of its spontaneity, and therefore 
of the character of Mind,
(3) The third erroneous opinion, proposed by Lu Tsu- 
chien, is that Confucius, though referring to the actual 
Mind with these terms ("coming in" and "going out"), is 
not to be understood as making a value judgement. Rather, 
his intention is to convey something of the swiftness and 
agility of Mind in the transition between tranquility and 
activity. Although what Confucius indicated to us is not 
the Original Mind, the marvellous agility and flexibility 
of the substance of Mind is still revealed in its 
continuous cyclical transformation. Facing this opinion, 
Chu Hsi’s attitute became conservative again. He commented 
that Confucius, in describing the endless transition of 
Mind, did not mean to admire it, but rather mean to 
cultivate it with the method of Attentiveness.
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Set in contrast to the above three views, Chu Hsi' s 
concept of Mind should be clear. There is only one Mind, 
which is our everyday mind, and whose character is pure 
spontaneity. Nevertheless, Mind should not be thought of 
as amoral; firstly, it has to be evaluated in terms of 
morality; and secondly, only if preceded by the practice 
of Attentiveness, will Mind naturally move in the 
direction of morality.
But in that case Attentiveness is only the necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for achieving a moral Mind. 
Mind as such is a purely spontaneous capacity, and in form 
is a pure consciousness. The practice of Attentiveness 
contributes to its containment and so enhances its 
tendency toward morality. But a great deal more effort is 
required in order to extend the Mind and increase its 
moral value. For this purpose, another moral method, the 
Investigation of Things, has to be employed.
4. The Concept of the Body and the Search for Universality
In section A of this chapter we have seen that through the 
debate with the Hunan School, Chu Hsi's concept of the 
Body (shen) was formed. What I shall now consider is how 
that concept contributed to the development of the method 
of the Investigation of Things, in the tenth month of 
1173, Chu Hsi wrote ” Nan-chien-chou yu-hsi hsien-hsiieh 
chi." In it he said:
Heaven gives birth to Man and endows him with 
the Nature of Humanity, Righteousness, 
Propriety, and Wisdom, and therefore puts Man 
into the relations of sovereign and subject, 
father and son, brother and brother, husband 
and wife, friend and friend, which are called 
the "constancies" of Man, However, the material 
force which a particular man is endowed with is 
not necessarily pure and excellent. Therefore
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while desires are aroused and Feelings are in 
excess, he may degenerate without knowing it. 
For this reason the ancient sage kings 
established schools to educate their 
people. . , . ■’s2®’21
Following this is a passage concerned with Elementary and 
Great Learning similar to that described in the previous 
section. It is noteworthy that in this passage it is the 
Body that brings about the necessity for learning, Chu Hsi 
followed Chou Tun-1 and Ch’eng I, in maintaining that the 
human Body, with Nature as its Principle, is composed of 
the "highest excellence of the Five Agents." But as 
evident in this passage, this excellence is relative to 
the animals and plants. Between men, Bodies manifest 
natural differences, and these differences are ultimately 
due to an unequal endowment of Material Force, Thus, it is 
the differences between Bodies, and in their underlying 
Material Force, that constitute the reason that all men 
are in need of education; and this education enables them 
to realise their Nature and the Essential Relationships, 
which are universal, In other words, learning is a 
struggle toward the objective and universal Principle, by 
Man who, still being imperfect, is inclined toward error. 
The purpose of the Investigation of Things, which now 
becomes the central method of moral cultivation, is 
therefore to search for the objective and universal 
Principle,
5. The Substance—Function Structure of Principle
Chu Hsi came to appreciate the philosophical significance 
of the Investigation of Things in the period from about 
1174, when he was forty-five years of age. This is shown 
by the following facts, (1) In a letter replying to Chiang
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Mo, written probably in 1174, Chu Hsi said that he had 
known of Ch'eng I's interpretation of the method of the 
Investigation of Things when he was fifteen or sixteen, 
and had given it more than thirty years thought. He added, 
however, that it had not been till recently that he had
realised the correctness of this interpretation. This
realisation came, he said, on the one hand through the 
justification it offered his own method of moral practice, 
and on the other hand through the discovery of the 
consistency between that interpretation and other 
Classics.3®3 (The classical source for the Investigation 
of Things is the Ta~hsueh, > (2) Two years later in another
essay he related the Investigation of Things to other 
Classics and declared it the cardinal heritage of the 
tradition received from Confucius, Yen Tzu, Tzu-ssu, and 
Mencius,3®0 (3> A year earlier, in 1175, Chu Hsi 
confronted Lu Chiu-yiian at the Goose Lake Monastery (O-hu 
ssu) in a debate over the relative primacy of learning 
(i.e., the Investigation of Things), or of the cultivation 
of Original Mind <.pen-hsln> .3®'* Although their debate was 
somewhat preliminary, it may well have brought about Chu 
Hsi's rethinking of the meaning of Investigation of 
Things,
Now we shall see how Chu Hsi interpreted the 
Investigation of Things in the letter replying to Chiang 
Mo.
Heaven gives birth to people, giving them 
Things (wu, by which Chu Hsi meant external 
things and affairs, although the human Body 
should also be included) and Standards (tse). 
"Things" refer to that which has Physical Form, 
and Standards to Principle (li), which 
transcends Physical Form. As soon as Man is 
born, he cannot but have Things, If he does not 
understand the Principle of those Things, he is 
unable to follow the correctness of Nature and 
Heavenly Destiny nor to respond to Things in 
the proper manner. Therefore he must reach into 
Things in order to find Principle, If he knows 
to search for Principle but does not enter
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thoroughly into Things, the Principle of Things 
will not be totally uncovered and his Knowledge 
will not be fully extended. Therefore he should 
Investigating Things thoroughly. This is why we 
say that in the Investigation of Things, only 
by entering into Things can the Principle of 
Things be fully uncovered. When this is 
achieved, our Knowledge will become
comprehensive and thorough, and consequently 
without obstacle or ignorance; the Will will 
naturally become Pure and Mind will become 
Rectified. This is the original meaning of the 
text in the Ta-h&ueh, and that is why the 
interpretation of Master Ch’eng is correct,3®3
The first thing we notice in this paragraph is that 
Chu Hsi maintains Man can reach Principle only by 
Investigating Things, including himself and all that he 
encounters. The idea that Principle, the aim of 
Investigation, is to be found in Things, is evidently 
based on the doctrine of his new metaphysics that the 
Great Ultimate (i.e., Principle) dwells in each Concrete 
Thing. According to Chu Hsi, the Principle in a Thing will 
be revealed to us in terms of its substance-f unction 
structure. The functional part he named "the way it (i.e., 
the Thing in which Principle dwells) should be" (suo-tang- 
jan) and the substantial part "the reason it should be so" 
(suo-i-jan) , as® The former refers to both the ideal state 
of the Thing, and the self-evidently correct behaviour 
which should be universally directed towards that Thing. 
For example, Chu Hsi says in the same letter:
"What should be treated generously" refers to 
fathers, sons, and brothers, having affection 
towards each other. This is "the way it should 
be” of Principle, and is also the way Mind 
cannot help but feel.
In this example, fathers, sons, and brothers are "Things," 
whereas the affection and the devotion among them are "the 
way Things should be."3®® The substantial part, "the 
reason it should be so," indicates Nature (the Great
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Ultimate immanent in that Thing) which supports the 
existence of that Thing, and which can manifest "the way 
it should be."
This substance-function structure of Principle may 
be examined from the two ponts of view discussed in the 
previous chapter. From the point of view of the whole, the 
Great Ultimate is the reason for the circulation of 
Material Force between tranquility and activity. The Great 
Ultimate, as substance, is "the reason that Things should 
be as they are." As regards "the way Things should be," it 
consists in the circulation of Material Force, during the 
tranquility of which the Concrete Things are made, and 
during the activity of which the Concrete Things fulfill 
their Natures. From the paint of view of Concret Things, 
in each of them dwells Nature, the Great Ultimate 
incarnated: that is "the reason it should be so." When
Nature is manifest both as the ideal of that Thing, and as 
the moral codes which should be followed by all those who 
come in touch with that Thing, it becomes the Way (in a 
narrow sense, meaning the manifestation of Nature), that 
is "the way the Thing should be,"
With this concept of Principle there is no 
distinction, such as we make today, between natural law 
and moral law. This is because Principle, the metaphysical 
substance, as abstract regulative standard is itself the 
idea of law. It is in itself the metaphysical reason for 
the existence of Things. But while dwelling in a Thing as 
its Nature, its function consists in the laws which are to 
be followed by all Things. Both natural and moral laws 
constitute "the way Things should be." As natural Things 
must follow natural law so must Man observe moral law. And 
as to "the reason Things should be so" it is the same 
Great Ultimate for both kinds of law. In this sense there 
is no distinction between natural and moral law.
Now we examine how "Investigating Things" enables 
Mind to achieve morality. For this purpose Chu Hsi first
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contrasts and then combines the Investigation of Things 
(as an external study) with the Extension of Knowledge (as 
an internal acquirement) . Chu Hsi can do this, in my 
opinion, for the following reason. Mind, as pure 
consciousness, may be considered both with regard to its 
contents and with regards to its capacity. Its contents 
are what it embraces, and this includes Nature and 
Feelings, as well as the acquired knowledge of Principle. 
Its capacity is shown by the fact that it can yield a 
mastery over Nature, Feeling, and the Body, and can 
acquire Principle and put it into application. Since Mind 
has these two aspects, the uncovering of the Principle of 
Things not only extends the contents of knowledge, but, 
more importantly, extends the capacity of Mind. The Will, 
in Chu Hsi’s system, is defined as ’’the activity of the
Mind.’’ Therefore, while Knowledge is broadened to the
point where nothing remains obscure and the capacity of 
the Mind is greatly increased, the Will will be Pure, and 
as a natural consequence Mind will be Rectified.
Here I shall give an example from Chu Hsi's Meng-tsu 
huo~wen C Questions and Answers on the Mencius! , the 
production of many years effort, published in 1177.33,3161 In 
that work Chu Hsi discussed substance and function in 
terms of understanding Principle. He Interprets the phrase 
’’the extension of Mind to the utmost, (chin-hsin") as
the result of Investigating Things and Extending 
Knowledge. He says that the substance of Mind emcompasses 
[the Principle of] everything and the function of Mind 
manages (i.e., properly responds to) everything. 
Therefore, while through Investigation, Principle is 
thoroughly understood and nothing is left unknown, the 
substance and function of Mind which include everything 
may be fully extended.3®®
These conclusions concerning the Investigation of
Things and its relation to Mind were the culmination of
Chu Hsi’s long retirement from public office, when he left
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his post as the clerk of records of the T* ung-an 
prefecture in 1156. During these twenty years he had 
adopted Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism, and then struggled 
to establish his own metaphysics. Living on a government 
sinecure, he enjoyed "the twenty years in seclusion."3433 
By the end of that period, he had achieved many things. 
The meaning of Principle had been clarified; and, of the 
two methods of self-cultivation, the Investigation of 
Things had been given a predominent position. This was 
because the practice of Attentiveness had been restricted 
to the role of "containing" (t&'un) Mind as the 
prerequisite for further effort, whereas the Investigation 
of Things was the way to "extend" (chin) Mind, in the
aspects both of substance and of function. By this time, 
then, the elements of his philosophy were complete. From
about the age of fifty, his life entered a new stage.
Although he still had plenty of time in seclusion, he 
dedicated himself sometimes to government duties, 
sometimes to political struggles, and he often Involved 
himself in debates with other schools. His life was no 
longer as peaceful as it had been during the previous
twenty years, yet it was only in response to these 
challenges that he was able to test and revise his 
opinions, and so merge them into a comprehensive system.
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C. THE ELEVATION OF PRINCIPLE 
<1175-1189)
1. Honouring Moral Nature and Following the Path of 
Enquiry and Study
In 1175 the celebrated debate between Chu Hsi and the Lu 
brothers, Lu Chiu-ling and Lu Chiu-yiian, took place in the 
Goose Lake Monastery. The significance of this debate for 
Chu Hsi was that he was provoked into rethinking his 
method of the Investigation of Things. This is evident 
from the fact that in the following years one of Chu Hsi’s 
main concerns was to find a balance between "honouring 
moral nature" (tsun-te-hsing) and "following the path of 
enquiry and study" (tao—wen-hsueh) .
The classical source for these two methods of moral 
cultivation is an axiom of the Chung-yung. 3V,° The latter 
method was generally regarded in Chu Hsi’s time as the 
essential part, and indeed often as Identical with, the 
Investigation of Things. This was the first of the many 
disagreements between Chu Hsi and the Lu School,
In the debate at the Goose Lake Monastery, the Lu 
brothers made a contrast between the Original Mind (pen- 
hsin> and book learning. The Original Mind they referred 
to was that which is universal to everybody and which is 
naturally moral. That everybody has the Original Mind is 
evident from the fact that everybody, without instruction, 
knows how to love their parents, respect their elders, 
mourn for the dead, and show reverence during rituals, 
They argued that extension of the Original Mind leads to 
sagehood, but that book learning distracts from the 
cultivation of the Mind, so much so that if it should 
become the chief focus and concern, it would block the 
Original Mind and never lead to sagehood. Chu Hsi was
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very displeased with their criticism of book learning, to 
which he had been devoted for so many years. After the
debate, in a letter to Chang Shih, Chu Hsi described the 
Lu brothers as "totally abolishing book learning and 
dedicated solely to daily practice. Their teaching is the 
enlightenment of the Original Mind in the course of daily 
practice." Chu Hsi thought "they are too confident, and 
narrow-minded, and they do not acquire virtues externally, 
so that they are unconsciously inclined toward Ch’an."
However, although he did not retreat an inch in his
argument in favour of book learning, he was impressed by
the personal virtues of the Lu brothers, so that he 
described them as "having admirable temperaments,"
"holding fast to simplicity and honesty, and
straightforward from within, which is really
extraordinary. "
In the next few years Chu Hsi had more encounters 
with the Lu brothers and their students, Comparing their 
personalities with those of his own students, Chu Hsi 
concluded that both schools had strengths and weaknesses, 
and the best thing to do was to combined the strengths and
to eliminate the weaknesses of both sides. In 1180, at the
age of fifty-one, he expressed this opinion in several 
letters,3:73 but what I shall quote here is a letter 
written to Hsiang An-shih, a student of the Lu brothers, 
in 1183.
Generally speaking, from the time of Tzu-ssu (the 
supposed author of the Chung-yung), it has been 
proposed that "to honour moral nature" and "to
follow the path of enquiry and study" are the two
crucial disciplines in education. Now what Tou­
ching (Lu Chlu-yiian) has said is exclusively 
concerned with honouring moral nature, while what 
[Chu] Hsi usually discusses is generally in the 
line of enquiry and study, Therefore his (Tou­
ching’s> followers are mostly magnificent in 
moral integrity, but are not the least bit 
careful in studying the Way. On the contrary they 
cover up their carelessness by inventing and 
sticking to an imaginary doctrine, As for myself,
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although I never talk unintelligibly about the 
Way, I often miss the the crucial paint of 
discerning whether my study is "far [the 
improvement of] myself" or "for [the approbation 
of] others, ’’::2'74 [and consequently neglect the 
pursuit of internal virtues. ] Now both of us 
should reflect and make effort to avoid the 
weaknesses and combine the strengths, so that we 
may not be one-sided. 3:?'s
Chu Hsi admired "keeping steadfast to virtues" on the part 
of the Lu School, but was more reserved when speaking of 
their learning and doctrine. However, the teaching of the 
Lu School served as a mirror in which were reflected the 
shortcomings of his awn method. Moral cultivation and 
classical study should be combined, as Tzu-ssu taught. But 
in reality they are usually so divided that complete 
dedication to one results in neglect of the other. Perhaps 
this difficulty is a permanent one. For, strictly 
speaking, neither Chu Hsi nor Lu Chiu-yuan solved it, nor 
was it solved in the subsequent intellectual history. It 
is said, for example, that the Ming scholars "honoured 
moral nature," whereas the Ch’ing scholars "followed the 
path of enquiry and study,"3v'ei
Our task, however, is to see how Chu Hsi formulated 
his solution to this problem. His experience with the Lu 
brothers reminded him to keep a balance between dally 
practice and book learning, But in my opinion, a more 
positive consequence is that it inspired Chu Hsi to 
reflect upon the significance of studying the Confucian 
Classics. This can be seen from the following change in 
his attitude to this question. In his letter of 1183, 
quoted above, he had been critical merely of the 
carelessness with which the Lu School approach book 
learning, but from 1185 on, he became increasingly 
distressed by their occasional self-proclaimed superiority 
and arrogance, which he ascribed to their lack of 
cultivation in the Classics. a:"/7. Their behaviour increased 
his confidence in the relation of the Classics to moral
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cultivation, so that a year later in a letter to Lu Chiu- 
yuan he described how effective he himself had recently 
been in his daily practice, and how he was no longer 
troubled by the shortcomings of detailed and therefore 
fragmented study.333 Because Chu Hsi never abandoned 
commentating the Classics, I believe, that what he meant 
by this must have been that the sayings in the Classics 
were now for him not only texts for study, but 
increasingly applicable to daily life.
In a letter from his later years written to one of 
his students, Lin Pu, Chu Hsi described the nature of 
Confucian teaching as fallows:
Although the Way as a whole is high and great, it 
exists to the fullest in the daily, trivial, and 
Immediate affairs. , . , Therefore the sage 
(Confucius) taught us to go about our affairs in 
the proper order. He made us seek among the most 
immediate and trivial things, thereby enlarging 
our minds with learning to open the door of 
scholarship, and constraining our behaviour with 
propriety to guarantee the fulfillment of daily 
practice.333 Then, when one advances an inch, one 
will stand fast at that inch; when one advances a 
foot, one will stand fast at that foot, In this 
way we gain ground daily and monthly. Then the 
Way as a whale may be expected to be gradually 
understood, and practised until eventually 
fulfilled.330
From this letter we can see that Chu Hsi made use of a 
correspondence between the Confucian Classics, daily 
practice, and the Way. Chu Hsi had sufficient reason to 
require such a harmony between these three, because the 
Confucian Classics reflected the world of the Essential 
Relationships, and it was within that world that Chu Hsi 
sought the Way, This position could not have been reached 
without the challenge of the Lu School with respect to 
book learning.
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2. The Distinction Between Heavenly Principle and Human 
Desires
In the twelfth month of 1182, at the age of fifty-four, 
Chu Hsi was appointed financial adviser of Eastern 
Chekiang (Che-tung), and in that, capacity was responsible 
for the management of a large famine relief campaign. 
While in that post he had the opportunity of meeting 
several Chekiang scholars. In the result, he was far from 
impressed by their teaching; and after he resigned and 
returned home, in the ninth month of 1183, he wrote 
several letters in criticism of them. 331
He said of them in a letter to Shen Shu-hui:
They abolish the Classics while studying the 
Histories; pass over the Way of the sage kings, 
while promoting the art of power politics; 
discussing thoroughly the historical process of 
ascent and downfall, yet not examining whether 
their own minds are contained or distracted.333
These three criticisms are made by means of three 
contrasts. The first contrast concerns the works to be 
studied: the Classics or the Histories. In the second
contrast Chu Hsi attacks their learning: their goal was
the politics of self-interest and opportunism. In the 
final contrast Chu Hsi complains that they are rashly 
negligent of the cultivation of their own minds.
In the course of the dispute, the focus of attention 
gradually fell on the distinction within the Mind itself 
between Heavenly Principle (t'ien-li) and Human Desires 
<jen-yu) , This theme was earnestly debated between Chu Hsi 
and Ch’en Liang, the outstanding Chekiang scholar. In 
their debate such problems as the role of ethics in 
politics, and of the Way in history, were also raised,333 
but we shall be concerned only with Chu Hsi’s elevation of 
the concept of Heavenly Principle.
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Chf en Liang argued. that human History always 
manifests Morality. According to him, wherever Man exists, 
there is the Mind, which cannot be lost forever, and 
wherever there is the Mind, there are the laws (of the
sage kings), which cannot be abolished forever.
Chu Hsi retorted that in the use of the term 11 not
forever," Ch* en Liang in fact has allowed that the Mind
may "sometimes" be lost and the laws "sometimes"
abolished. Chu Hsi pointed out that the Mind is not always 
reliable. It is composed of the Moral Mind (tao-hsin) and 
the Human Mind (.Jen-hsin) , and that although the farmer is 
the source of morality, the latter is the source of 
immorality, Chu Hsi then traced the origins of both kinds 
of Minds and showed that from the time of birth, Man is 
confined to the particularity of his individual Body, and 
so has a particular Human Mind manifesting Human Desires. 
On the other hand, because at his birth he acquired the 
perfection of Heaven and Earth, he must have a Moral Mind 
manifesting Heavenly Principle. In daily life there is 
always the continual competition between these two Minds, 
and one must win over the other. Therefore we must make 
sure to discriminate the Human Mind from the Moral Mind, 
and having done so to hold fast to the latter. Only 
through such steadfast application will it be possible not 
to stray from Heavenly Principle to Human Desires.284
The distinction between the Human Mind and the Moral 
Mind played an important role in Chu Hsi’s late 
philosophy. It was a continuation of his theory that the 
Mind should not be regarded as inherently good, but must 
be made virtuous through moral effort. That is why he had 
developed the "new theory," in which he maintained that 
the practice of Attentiveness was necessary for the proper 
functioning of the Mind, The advance made by Chu Hsi 
during the present debate consisted in his having 
accounted theoretically for the moral character of the 
Mind. Since Man is endowed with the excellence of Heaven
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and Earth, while at the same time being confined to a 
particular Body, so there is a permanent distinction and a 
constant competition between the Moral Mind and the Human 
Mind. Indeed, though Chu Hsi touched on this point, most 
of his argumentation during this period was concerned with 
the distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human 
Desires.
In making this distinction, Chu Hsi affirmed the 
supremacy of Principle. In contrast to the sometimes 
wayward Mind, Principle is permanent and absolute. When 
the Mind becomes conscious of the Principle, it becomes 
identified with the Moral Mind. But even if the Human Mind 
should supersede or obstruct the Moral Mind, Principle 
will still subsist within Man as the inchoate perfection, 
or will exist above Man as the Way of Heaven and Earth. 
Indeed, Principle precedes Mind, and even precedes 
history. In this way Chu Hsi came to deny Ch’ en Liang's 
argument which ascribes moral value to human history 
without qualification. Chu Hsi paints out in a letter to 
Ch’en Liang:
It is true that Heaven, Earth, and Man are as 
they are because there is only one Way. But 
Heaven and Earth have no Mind (here "having no 
Mind" means "being absolutely objective") whereas 
Man has Desires. Therefore although the 
revolution of Heaven and Earth is constant, Man 
may sometimes go astray. The moment the Moral 
Mind is lost, the Way of Man is extinguished. 
When the Way of Man is extinguished, although' the 
one Way still functions in Heaven and Earth, it 
does not proceed among Men. It is wrong to infer 
from the fact that Heaven always proceeds high 
above and Earth always complies down below, that 
the Way of Man is always fulfilled, and in its 
turn supports the existence of Heaven and 
Earth.
In this way Chu Hsi not only demanded the necessity of the 
self-examination of the Mind, and of the fulfillment of 
the Way of the ancient sage kings, but, most importantly,
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taught the constancy and absoluteness of Principle (the 
constant Way of Heaven and Earth).
The distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human 
Desires became another weapon for Chu Hsi to use in his
attacks on the Lu School. In 1186 when Chu Hsi was fifty-
seven, his relationship with the Lu School became
increasingly antagonistic. From this time he often made
reference to this distinction. In a letter to Lu Chiu-yuan 
he described their advocacy of the primacy of Original 
Mind as an arrogant theory separating the internal and the 
external, the subtle and the coarse, and involving a 
dichotomy between conscience and daily affairs.206 This is 
an accusation that the Lu School failed to cultivate their 
Minds with the Principle which is manifested in external 
Things. In a letter to his friend, Chao Yen-su, written at 
about this time, Chu Hsi describes the learning of Lu 
Chiu-yuan as follows:
He has good opinions on the cultivation of the 
Mind. Because of these, he regards himself as 
transcending traditional and contemporary 
scholarship, and pays no more attention to the 
Investigation of Principle. In this way he has 
lost what he had gained. He fails to notice that 
his human desires are going astray everywhere 
while he boasts that he possesses all Heavenly 
Principle within his mind. I do not know where 
his cultivation lies!:S!Kr;K
This comment, I believe, is too harsh on Lu Chiu-yiian. 
However, it does reflect how Chu Hsi had regained his 
confidence in his own method. It also shows that in his 
own philosophy the position of Principle had been elevated 
above that of Mind.
3. The Distinction Between ”the Great Ultimate” and 
”Yin and Yang”
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I shall now consider the development of the relationship 
between Principle and Material Force in Chu Hsi*s 
philosophy. The use of "Principle" and "Material Force" as 
contrasting terms seems to date from 1172, when he wrote 
his draft of the T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh\ but he does not 
use them frequently in this contrastive way until 1189, 
after a debate with Lu Chiu-yuan.;:ae3 I believe the reason 
for this is that when first proposed in Chu Hsi’s forties, 
it was explicitly used for the purpose of explanining 
individual life (this has been discussed earlier in this 
chapter) , but for this purpose Chu Hsi found the other 
pair of categories, the Great Ultimate (the Way) and Yin 
and Yang (Concrete Things), was more powerful. But as his 
emphasis was towards providing a metaphysical foundation 
for morality, he came to rely more and more on the 
doctrine of "Principle and Material Force.” Although in a 
broader sense the Great Ultimate is identical with 
Principle, and Yin and Yang with Material Force, these two 
sets of categories have different emphases. The pair of 
"the Great Ultimate" and "Yin and Yang" emphasises the 
union of substance and function, while the other pair 
emphasises the distinction between them. The following is 
a description of the process through which "the Great 
Ultimate" was elevated above "Yin and Yang," paving a way 
for the substitution of the doctrine of "Principle and 
Material Force,"
In the years 1173-1174, Chu Hsi discussed in a letter 
to Yang Fang his T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh and explained the 
term "Great Ultimate." He said that the name "Ultimate" 
(chi) was derived from the word for "hinge-pole" ishu- 
chi), which term suggests the unmoved but activating 
Principle for the circulation of Yin and Yang. It is in 
this sense that the Great Ultimate is "the root of Heaven, 
Earth, and the myriad things. From this explanation,
we may deduce that while the Great Ultimate was used for
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the purpose of interpreting life, it was its immanence in 
Yin and Yang that Chu Hsi was concerned with.
I explained in the last section how, while farming
the doctrine of the Investigation of Things, Chu Hsi 
thoroughly explored the moral significance of Principle.
Having done this, it was the transcendence of the Great
Ultimate (i.e., Principle) that gradually became his main 
concern.
In his early fifties, in a letter replying to Ch’eng 
Chiung, Chu Hsi states that the meaning of the words
"Great Ultimate" (t'ai-chi) is "the consummation of
Principle" Cli-chih chih chi). His intention in this 
letter was to refute Ch'eng Chiung's opinion that "the 
Great Ultimate" means "the Great Equilibrium" (.ta-chung) 
which existed before the separation of Yin and Yang, and 
of Heaven and Earth. Ch'eng Chiung’s theory, according to 
my classification, was that of Evolutionary Vitalism. In 
the letter, after defining the meaning of the Great
Ultimate, Chu Hsi explains its immanent character by
saying:
Wherever there is Principle, there must exist 
some Thing. There is no temporal sequence between 
them. So it is said "Change constitutes the Great 
Ultimate," meaning that the Great Ultimate is
immanent in Yin and Yang, and not external to 
them.
Here Chu Hsi emphasises the immanence of the Great 
Ultimate in order to refute Ch*eng Chiung*s theory, but 
the description of the Great Ultimate in terms of "the 
consummation of Principle," replacing his earlier "hinge- 
pole" metaphor, reveals his increasingly transcendental 
view of the Great Ultimate.
In the second month of 1188, in his fifty-ninth year, 
Chu Hsi produced printed editions of his two earlier 
works, T'ai-chi t'u shuo chieh and Hsi-ming chieh-i 
i Commentary on Chang Tsai's Western Inscription! , i In
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the summer of that year, he received a letter from Lu 
Chiu-yuan charging that Chou Tun-i’s original work, the 
T'ai-chi t'u shuot was taken from Taoism. Subsequent to 
this letter, a new debate developed between Chu Hsi and Lu 
Chiu-yuan on the relationship between "the Great Ultimate" 
and "Yin and Yang. I believe that this debate
functioned as the last step in Chu Hsi' s elevation of 
Principle, resulting in the establishment of the doctrine 
of "Principle and Material Force" in the following year.
In this debate Lu Chiu-yuan defined the Ultimate as 
" chung," but differd from Ch* eng Chiung in that he
situated it in the state after the emergence of the myriad 
things. Therefore the term "chung" as Lu Chiu-yuan used it 
should be translated "the mean." In contrast to Ch*eng 
Chiung, Lu Chiu-yuan advocated a Great Ultimate that was 
completely immanent. He even went to the extreme of 
calling Yin and Yang (which belong to the category of 
Concrete Things) "the Way" and "that which is above the
farmed" (hsing-erh-shang) . Both Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yuan
agreed that Yin and Yang constitute Material Force, and by 
opposition and interaction, produce the world and create 
the myriad creatures. But as regards the Great Ultimate, 
Chu Hsi thought that it was the abstract Principle 
activating Yin and Yang. Lu Chiu-yuan, for his part, 
maintained that since Yin and Yang are above individuals 
they themselves constitute the Way, This means that the
Great Ultimate cannot be independent and distinct from Yin 
and Yang, but rather that the Great Ultimate must be 
thought of as constituted by the latter and by their
constant alternation. In the world of individuals, the 
Great Ultimate is nothing other than the proper 
arrangement of Yin and Yang; hence his definition of the 
Great Ultimate is "the Great Mean,"
Chu Hsi rejected Lu Chiu-yuan*s definition by saying:
"Ultimate" refers to the "consummation" of
Principle / while "mean" describes its
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"impartiality." Although the Great Ultimate is so 
impartial as to be the foundation of the 
revolution of the myriad creatures, the name 
derives not from the "impartiality" but from the 
word "consummation" (chih-chi> with the meaning 
of a "standard" (.piao-chun) .
The reason for Chu Hsi's elevation of Principle to 
the highest metaphysical level is a moral one. He is 
suggesting, in my view, that to regard Concrete Things, 
such as Material Force or Yin and Yang, as the Great 
Ultimate easily leads to the confusion of the actual world 
with the ideal standard, and that to avoid this confusion 
it was necessary to insist that the Great Ultimate was the 
abstract absolute Principle, existing in but distinct from
the Material Force of Yin and Yang and the myriad things
they produce.
In the first month of 1192, three years after this 
debate, Lu Chiu-yuan gave a public lecture on the "huang- 
chi" section of the " hung-faii* chapter of the Shu ching 
C the Book of History]. In that lecture he followed the 
traditional definitions of " huang” as "great," and "chi" 
in the sense of "chung" as "the mean." When Chu Hsi 
learned about that lecture, he wrote the "Huang-chi pien" 
C"A Discussion on Huang-chi"3 in r e f u t a t i o n , I n  this 
piece Chu Hsi gives the following definitions:
Huang means "emperor" and chi means both 
"consummation" and "standard," and always stands
in the centre as the paradigm for the things on
all sides. :as'e
And goes on to say:
The earlier scholars . . , wrongly defined huang- 
chi as the "great mean," and owing to the 
prevalence of terms indicating leniency and 
broad-mindedness in the text they misinterpreted 
"the mean" as "ambiguity," "looseness of 
Principle," "indiscrimination between good and 
evil." They did not know that the Ultimate itself 
should not be understood as the mean, though it 
stands in the middle. They did not realise that
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"mean" indicates neither being in excess nor 
falling short, nor that it Indicates accuracy and 
the utmost propriety without the least 
deviation.
Although this essay was primarily concerned with the 
political application of the concept of the Ultimate, it 
does reveal the ethical motivation for Chu Hsi * s 
insistence on the definition of Ultimate as "the 
consummation and standard." Principle then must be 
elevated to the position of paradigm for the Concrete 
Things. The completely immanent interpretation leads to an 
understanding of Principle as either the uniqueness of 
every individual or the harmony between all individuals. 
But such an interpretation, in Chu Hsi' s eyes, could 
encourage moral laxity and compromise, in direct 
opposition to his idea of Principle.
We are now in a position to re-examine Chu Hsi ’ s 
criticism of the Lu School, in terms of this contrast 
between the actual and the ideal. In his early fifties Chu 
Hsi had admired the moral integrity of the Lu brothers and 
some of their students. He had even considered their 
method of cultivating Original Mind to be a valuable 
technique of moral cultivation, their only fault being 
their neglect of careful study of the Classics. Later, 
after meeting other students of the Lu School, Chu Hsi was 
lead to accuse them of separating the Original Mind from 
daily life, and of dedicating themselves to the former 
while being negligent of the latter, and as a consequence 
being allured by Human Desires, But now with his revised 
theory he could criticise both types of students. Whether 
they united the Original Mind with daily practice or not, 
they based themselves on individuality and actuality, 
which cannot be their own ideal standard. In my opinion 
this criticism was more fundamental than the charge of 
lacking learning, or of not discerning Human Desires in 
daily actions. Although it is unjust to impute curruption
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by Human Desires to people as honest and upright as the Lu 
brothers, there does seem to be ground for maintaining 
that individuality and actuality form an unreliable basis 
for moral behaviour.
At this stage the doctrine of ”Principle and Material 
Force" was almost complete. Principle had been elevated to 
absoluteness, and was contrasted no longer with selfish 
desire, but with actuality and individuality. Material 
Force, which was still seen as the metaphysical basis for 
actuality and individuality, has now also been assigned 
the role of determining their moral values, and has 
therefore itself become a moral concept.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF MAR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE
SUMMARY
This chapter presents Chu Hsi' s final concept of Man 
based on his doctrine of '’Principle and Material Force,"
Principle and Material Force became a pair of 
associated concepts in Chu Hsi's metaphysics after he had 
reached his sixties. By that time the role of Principle 
had been raised to that of a regulative standard, and 
Material Force had also come to be regarded as the reason 
for moral differences. The concepts of Principle and 
Material Force were combined in order to account for the 
moral quality of creatures - Principle as the reason for 
the universality of morality in the world, and Material 
Force as the reason for moral differences among different 
creatures. This combination, as applied to creatures, 
formed the concept of Physical Nature, such that Man would 
be morally higher than the other creatures because of the 
superiority of his Physical Nature,
But the superiority of Man’s Physical Nature consists 
in his possessing Mind, which enables him to transcend 
individuality and actualise the universal Principle. Mind 
is constantly influenced, though never determined, by 
Principle and Material Force. Mind, therefore requires 
moral cultivation. It is through such cultivation that 
Mind is able to actualise Principle, and to avoid the 
harmful influence that may arise from Material Force.
I shall in this chapter discuss how Elementary 
Learning, and the first four steps of the Great Learning, 
contribute to the cultivation of Mind.
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A. THE CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL NATURE
The last phase of Chu Hsi's metaphysics was 
characterised by the doctrine of "Principle and Material 
Force," which he completed around his early sixties, as a 
development of the doctrine of "the Way and Concrete 
Things." The following passage is a typical example of Chu 
Hsi' s presentation of this metaphysics. It comes from his 
"Ta Huang Tao-fu," written in about 1190:
Principle and Material Force are the two 
constituents of the world. Principle is "the Way 
above Physical Form," and the origin of creation, 
Material Force is "Cthe source of] Concrete
Things having Physical Form," and is the matter 
of creation. Therefore, when Man and Things are 
born, they must be endowed with Principle in 
order to have Nature, and with Material Force in 
order to have Physical Form. Although Nature and 
Physical Form are within the same Body, their 
differences in respect of the Way and Concrete
Things are very distinct and not confused.
In this passage, Principle and Material Force are the two 
sources of creation. But the significance of this doctrine 
lies rather in its account of creatures (Man and Things), 
within which Principle and Material Farce are combined in 
a "neither separate nor alloyed" (.pu-li pu-tsa)
relationship.
We have seen that Principle and Material Force had 
been used together far the purpose of interpreting life.
However, in his sixties Chu Hsi made use of this pair, not
only for ontological reasons, but, it seems clear, also 
for interpreting the moral character of creatures, Of 
course, for such a purpose, both Principle and Material 
Force must have moral implication. In the previous chapter 
I described the development of the moral import of 
Principle during Chu Hsi's fifties. Here I shall present
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how the concept of Material Force acquired moral 
significance.
In Chu Hsi's philosophy there are two aspects of 
Material Force relevant to morality. One of these, 
discussed in the previous chapter, is that Material Force, 
while its transient character is in contrast with the 
permanence of objective Principle, can make the excellence 
of the latter evident. The other, which he had begun to 
develop during his middle age, but did not complete until 
his sixties, is that Material Force must be regarded as 
the reason for moral differences. Indeed, an ethical 
"ladder" may be constructed with Material Force 
determining the relative position of every creature. 
However, the constituents, Principle and Material Force, 
are not by themselves sufficient for this purpose, what is 
required is their conjunction as the Physical Nature 
(.ch'i-chih chih hsing) of the different species. On the 
top of this ladder stands Man, who through his Physical 
Nature possesses the moral capacity to engage in moral 
cultivation. The development in Chu Hsi’s philosophy of 
this second moral implication may be summarized as 
follows.
In his u Hu-tzu chih-yen i-f," written in 1172, there 
Chu Hsi states in the following passage that Heavenly 
Principle and Human Desires have different origins:
The beginning of Heavenly Principle is unknown. 
In Man it is with him from his birth. Human 
Desires come into existence only after he is 
confined by Physical Form, contaminated with 
Material Force, habituated to bad customs, and 
disquieted by Feelings.
In this passage Material Force is presented, not only as 
the material source of the creation of Man, but also as a 
determinant of his moral character. However, this seems to 
me to have been only Chu Hsi’s initial view of this second 
ethical significance of Material Force.
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The increase in this ethical significance of Material 
Force was reflected in Chu Hsi’s gradual adaption of the
concept of Physical Nature (.ch' i-chih chih hsing) . Before
his sixties Chu Hsi was concerned to advocate the
excellence of Principle. But parallel to the moral
elevation of Principle, possibly unconsciously, he
gradually made use of the concept of Material Force to
explain the moral differences among creatures. But once 
Principle and Material Force acquire the purpose of
determining the moral character of different creatures, 
they could not simply be two distinct metaphysical
sources, but had also to combine in the creatures they
composed. Through focusing on this immanent conjunction, 
the concept of Physical Nature gradually emerges. The
process in which this conception took shape is reflected 
in Chu Hsi’s change of attitude to the following three
passages of the two Ch* engs and Chang Tsai on the relation
of Nature to Material Force,
Ch'eng Hao said:
What is inborn is called Nature. Nature is the
same as Material Force and Material Force is the
same as Nature. They are both inborn.299
Ch’eng I said:
Man’s Nature is the same as Principle, and
Principle is the same from the sage-emperors Yao 
and Shun to the man in the street. Capacity
(ts'ai) is an endowment of Material Force. 
Material Force may be clear or turbid. Among Men 
those endowed with clear Material Force are wise, 
while those endowed with turbid Material Force 
are foolish.300
And Chang Tsai wrote:
With the existence of Physical Form, there exists 
Physical Nature. If one cultivates properly a 
"returns to his Origin," his Heaven-and-Earth 
Nature (t’ien-ti chih hsingt i.e., Original 
Nature, pen-Jan chih hsing) will be preserved.
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Therefore In Physical Nature there is that which
the superior man denies to be his Original 
Nature.301
Ch1 ien Mu, in his Chu-tsu hsin~hsileh-ant studied Chu Hsi’s 
attitude toward these three passages, and reached the 
conclusion that Chu Hsi’s opinion in his forties and 
fifties was close to that of Ch’eng I, who emphasised the 
distinction between Nature and Material Force; while after 
the age of sixty, he became more like Ch’eng Hao in 
holding that Nature is always combined with Material
Force. Recognizing such a combination, Chu Hsi’s
references to Chang Tsai’s concept of Physical Nature also 
become more frequent.303 It seems correct to say that Chu 
Hsi’s conception of Physical Nature was formulated through 
a struggle to synthesize these three views on ’’Nature and 
Material Force.’’ When the final formulation of his own 
concept of Physical Nature had been achieved, Chu Hsi was 
able to compromise the differences between the three 
philosophers. His explanation is as follows. Principle and 
Material Force are combined in Physical Form (the Body), 
Principle being the reason for moral Identity, and 
Material Force the reason for moral differences. That 
which results from this combination is Physical Nature. In 
it Principle and Material Force are closely associated, 
yet not identified. Because of this combination, Material 
Force exercises its influence, and consequently Original 
Nature, as the indwelling Principle, is in some way 
ethically limited.
In addition, in Chu Hsi’s later years he showed a 
tendency to ascribe the term "Nature’’ exclusively to 
"Physical Nature." One of the reasons for this is 
semantic. In a conversation same time after 1197, he 
quoted the following remarks of Ch*eng Hao:
What is inborn is called Nature. Man is born in 
tranquility. That which is before tranquility 
cannot be described. As soon as we talk about
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Nature, what we refer to is already not that
Nature,303
His own explanation was:
With regard to Nature, not until there is
material substance can the term Nature be used. 
Before the birth of Man in tranquility, there has 
been no more than the Heavenly Way, and so the
word Nature cannot be used, 30/t-
Chu Hsi’s explanation took the last ’’Nature” in the saying 
of Ch’eng Hao as ’’Original Nature,” but since, Chu Hsi 
contended, it is the same as the Heavenly Way, it should 
not be denominated "Nature.” Nature, as Heavenly Way 
(Principle) dwelling within individual creatures, can only 
be referred to after their birth. But in that case it 
should be called Physical Nature, which is the combination 
of Principle and Material Force, even if in theory there 
may still be Original Nature, which refers to the abstract 
regulative aspect of Physical Nature.
But his conflation of Nature and Physical Nature is 
more a matter of ethical fact than of definition, From the 
point of view of Original Nature all creatures are of the 
same ethical quality. But in reality, because of 
differences of Physical Nature (Original Nature Influenced 
by Material Force as a result of their combination) , 
ethical quality differs throughout the different species.
In this way Material Force gained an ethical import 
in addition to its original corporeal meaning. The moral 
role of Material Force is clear from the following passage 
in his Ta-hsueh huo-wen C Questions and Answers on the 
Grea t Learni ngl :
From the point of view of Principle, all things 
arise from one source, and of course Man and 
Things cannot be distinguished as higher and 
lower creatures. But from the point of view of 
Material Force, that which receives its integrity 
(cheng) and clarity (.t'ung) becomes Man, while 
those which receive its partiality (p'ien) and
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cloggedness (se) become Things. Because of this, 
they cannot be equal, but some are higher and 
others are lower,303
The degree of integrity or partiality of their endowed 
Material Force determines the degree of uprightness or 
baseness of the type of creature; while the clarity or 
cloggedness of their endowed Material Force determines 
their intelligence or foolishness. In this way Material 
Force accounts for moral differences as well as material 
actual!sation,
Physical Nature is, therefore, the synthesis of 
Original Nature (which is both vital and moral Principle), 
and Material Force (which actualises life and 
differentiates moral quality), It follows that the myriad 
creatures are classified according to differences between 
their Physical Natures with respect both to life and to 
morality. In his ”Ta Yu Fang-shu," Chu Hsi paints out that 
there are three general divisions:
Heaven gives birth to creatures. Among them, 
there are those having blood, breath, perception, 
and consciousness: these are Men and animals.
There are also those not having blood, breath, 
perception and consciousness, but are alive: 
these are grasses and trees. There are still 
those no longer living which retain only form and 
smell: these are the withered and dried.30®
Things are classified according to the degree of openness 
and strengh of life determined by Material Force, while 
the degree of morality is commensurate with such degree of 
life. So that Chu Hsi continues:
Man is most brilliant and furnished with the 
Nature of Five Virtues, while animals are muddled 
and not complete in those Virtues, Plants and the 
withered have neither perception nor 
consciousness, not to mention the Virtues, 
However, as creatures they are still completely 
furnished with Principle.30^
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The above quotation shows how with the concept of 
Physical Nature, the superiority of Man is vindicated. At 
the top of the ethical ladder, Man alone is endowed with 
complete perception and consciousness, which is the 
prerequisite for the fulfillment of Principle. So Man is 
the only moral creature. This point can be clarified by 
attending to the difference between Man and animals.
Here I shall quote a comparison between Man and 
animals by a student of his, with whom Chu Hsi states that 
he agreed:
Consciousness and movement proceed from Material 
Force, while Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, 
and Wisdom proceed from Principle. Both Man and 
Things (i.e., animals) are capable of 
consciousness and movement, but though Things 
possess Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and 
Wisdom, they cannot have them completely, , . , In 
your C Meng-tzu! chi-chu L Comprehensive Commentary 
on the Book of Mencius! you maintain that "with 
respect to Material Force, Man and Things do not 
seem to differ in consciousness and movement, but 
with respect to Principle, the endowment of 
Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom 
are necessarily imperfect in Things.” ... 303
In this paragraph only morality comes from Principle 
whereas the phenomena of life such as consciousness and 
movement come from Material Force, By this distinction Man 
and animals are classified. It seems to me that the 
following interpretation is plausible. Principle is the 
reason for both life and morality. It is in itself an 
abstract concept, which from the vital point of view, 
activates the opposing-and-circulating pattern of life, 
and from the moral point of view, constitutes the Four 
Virtues, Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom. 
On the other hand, consciousness and movement are 
”phenomena” of life and therefore belong merely to 
Material Force. Differences in Physical Nature determine 
the differences between Man and animals. In animals, the 
Material Force component of their Physical Nature enables
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them to manifest the "phenomena” of life, while in Man, 
the Material Force components of Physical Nature are such 
as to make him understand and put into practice the vital- 
and-moral Principle. Therefore it is Man alone who has the 
complete and perfect virtues. His intention, it seems, is 
to say that the Material Force composing Man is more 
excellent than that composing animals, so that, in Man it 
is possible for Principle to be free from the confinement 
of the individual life, and to unfold completely as the 
universal moral Principle.
But what is that excellence with which Material Force 
endows Man? It is Mind. In Chu Hsi’s description of the 
Material Force composing Man, his use of such terms as 
"integrity” (referring to morality) and "clarity” 
(referring to intelligence) suggests Mind. It is Mind, 
which elevates Man above animals both in his faculty of 
knowledge, and in his capacity to transcend his 
individuality.
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B. THE STATUS OF MIND
1. The Content and the Farm af Mind
In the fourth chapter of this essay, I described how Chu 
Hsi, while discriminating between the concepts of 
Principle and Material Force in traditional Confucian 
vitalism, had proposed the concept of "the Spirits and the 
Divinities" as the essence of Material Force, in order to 
serve as a link between them. I also pointed out that, 
according to Chu Hsi, the counterpart of "the Spirits and 
the Divinities" in Man is Mind. In the previous section, 
through analysing the Physical Nature of Man, we saw that 
Chu Hsi regarded Man1s superiority as consisting in his 
having Mind, which, as the excellence of Material Force, 
enables Man to transcend his individuality and to realise 
Principle. In this section I shall focus on the structure, 
position, and inclination of Mind.
I have said that Mind may be examined either from the 
point of view of its content, or from the point of view of 
its farm. As this distinction is important to my present
study, I would like to give a brief account of it at this
point.
For Chu Hsi the content of Mind is exclusively of 
Nature and Feelings. This idea was formulated in 1169, 
when he was forty, but even in a conversation dated from
1198 he still said:
Mencius says that the Mind of compassion is the 
beginning of Humanity. Humanity is Nature,
compassion is Feeling. Here we know Mind through
Feeling. Mencius also says that Humanity,
Righteousness, Propriety, and Wisdom are rooted 
in Mind. Here we know Mind by Nature. Mind
includes Nature and Feelings, Nature is
substance, Feelings are functions,303
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On the other hand, from the formal point of view, Chu Hsi 
looked on Mind as pure consciousness. This conception is 
easy to reach by reflecting upon one's own mind, so that 
at the age of twenty-nine, in his "Ts* un-tsai chi” Chu Hsi 
had already said:
It is all because of his Mind that Man occupies 
the centre between Heaven and Earth and is the 
most intelligent among the myriad creatures. 
Nevertheless, the entity of Mind cannot be 
grasped by seeing, nor by hearing, nor by 
thinking. If you say there is such an entity, you 
cannot describe it. But if you say there is not, 
you meet it everywhere in daily life.310
In this passage, Chu Hsi means that Mind, as consciousness 
and as the faculty of intelligence, is that which makes 
Man unique in the universe. Mind is everywhere, because 
with its intelligence it can form a world of consciousness 
extending to everything it encounters. However, since 
consciousness itself is only a subjective capacity, it 
cannot be grasped by faculties such as seeing, hearing, 
and thinking.
In Chu Hsi's mature period, the formal aspect of Mind 
became more important than its content. This was because 
for him Mind as consciousness also had the capacity to 
know and apply moral principles, thereby giving Man the 
ability to control his environment. The most immediate 
object of such control is his Body, so that in a 
conversation some time after 1178, Chu Hsi said: "Mind is
the abode of intelligence and is the master of the 
Body."31'1 But in addition, Mind, as form, can even master 
its own content. In the following two passages which can 
be dated from 1193 and from 1180 respectively, Chu Hsi 
said;
There is a difference between Mind and Nature. 
That which is intelligent (ling) is Mind, and 
that which is substantial (shih) is Nature. The 
, intelligent is that which is perceptive and 
conscious. . . . Nature is Principle, Mind is that
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which stocks, holds, implements, and manifests 
Principle.313
Nature is no more than Principle, and Feelings 
are its unfolding and functions. The perception 
and consciousness of Mind is that which contains 
Principle and carries out Feelings.313
The first passage describes Mind's mastery over 
Principle, and the second passage points out that Mind 
takes charge of both Principle and Feelings.
2. The World of Consciousness
Mind is the counterpart of the cosmological concept of 
"the Spirits and the Divinities" in Man. Nevertheless, 
they are different in that the latter concept was devised 
as the link between Principle and Material Force, whereas 
Mind, in addition to this, also forms a world of 
consciousness for Man. In his " Chung-yung chang-chu hsu1* 
["Preface to the Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean" ] 
written in 1191,31 Chu Hsi said:
In its perspicuity, intelligence, perception, and 
consciousness, the Mind is one. However, it is 
supposed that there is a difference between 
"Human Mind" (j en-hsin) and "Moral Mind" (tao- 
hsin) . This is because Mind may either be born 
from the particularity of "Physical Form and 
Material Force" (h&ing-ch*1) , or originated from 
the perfection of endowed Nature and Destiny. 
Because of this difference C in the basis] of 
perception and consciousness, the same Mind may 
exist in a state of precariousness and 
instability or in a state of subtlety and 
obscurity.313
Here Chu Hsi is appealing to the first two of four famous 
sentences in the Shu ching. These are: "The Human Mind is
precarious. The Moral Mind is subtle."3'13 In this 
explanation he declares that there is but one Mind which
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may emerge from two different sources. What is important 
here is his Implication that Mind is relatively 
independent from both Principle and Material Force. Mind 
can either be regarded as emerging from Nature and
Material Force, or (as he sometimes put it) as the essence 
itself of Material Force. But as consciousness it is 
independent. It is influenced, but not dominated, by
either of its sources, otherwise there would be two Minds
conflicting with each other. On the other hand this
independence is relative, not absolute, because Mind has
an innate inclination either towards morality or towards 
error, rather than a self-contained completeness. In 
consequence, Mind occupies a special position in the
universe, namely, the world of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, this world of consciousness exists merely
for Man, and its position in the universe is subsequent to 
Principle and Material Force. Therefore this view of Chu 
Hsi's ought not to be called Idealist, although it shows 
signs of the influence of Buddhist Idealism.
It is worthwhile to mention Tomoeda Ryutaro’s 
evaluation of the position of Chu Hsi’s metaphysics in the 
history of Chinese philosophy. According to him, the 
problem faced by Chu Hsi was that of the contradiction 
between the traditional Confucian cosmology of the 
Primitive Ether (yUan-ch* 1) , and the Buddhist idealistic 
metaphysics. He asserts that the mast sophisticated
Buddhist Idealism was that of the Yuan—Jen lun [An Enquiry 
on Man3 of Tsung-mi (770-841). Tsung-mi was a critic of 
both Confucianism and Taoism, Both schools affirm the 
existence of Nature (hsing) and of the Primitive Ether 
(.yuan-ch* i) . But for Tsung-mi, both Nature and the 
Primitive Ether are but a development of consciousness, 
Nature being its subjective and active aspect, and the 
Primitive Ether being its objective and passive aspect. 
The ultimate reality beneath this development of 
consciousness is the true, unique, and intelligent Mind,
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which is the foundation of both the subjective and the 
objective world. According to Tomoeda, from the time that 
Tsung-mi proposed this idealistic interpretation of Man 
and the world, the Confucianists had endeavoured to find a 
suitable refutation, In the T*ang dynasty, Tsung-mi 
provided a more powerful theory than that of Confucian 
scholars such as Han Yu, Liu Tsung-yuan, and Liu Yu-hsi. 
By the Sung dynasty, the Neo-Conf ucianists felt it 
necessary to explore a new metaphysical foundation upon 
which both subject and object, the human and natural 
worlds could be established. It therefore became necessary 
to settle the controversy between the Confucian Primitive 
Ether cosmology and Buddhist Idealism. This work, 
according to Tomoeda, was completed by Chu Hsi who 
established Principle or the Great Ultimate, as the 
foundation of both human and natural existence. Tomoeda’s 
conclusion is that Chu Hsi gave traditional Confucianism a 
metaphysical basis by substituting the Great Ultimate as 
Principle for the Buddhist idea of the true, unique, and 
intelligent Mind.31^
I would add to this analysis the important fact that 
Mind still played a crucial role in Chu Hsi’s system. 
Although he no longer regarded it as the ultimate 
substance, and gave it a secondary role, Mind still formed 
the subjective world of consciousness for Man.
3. Mind and Moral Disciplines
In his " Chung-yung chang-chu hsu>" immediately following 
the passage quoted above which distinguishes between the 
Human Mind and the Moral Mind, Chu Hsi continues:
Everybody has Physical Form, so that even the 
most intelligent cannot but have Human Mind,
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Everybody has Nature as well, so that even the 
most foolish cannot but have Moral Mind. If the 
two become confused and cannot be controlled, the 
precarious one (i.e,, Human Mind) will become 
more precarious and the subtle one (i.e., Moral 
Mind) subtler. Finally the selfishness of Human 
Desires will no longer be conquerable by the
justice of Heavenly Principle. "To be discerning" 
is to discriminate between the two, and "to be 
single-minded" is to keep steadily to the justice 
of the Moral Mind. Strive endlessly until the 
Moral Mind becomes the enduring master of the
Body, with the Human Mind its abiding servant. In 
this way the precarious will became stable and 
the subtle will become manifest, so that justice 
and correctness may be in your activity and 
tranquility, in your speech and behaviour,3'13
This passage appeals to the latter two of the four 
sentences in the Shu chlng} which read: "Remain discerning 
and single-minded. Keep steadfastly to the Mean 
( chung), ”'3'1
As has been said above, although Mind forms its own
world, it is not independent of the influence of its two
sources, endowed Heavenly Nature and Material Force 
underlying one’s Physical Form. Because of the incessant 
influence of these two, Mind can never be static, but 
inclines towards both morality and immorality. Because 
these two sources are equal and universal, no individual 
inclines exclusively in one of these directions. Rather, 
there is a constant struggle between the two for supremacy 
in all men, from the most intelligent to the most foolish. 
In this sense Man is the point of convergence of both 
possibilities. This is the metaphysical basis of morality.
Heavenly Nature and Material Force are the two 
sources of Mind and therefore no more than external 
determinants. Mind, having formed its own world of 
consciousness, can arrange its own cultivation. While Mind 
is in tranquility, it contains nothing which can be 
described as immoral. But in activity, by the influence of 
these two sources it may tend to either Heavenly
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Principle or Human Desires. Different moral efforts are
required for different states of Mind. While in
tranquility, there should be Attentiveness or Containment 
of Mind. Whereas in activity the effort should be directed 
towards discriminating between the Human Mind and the 
Moral Mind, and towards keeping to the latter.
At this stage Chu Hsi's theory of Mind was complete. 
He had established the position of Mind in the universe, 
and clarified its structure and its inclinations. He was 
now ready to systematise the various moral disciplines
which had been for so long his major concern. This he did
in his two studies of the Ta-hsCieh, the Ta-hsueh chang-chii 
[ Commentary on the Ta-hsuehl and the Ta-hsiieh huo-wen 
I Questions and Answers on the Ta-hsiiehl .
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C. METHODS OF MORAL PRACTICE
1. Elementary Learning and the Practice of Attentivenees
In the Ta-hsuehf the eight steps of the Great Learning are 
listed as the Investigation of Things (lco-wu> , the 
Extension of Knowledge <chlh-chih') , Purification of Will 
< oh * eng-i) , Rectification of Mind (.cheng-hsi n) , Personal 
Cultivation (.hsiushen') , Regulation of the Family (cii'l- 
chia> , Bringing Order to State (.ch* ih-lruo') t and Bringing 
Peace to the World (p * ing-t * ien— hsia) , Chu Hsi had much 
respect for the comprehensive scheme of moral education 
expounded in this classic work, and accordingly, 
systematised his own methods of moral practice. For this 
reason, having discussed the development of these methods 
in previous chapters, we can conclude with a look at Chu 
Hsi's last writings on that Classic, the Ta-hsiieh chang- 
chii and the Ta-hsUeh huo-wen, both of which he continued 
to revise until his last years.
The first thing noteworthy in Chu Hsi1s studies of 
the Ta-hsiieh is his addition of a precedent stage of 
Elementary Learning as preparation for the Great Learning. 
The significance of the Great Learning is that it aims at 
the philosophical and political aspects of morality, in 
contrast with the Elementary Learning which aims at the 
establishment of personal character and good behaviour. 
Chu Hsi says:
Although there are differences between the Great 
and Elementary Learning, both aim at the same
Way, In childhood, if one does not engage in the 
Elementary Learning, one will be unable to 
collect one's straying Mind and to cultivate 
one's character, which is the foundation of the 
Great Learning. When one grows up, if one does
not advance to the Great Learning, one will be
unable to examine Principle and put it to
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Cpolitical] practice. In that case the successful 
conculsion of one's Elementary Learning will not 
be achieved, 3 30
According to Chu Hsi, in the ancient golden age, everyone 
went to "elementary school" at the age of eight, whereas 
at the age of fifteen, the children of aristocrats, and
the brilliant youth among the commoners, went to "great 
school." The curriculum in the "elementary school" was 
concerned with daily manners and the practical skills of 
social life. But in the "great school" students were 
taught such disciplines as the Investigation of Principle, 
Rectification of Mind, personal cultivation, and public
admi nlst rat ion.331
There are three things to be noted in this division. 
Firstly, Chu Hsi was reconstructing an ideal of the 
ancient system of education from fragments in the Li chi. 
His plan was that the aristocrats should be highly 
educated in preparation for their political privileges and 
responsibilities, and that the brilliant among the
commoners should also have access to political power.
Secondly, this division was a reflection of the social 
situation of Chu Hsi’s own age. In the Sung dynasty, 
society was composed of various overlapping strata: there
was a political division between bureaucrats and 
commoners, and an economical one between landowners and 
tenants. The children of bureaucrats and landowners not 
only had the opportunity to be educated, but were also 
potential recruits for governmental posts. Under these 
circumstances, their education, as reflected by Chu Hsi’s 
interpretation of the Ta~hsiieh> should be morally and
politically oriented. The admission of commoners suggested 
by Chu Hsi also reflected the social situation of his 
time, Because in the Sung dynasty the civil examinations 
were the major condition for the recruitment of officials, 
the commoners also had an equal chance in theory to enter 
government. Their actual lack of opportunity was due
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rather to the fact that they could not afford an 
education, not to class ideology or legal obstacles. 
Because in theory their class was no obstacle to 
education, Chu Hsi aimed at the single Way throughout the 
Elementary and Great Learning, He believed that through 
the popularisation of elementary education cultivated 
commoners would not only be more easily governed, but the 
brilliant among them would also have the opportunity to go 
on to the great school, and finally join the ruling elite.
The third and most important point is that, leaving 
aside the socio-political background, the division between 
moral practice <the Elementary Learning) and moral 
knowledge (the Great Learning) contributed to the theory 
of moral education, This division can be justified by the 
common sense notion that, in society, moral codes must be 
inculcated in and practised by everybody, of no matter 
what social standing, while the philosophical 
investigation into their significance cannot but be 
exclusive to a talented few. On the other hand, although a 
philosophical enquiry into morality is limited to those 
few, it still has to be based on the moral practice in 
which they were trained during their Elementary Learning. 
Moral practice, though it belongs to Elementary Learning, 
is the foundation for moral knowledge, And moral knowledge 
investigates the "why" of moral codes so that students may 
be conscious of, and thereby improve, their practice,
Chu Hsi insisted that Elementary Learning should be 
universal and fundamental, and that its essence consists 
in the training of Mind. This has been discussed in the 
fourth chapter, but a few words need to be added here. In 
the daily exercise of social conduct during Elementary 
Learning, students simultaneously learn endurance and 
composure of Mind. Chu Hsi said that for those who missed 
the opportunity of Elementary Learning, the practice of 
Attentiveness would make up well for it, and should 
prevail throughout the whole process of learning. In
203
Elementary Learning, Attentiveness cultivates the Mind as 
such and enhances vigilance in daily practice, while in 
the Great Learning, it opens the path to intelligence and 
promotes morality and merits.333
2. The Investigation of Things and the Extension of 
Knowledge
Although the Investigation of Things and the Extension of 
Knowledge are the first two steps of the Ta-hsueh, for Chu 
Hsi they are related as effort and achievement, as
objective enquiry and subjective acquisition - therefore I 
shall discuss them together.
Since the Investigation of Things is the moral effort
of Mind, its significance must be understood in the
context of Mind. Although Mind is the capacity of 
conciousness, it is constantly influenced by its two 
underlying sources, Principle and Material Force. 
Therefore, the significance of the Investigation of Things 
may be expounded in terms of the doctrine of "Principle 
and Material Force."
The fallowing describes haw Chu Hsi made use of this 
doctrine in his exposition. Man, in comparison with 
animals, is endowed with Material Force, characterised by 
"integrity" (cheng) and "clarity" <t/ung> . Therefore his 
Mind is moral and Intelligent, having the capacity to know 
and practise the endowed Principle. On the other hand, 
there are differences of degree within these categories of 
the Material Force from man to man. Within the
characteristic of "integrity" there are degrees of
"beauty" (mei> and "ugliness" (e), which determine the
different moral capacities among Men, and within the
characteristic of "clarity" there are degrees of
"clearness" (.ching) and "turbidity" (chuo) , which
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determine the different degrees of intelligence among 
Men.333 Therefore although Man is fundamentally moral, he 
has to struggle with obstacles within his Material Force 
in order to secure the successful actualisation of 
Principle. The Investigation of Things, which Investigates 
the Principle immanent in Things, is the first step of the 
process of transcending the limitations of Material Force.
The relation of the Investigation of Things to the 
preceding effort, the Elementary Learning or 
Attentiveness, may also be examined by means of the 
doctrine of "Principle and Material Force.” According to 
Chu Hsi, no matter how obstructed a man’s Material Force 
is, the original Brilliance Cwing) of his Mind, as the 
gift of Heaven, always subsists. Morality, therefore, is 
natural to Man, For those born with the best Material 
Force the Brilliance of their Minds facilitates the 
natural manifestation of Principle, while those with the 
most obstructed Material Force may still come upon a 
sudden enlightenment of their original Brilliance. Based 
on this theory of innate morality, moral education becomes 
the cultivation of the original Brilliance of Mind. The 
Elementary Learning or Attentiveness, then, takes place in 
the first stage, during which Mind is contained, and 
disposed to display its Brilliance. This Brilliance 
continues to be the main concern of the Great Learning, in 
which the Investigation of Things and the Extension of 
Knowledge, the first two steps, magnify the Brilliance, 
and the following steps realise it in actual practice.3aA
Two things should be mentioned here with regard to 
the relationship between Elementary Learning (or 
Attentiveness) and the Investigation of Things. The first 
concerns the nature of moral cultivation in Chu Hsi’s 
philosophy. According to Chu Hsi, Man is a combination of 
Principle and Material Force, and the purpose of moral 
cultivation is to carry out Principle, by overcoming any 
hindrance from Material Force. But by "overcome" Chu Hsi
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did not mean to suggest that it could be corrected or 
changed directly. Rather, he meant that by concentrating 
on the Brilliance of Mind Man may extend its capacity and 
realise Principle. As his concept of Physical Mature came 
from Chang Tsai, so this opinion on moral cultivation also 
shows the Influence of Chang Tsai, who said;
While Virtue (i.e., Principle functioning in Man) 
has not overcome Material Farce, our Mature and 
Destiny proceed from Material Force. But when 
Virtue overcomes Material Force, then our Mature 
and Destiny proceed from Virtue.33®
In other words, because Principle and Material Force are 
the two ineradicable sources of Mind, moral practice 
consists in extending the influence of the former while
carefully avoiding any baleful influence from the latter. 
The second thing we should mention here is that although
the Elementary Learning (or Attentiveness) and the 
Investigation of Things are closely connected, they do not 
overlap. The fulfillment of the former step makes the 
latter possible and easy, but though the former practice 
forms the prerequisite for the latter, it does not 
include the latter. The same relationship occurs between 
all successive steps of moral practice.
Mow we shall discuss the objects of Investigation.
Chu Hsi attempted to Investigate many kinds of Things;
manifest things, abstruse thoughts, Classical texts, and 
discourse; objects ranging from personal virtues and the 
Essential Relationships to the vast universe and the 
natural world.33® Although the Principle Chu Hsi was 
searching for was an abstract regulative standard, it 
subsisted in all kinds of empirical Things. For instance, 
in a conversation recorded from his seventieth year, Chu 
Hsi pointed out the importance of empirical knowledge. He 
said that if one were to neglect a book one would lack the 
Principle contained in that book, and if one were to evade 
a practical task, one would lack the Principle in that
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task. This position is put in the Ta-hsueh chang-chii,
which says that the virtue of Mind is "to contain all 
Principle and to respond to all affairs correctly. »,a3:K® 
Obviously a broad empirical knowledge is required in order 
to engage with all affairs correctly.
The purpose of Investigation is to attain the 
Principle within Things. In everything Principle exists at 
two levels, as "the way Things should be," and as "the 
reason Things should be so."329 On some occasions, in his 
"Ta Wang Ch’ang-ju" for instance, Chu Hsi omitted the 
reference to the level of the "reason," thinking that the 
significance of that level would be grasped as long as one 
constantly acted in accordance with "the way Things should 
be," In this way these omissions show us that in his 
method, knowledge and practice are combined. Principle 
will first appear as "the way Things should be," Only 
after this way is well understood and efficiently 
practised, will one feel that Principle also appears 
necessarily and spontaneously. Then one may be said to 
have recognized the level of "the reason Things should be 
so."330 In the Ta-hsueh chang-chu the aim of the 
Investigation of Things is "to reach thoroughly the 
surface and the core, the essence and the crudeness, of 
Things".33’1 The core and essence are "the reson Things 
should be so," while the surface and crudeness are "the 
way Things should be,"
I shall now discuss the relationship between the 
Investigation of Things and the Extension of Knowledge. 
The Extension of Knowledge is the subjective acquisition 
made during the process of the Investigation of Things. 
The phrase "Extending Knowledge" indicates not only 
extending the contents of knowledge, but, more 
importantly, increasing the capacity of intelligence. 
Because Mind is pure consciousness, while it practises the 
Investigation of Things, it not only increases its 
knowledge of things, but also increases its own
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Brilliance, and its capacity for knowledge. Therefore, 
while the practice of the Investigation of Things succeeds 
in "reaching thoroughly the surface and the core, the 
essence and the crudeness, of Things," the effect on the 
Extension of Knowledge is to bring out "the total 
Brilliance of the whole substance and the great functions 
of the Mind."333 The Brilliance of the substance of the 
Mind refers to the understanding of Principle, while the 
Brilliance of the functions of the Mind refers to the 
proper management of affairs. Both refer to the increase 
of the capacity of the Mind.
3. The Purification of the Will
The third step of moral practice is the Purification of 
the Will (ch'eng-l'). The Will here means the activity of 
Mind. According to Chu Hsi, Mind has a natural Brilliance, 
and so should be in its activity naturally Pure, But in 
reality, because Mind receives harmful influences from 
Material Force, the Will as the Mind in activity may
contain impurities. Because the impure Will is against its
own nature, Man with impure Will is in a state of "self- 
deception" and cannot be at peace with himself. The 
Purification of the Will, Chu Hsi contends, consists in
nothing more than guarding against self-deception, and 
remaining at peace with oneself,333
Purification of the Will is mainly concerned with
moral feelings and with moral behaviour. The following is 
a summary of Chu Hsi’s exposition on this subject. Because 
Mind emerges from, and is consequently influenced by, 
Principle and Material Force, its activity may be either 
good or bad, and external behaviour will also fall into 
these two categories. But because the goad is that which 
is originally endowed by Heavenly Destiny, and the evil is
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the contain!nation by Human Desires, the activity of Mind 
should be to love the former and abhor the latter. 
However, owing to lack of Knowledge, or the turbidity of 
Material Force, the good may be not known. In that case, 
Purification of Will must be preceded by the effort of 
Extending Knowledge, in order to make known the truth of 
good and evil. But even after Knowledge is Extended and 
the activity of Mind becomes generally good, further 
effort towards the Purification of the Will remains 
necessary in order to purge any unnoticed inclination 
toward evil.33A This effort, therefore, ensures the 
natural unfolding of the Brilliance of the Mind, which 
loves, and is determined to acquire, the good, just as it 
loves beautiful women, and hates, and also is determined 
to reject, the bad, just as it abhors a repulsive 
stench.333
4. The Rectification of Mind
After the effort to Purify the Will, we come to the fourth 
practice in the Ta-hsueh, the Rectification of the Mind. 
Since all of the practices we have discussed so far are 
somehow concerned with the Rectification of Mind, it will 
be necessary to find a more specific meaning for this 
term.
Besides "rectification," Chu Hsi adapted another 
meaning of the word cheng', namely, "to balance and make 
stable." This phrase refers to the substance of Mind which 
is "clear and bright, without content like a mirror, and 
balanced as a steelyard,"33S When Mind functions properly, 
the state of balance and stability is maintained; if it 
functions improperly, that state is lost. In the Ta-hsueh 
huo-wen, Chu Hsi says;
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When Mind fails to examine the external affairs 
it meets, its response cannot but inaccurate, and 
the Mind cannot but be led astray by its wrong 
response, At that time, it may foe said that 
Feelings disturb the original substance of Mind, 
or that the functions of Mind have lost their 
appropriateness.333
We may notice that in this passage the earlier efforts to 
Extend Knowledge and Purify the Will are included, since 
the proper functioning of Mind is the result of the 
practice of both "examining external affairs" and 
"responding to them correctly." But in addition to these, 
there is one more effort implied in this passage, that is, 
the constant containment of Mind. This consists in 
restraining the functioning of Feelings from exceeding 
their due course; and preventing Feelings, after their 
functioning, from continuing to influence the original 
balance and stability of Mind,
There is a complete system of moral cultivation in 
the realm of Mind from the stage of Elementary Learning to 
that of the Rectification of the Mind. But at this point 
Chu Hsi shows us that what he aimed at was more than 
individual morality. The effort of Rectifying the Mind is 
the conclusion of all the earlier practices whose concern 
was with the Mind, But from now on the Mind was to be 
regarded in contrast with the Body and the external world, 
The Mind is the master of the Body; only by maintaining 
its balance and containing itself can it successfully 
master this corporeal Body, and make all its activities 
follow its will and manifest Principle,333 The later 
stages of practice in the Ta-hsiieh are concerned with 
social and political practice, which will not be discussed 
here. But it is clear that Chu Hsi’s conception of 
morality, in spite of requiring subjective fulfillment, is 
by no means merely individualistic.
210
CHAPTER VI 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVEN AND HAN 
SUMMARY
This chapter presents Chu Hsi's final account of the 
world, that is to say, of the relationship "between Heaven 
and Man, This position, fully formulated in his sixties, 
was in complete opposition to the ideas of Ch’an Buddhism.
In the earlier chapters we have seen how Chu Hsi 
produced parallel analyses of the concepts of Heaven and 
Man, In this chapter I shall examine the relationship 
between these concepts from three paints of view; those of 
Principle, Mind, and Material Force.
According to Chu Hsi, Principle is immanent in the 
empirical world, and is manifested within it as "the Way 
the world should be," The world may be thought of as 
manifesting the Way. From the point of view of this theory 
of Principle, therefore, the world appears stable and 
orderly, and prescribes to Man his moral duty. The 
universality and objectivity of the Essential 
Relationships also becomes evident.
From the point of view of Mind, Chu Hsi was to
propose the concept of Purity, the subjective capacity to 
carry out the Way. The Purity of the Will of Heaven is due 
to the natural working of Principle, and makes possible 
the unfolding of the Heavenly Way. But Man must exert much 
effort in order to acquire the Purity of Heaven.
From the point of view of Material Force, the 
limitations and the contingency of Man are clearly 
evident. Even if a man is able to cultivate morality,
there is no guarantee that he will gain happiness.
Although, in this view, Man gain the dignity of moral
toil, he loses the original simplicity and harmony of 
spirit sought by Ch'an Buddhism.
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A. THE WORLD AS MANIFESTING THE WAY
1. Chu Hs±*s View of the World — the Relationship Between 
Heaven and Man
In the last two chapters, I have described Chu Hsl's 
treatment of the concepts of Heaven and of Man. With 
respect to Heaven, Chu Hsi established the three levelled 
system of Principle, the Spirits and the Divinities, and 
Material Force. And for Man, he constructed three parallel 
levels; Nature, Mind, and Material Force. I have also 
pointed out in previous chapters that a moral concern 
provides a clue to the development of this metaphysics.
I have in general restricted my examination of the 
above concepts to a discussion of their development within 
Chu Hsi’s system, and have not given detailed 
consideration to their structural relationships, I hope 
that this treatment has nevertheless contributed to an 
understanding of the role played by each concept, and of 
the nature of the system as a whole, In this chapter I 
shall conclude my thesis with an examination of morality 
considered as a relationship betweeen Heaven and Man. In 
other words, I shall examine the structure of Chu Hsi’s 
world-view in terms of morality.
Chu Hsi says in his Ta-hsiieh huo-wenx
First there is Principle, and then comes 
Material Force, comprised of Yin, Yang, and the 
Five Agents. The birth of creatures consists in 
the crystallization of Material Force into 
Physical Forms. Therefore, the birth of Men and 
creatures depends upon their reception of 
Principle as Nature, and Material Force as 
Bodies.333
In this paragraph, Chu Hsi interpreted the relationship 
between Heaven and Man from the point of view of creation.
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In the process of creation not only Man, but Heaven too, 
has both ideal (i.e., Principle) and real <i.e., Material 
Force) phases. But Chu Hsi also says:
Between Heaven and Earth, "Things" are all 
those which have voice, colour, discernible
features, and forms. Since there are Things, 
there must, as the reason for their existence, 
be the Standards < tse) of "the way Things
should be" which cannot be altered, which is 
endowed by Heaven, and not artificial,3^0
The main point of this paragraph is that the moral
standard of Things (including Man) is not artificial but 
endowed by Heaven. What is emphasised here is the 
idealistic aspect of Heaven. Therefore when we examine Chu 
Hsi's world-view, we shall find that Heaven is both the 
metaphysical foundation and the moral paradigm of Things, 
and Man, containing an idealistic element, while remaining 
in fact limited, must therefore be bound by moral
obligations.
In this chapter, I shall examine Chu Hsi's world­
view, that is, his conception of the relationship between 
Heaven and Man, from three points of view. The first is 
that of Principle, through which we discover his 
conception of an orderly world. The second is that of "the 
Spirits and the Divinities," or Mind, through which the 
Purity of the world is revealed. Finally, to balance these 
two idealistic paints of view, I shall examine his world­
view from the aspect of Material Force,
2. The World as Moral Binding on Man
In the previous chapter I examined Chu Hsi's teaching on 
morality with regard to personal cultivation, and reached 
the conclusion that the moral effort of the intelligent
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faculty of Mind is aimed at the fulfillment of Principle, 
in the face of the possible adverse influence of Material 
Force, Mow I shall examine what Chu Hsi taught about 
morality with regard to the world as a whole,
To give a revealing example, Chu Hsi once answered a 
student who asked about the meaning of "the Investigation 
of Things and Extension of Knowledge," in this way:
Unless Principle is apprehended one sees only 
Things, and not Principle. But once Principle 
is attained, one sees Principle rather than
Things, 3/J '1
For Chu Hsi empirical Things are composed of both 
Principle and Material Force, Principle being immanent in 
them, Therefore, if one, through the practice of 
Investigating Things should extend one's knowledge to the 
utmost, one will see the world of Principle which 
underlies the empirical world.
This appears to be a description of what may be 
expected when one attains the ultimate goal. However, the
method of self-cultivation appropriate to our present
condition should consist in a gradual disclosure of 
Principle in the Things we encounter, as well as a gradual 
unfolding of their moral constitution, This is why in the 
Ta-hsueh huo~wen Chu Hsi said that:
We should start from that which is closest and 
most pressing. Mind is that Thing which has 
mastery over the Body. It has as its substance 
the Mature of Humanity, Righteousness, 
Propriety, and Wisdom, and as its function the 
Feelings of compassion, of shame-and-disgust, 
of respect-and-reverence, and of right-and- 
wrong. These Feelings are intact within Mind,
and respond to external stimuli appropriately. 
Second comes the [proper] use of the organs of 
Body: mouth, nose, ears, eyes, limbs. And third
comes the relations in which the person (&h&n> 
"individual" not "corporeal body") is involved, 
those of sovereign and subject, of father and 
son, of husband and wife, of elder and younger, 
and of friends. In all of the above there is
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the Standard. (tee) of "the way Things should 
be" which cannot be altered. This we call
Principle. Beyond myself there are others, and
their Principle is not different from mine. 
Beyond Man there are Things, and their 
Principle is not different from that of Man. 
From the vastest, the revolution of Heaven and 
Earth, and the evolution of time - to the 
minutest - a mote of dust, or the duration of a
breath - nothing is beyond the scope of
Principle.
Chu Hsi’s point is that through the examination of every 
one of the Things that we possess or encounter, from our 
minds to the external world, we may find Principle within
each of them. This Principle, since it is universal, is
not only "the way Things should be," but also requires
that Man should act in accordance with it, that is,
Principle prescribes Man’s moral obligations. According to 
Chu Hsi, the world of Principle is immanent in the
empirical world, and becomes "the Way the empirical world 
should be," In this sense our world may be regarded as a 
world of moral obligation.
3. Mature, Standard, and the Way
In a conversation held some time from 1198, Chu Hsi 
differentiates between several of the concepts relevant to 
the relationship between Heaven and Man, The following is 
an outline of this conversation. "Standard" (tse) is 
understood as the endowment of Heaven to Things, and 
connotes the idea of "exactness and criterion" < wu-kua-pu- 
chi ch'ia~hao te tao-li) . "Mature" can be considered as 
"Standard," from the point of view of the reception by 
Things of the endowmed Standard; it generally, however, 
refers to the reception by Man, Another term, "the Way," 
indicates the path followed by Man (in a broader sense of
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the term, Things may also be included). The relationship 
between Nature and the Way is that of substance and 
function. As regards the relationship between the Standard 
and the Way, while Heaven gives birth to a Thing with its 
Standard, the latter functions as " the Way that Thing 
should be," which Man should follow constantly. 3/13
As Nature (both of Man and of Things) is natural and 
unchanging, so the Way, as the function of Nature, is also 
natural and unchanging, with regard both to the natural 
and the human worlds. Therefore, in his commentary on the 
text, "Following our Nature is called the Way," from the 
Chung'-yung\ Chu Hsi says:
The Way is like a path. When Man and Things 
follow the natural course of their Nature, they 
will find, among the daily affairs and objects, 
the path which they should follow. This path is 
called the Way,
And as Nature is universal, so the Way is universal. Chu 
Hsi appealed to the text of the Chung-yung which says: 
"The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What 
can be separated from us is not the Way."3/,£i
But although the Way is everywhere, that which 
mostly concerns Man is the way of the Essential 
Relationships, The reason that Chu Hsi defined the ” yung” 
of the Chung-yung as "ordinary" rather than "constant" is 
that "what is ordinary will also be constant...and may be 
examined in the present."34® But it is the Essential 
Relationships that are implied in this definition. 
Although the Way includes everything great and small, the 
most important thing is the way of the Essential 
Relationships. The Chung-yung enumerates them as follows:
There are five universal ways. . . . These are 
those governing the relationship between ruler 
and subject, between father and son, between 
husband and wife, between elder and younger
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brothers, and that in the intercourse between 
friends. These five are universal paths in the 
world.
It is only because these five paths are universal that 
they are constant throughout history. In a conversation 
dated from 1193, Chu Hsi said of the continuity, and the 
changes, through history:
It is the transmission of the three relations 
<of ruler and subject, of father and son, and 
of husband and wife) , and the five constancies 
(i.e., the five relationships), that is 
important. All modifications have the purpose 
of transmitting these relationships. For 
example, although the Ch*in dynasty, following
the Chou, and made many mistakes, it still
could not change the three relations and the
five constancies, 348
In conclusion, it may be said that Chu Hsi
demonstrated how the world manifest the Way, Man and 
Things have a moral obligation to follow their Way, of
which the Essential Relationships of Man are the most 
essential.
4. The Significance of Principle in the History of Chinese 
Philosophy
In a conversation held after 1190, Chu Hsi said that a 
constant, perservering practice of the Way in daily life, 
and in the Essential Relationships, will lead to an 
understanding of the inherent Principle. Because he
took Principle as the goal of self-cultivation, it is 
obvious that Chu Hsi could not have regarded it merely as 
an incentive to diligent practice, but rather as a reality 
which could be confirmed through assiduous moral effort. 
Chu Hsi believed that all our moral efforts are aimed at
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the realization of an immanent, pre-existent moral order 
of the world, not one which is invented a posteriori.
One may wish to ask the following question: does
Principle really exist as the metaphysical foundation of 
the natural and moral Way? If one does, one would have to 
admit that, although all of Chu Hsi’s philosophical 
enquiry implies an affirmative answer, he failed to 
convince many subsequent philosophers, especially those of 
the present day. Nevertheless it is passible to find a 
reasonable historical explanation for his world-view.
Firstly, after he rejected the Eclecticism towards 
which he had been inclined in youth, Chu Hsi maintained 
throughout his life an hostility toward Ch’an Buddhism. 
His proposal of a world manifesting the Way, and of 
Principle as its ultimate metaphysical foundation, had the 
purpose of apposing the view of Ch'an, which interpreted 
the world as a place of transcendence, freedom, and 
uniformity, and employed the concept of Emptiness as 
metaphysical foundation. Some time after 1193, a student 
of his offered an opinion on the two-levelled structure of 
Principle. He suggested that "the way Things should be" 
could be seen in the revolution of the universe, while 
"the reason Things should be so" was itself the Great 
Ultimate, Chu Hsi replied:
Yes, our enquiry must be penetrating. Such an 
enquiry is apt to incline us toward Ch’an, But 
the depth of our enquiry must remain distinct 
from Ch* an,330
So it was that the Great Ultimate, conceived as the 
regulative standard, replaced the Emptiness characteristic 
of Ch’an. And the world, based upon such a foundation, was 
given stability, order, and certainty.
Secondly, Chu Hsi supported a society based upon the 
Essential Relationships, in a period when the new socio­
political structure was being consolidated. For him the
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validity of the Way was based on the reality of Principle, 
the Essential Relationships being its most fundamental 
part. Chu Hsi affirmed the Great Ultimate <i,e,, 
Principle) to be the metaphysical reality, through which 
Things are provided with the potential to manifest the 
Way. Man, upon encountering these Things, discovers in 
them the Way as the manifestation of Principle. But, 
because Man is able to realise the Way through his mental 
capacities, Chu Hsi regarded Principle as functioning 
through Mind. He says in a conversation in his seventieth 
year:
Principle permeates everything within Heaven 
and Earth, while Mind masters the Principle of 
them. Since it is mastered by Mind, it 
functions only within Cthe capacities of] Mind. 
Therefore the substance of Principle subsists 
within Things, but its functions are manifested 
t hrou gh Mi nd. 33'
It becomes clear that the Way is based on the Principle 
within Things, and Man's task is simply to carry it out. 
In this way Chu Hsi demonstrated that the Way is an 
abjective reality.
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B. THE WORLD AS MANIFESTING THE PURITY 
OF THE WILL OF HEAVEN
1. Virtue as a Subjective Moral Capacity
From the last chapter, most of our discussion on moral 
cultivation, and on the Way manifested by the world, has 
been based on Chu Hsi’s Ta—hsueh chang-chu and Ta-hsueh 
huo-wen, both of which he completed in his sixtieth year, 
and continued to revise for the rest of his life. In these 
last two sections, I shall concentrate on two other works 
representative of his late years, the Chung-yung chang-chii 
C A Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mearil and the Chung- 
yung huo-wen I Questions and Answers on the Doctrine of the 
Meanl . Although the farmer was completed in his sixtieth 
year, and the latter could possibly have been written at 
about the same time,333 Chu Hsi did not undertake any 
subsequent revision of these two works, and they may be 
taken to represent the thought of his final years.
Chu Hsi regarded the Chung-yung as a Confucian 
Classic on metaphysics, and suggested that, of the Four 
Books, while the Ta-hsueh should be studied first to 
acquire the scheme of moral cultivation, the Chung-yung 
should be studied last because it deals with such subjects 
as Heaven, Nature, and the Way, through which the "hidden 
and marvellous" aspect of the ancient sages may be 
discovered,333 Therefore, to conclude my investigation of 
Chu Hsi’s view of the relationship between Heaven and Man, 
it is proper to turn to these two works.
In Chu Hsi’s interpretation of the Chung-yung, there 
is a fundamental antithesis between that which has 
objective certainty and that which exerts effort 
subjectively. The farmer is the Way, while the latter can 
be expressed by the concept of Virtue (te) . "Virtue"
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refers to the moral capacity of Mind which carries out the 
Way, rather than to Nature which is the reason for the 
Way.
The contrast he made between the Way and Virtue is 
based on the fallowing text of the Chung-yung".
There are five universal Ways, and the way by 
which they are effectuated is threefold, The 
five are those governing the relationship 
between ruler and subject, father and son,
husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, 
and that between friends. These five are
universal paths in the world. Wisdom, Humanity, 
and Courage: these three are the universal
Virtues, The way through which they are
accomplished is one.354
I quoted most of this passage in section A of this 
chapter for the purpose of introducing the "five universal 
Ways," But now my concern is with the other two concepts, 
those of Virtue < te) and of Purity < ch * eng) . Virtue also 
manifests Principle, just as the Way does. But the Way, as 
"the universal path which ought to be followed by 
everybody in the world, throughout history," is an 
objective reality, while Virtue, as "the Principle with 
which everybody in the world throughtout history is 
endowed," is a subjective capacity.333 The concept of 
Virtue can refer to Principle, which is one of the two 
sources of Mind; but it can also be investigated with 
reference to the other source - Material Force. In that 
case Virtue will have different strengths in different 
people. Therefore the text of the Chung-yung continues:
Some are born with knowledge (of the Way), Some 
learn it through study. Some learn it through 
hard work. But when the knowledge is acquired, 
it is found to be the same thing. Some practise 
it naturally and easily. Some practise it for 
their own advantage. Some practise it with 
effort and difficulty. But the achievement made 
comes to the same thing, (Chu Hsi’s commentary: 
The object of both knowledge and practice is 
"the universal Way.”)333
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It Is clear that Chu Hsi considers Virtue as the capacity 
to know and practise the Way. Principle provides the 
foundation for Virtue, but because of the influence of 
Material Force its strength varies among different people, 
The inferior therefore have to struggle to improve their 
abilities.
According to Chu Hsi's commentary, the significance 
of Virtue consists in the consummation of the Way, rather 
than in the improvement of Virtue for its own sake. This 
distinction, though minute, seems to me to be of 
importance. If Chu Hsi had recommended Virtue for its own 
sake, he would have been advocating an individualistic 
morality. But his commentary rules out this possibility. 
However, the other extreme of collective morality is also 
inadequate to characterize his system, for, although the 
Way is the ultimate goal, both its reason <i.e,, Nature) 
and its momentum (i.e., Virtue) must be found in the 
individual, and its accomplishment relies on the 
improvement of the individual, In this way Chu Hsi like 
many other great philosophers, although inclined towards 
collectivism, endeavoured to maintain a balance between 
the individual and society,
Chu Hsi's conception of the relationships between 
Nature, Mind, the Way, and Virtue, can be schematised in 
the following diagram;
SUBSTANCE Nature=Principle Material Force
FUNCTION
vw
The Way 
(Objective Reality)
Mind
Virtue
(Subjective Capacity)
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The passage quoted earlier said that the Way by 
which the three universal Virtues are accomplished is one. 
According to Chu Hsi, this one way is that of Purity 
(ci' eng') . By ’’Purity” is meant maintaining the integrity 
of Mind and not letting Human Desires intervene or 
contaminate the practice of Virtue,
2. The Homogeneity of Way from the Essential Relationships 
to the Hatural World
In section A of this chapter we saw that the Way is 
universal, encompassing both the natural and the human 
worlds. An examination of this homogeneity from the 
subjective point of view will lead us to an explanation of 
the Purity of Heaven and Earth (i.e., the world). In the 
Chung-yung- there is a relevant passage;
iS&ih ching says, "The hawk soars in the 
heavens; the fish leaps from the abyss.” This 
means that C the Way] is clearly seen above and 
below. The Way of the superior man has its 
simple beginnings in the relation between 
husband and wife, but in its furthest reaches, 
it is clearly seen in heaven and on earth,3se
Since Principle is unique, and the Way is the functioning 
of Principle, there can be only one Way common to all 
things from the natural world to the Essential 
Relationships. It is noteworthy that in the above 
quotation the Way known and followed by the superior man 
begins from the Essential Relationships before extending 
to the natural world, This progression implies that the 
Way can be attained to only through moral effort. On the 
other hand, from its homogeneity it is clear that the Way 
in itself is equally natural and vigorous, both in the
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Essential Relationships and in the natural world. Ch* eng 
Hao commented on this passage;
"Hawk flies and fishes leap,” this is the 
crucial point of Tzu-ssu’s (the supposed author 
of the Chung-yung) moral teaching, which is the 
same as Mencius's "Always be occupied by 
something but without expectation.” Both 
activities are sprightly and vigorous.3®®
Chu Hsi quoted Ch'eng Hao and explained that Tzu-ssu 
taught us that the Way unfolds and manifests itself in all 
places between Heaven and Earth. The Way is evident not 
only in the flight of the hawk and the leaping of fishes, 
but also in our daily affairs and the Essential 
Relationships. By that understanding of these 
manifestations which cannot be expressed in words, one 
gains insight into the wonderful essence of the Way. As to 
the teaching of Mencius, Chu Hsi explained that although 
the substance and functions of the Way permeate the entire 
universe throughout history, in the sphere of Man the 
containment of Mind is necessary for the manifestation of 
the Way in daily affairs. As soon as Mind is contained, 
substance is manifested in its entirety, and the wonderful 
functions then unfold; it is not necessary to wait to 
observe the flight of the hawk and the leaping of 
fishes!3*"0 Chu Hsi's proposal was that the Way is 
manifested as lively and vigorously in the human world, as 
it is in the natural world - on condition that one’s Mind 
is contained.
An understanding of the liveliness of the Way, and 
its uniformity in the natural and human worlds will 
provide a clue to the concept of Purity,
3. The World as Manifesting Purity
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In Chu Hsi’s philosophy, as the Way encompasses 
objectively the natural and the human worlds, so Purity of 
Mind unites subjectively the moral struggle of Man and the 
natural creative unfolding of Heaven. This conception is 
derived from the Chung-yung, in which there are two 
levels of Purity, that of Heaven, and that of Man. The 
relevant Chung-yung text is;
Purity is the way of Heaven. Endeavouring to be 
Pure is the way of Man. He who is Pure is one 
who has hit upon what is right without effort 
and knows it without thinking. He is naturally 
and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man
is a Sage <i.e,, a man who is commensurate with
Heaven). He who tries to be Pure is one who
chooses the good and holds fast to it.
Study extensively, enquire circumspectly, 
reflect carefully, sift clearly, and practise 
earnestly, ... If this course is followed 
diligently, even the stupid will become 
intelligent, and the weak will become 
strong. !5I&'1
Let us first examine the Purity of Man. The "one way" of 
the earlier quotation ("The way by which the three 
universal Virtues are practised is one,") also refers to 
Purity in this sense. Since the slightest impurity of Will 
can make hypocritical our Virtuous actions, we say that 
Purity is that which accomplishes the Virtues. But then 
Purity requires as much cultivation as Virtue in order to 
reach perfection, It must be preceded by the endeavour to 
know the good (objectively speaking, the Way), and it is 
achieved by holding fast to the good. Purity is that by 
which the Mind of Man can be united with that of Heaven.
Such an identity of Purities of Man and Heaven is
exemplified in the sages. Their Purity is spontaneous and 
natural, not an object of acquisition. That is why the 
Purity of the sages is regarded as the Way of Heaven.
We must now examine the Purity of Heaven, There is a 
relevant passage in the Chung-yung:
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Purity is the beginning and end of things. 
Without it there would be nothing. Therefore 
the superior man values Purity. 3e",:E
Chu Hsi explained this text by identifying "Pure” and 
"real” Cshih'). The Principle of Heaven and Earth is the 
ens realise! mum, therefore its process of creation allows 
no breath of illusion, and everything created since the 
beginning of the universe. At the level of Man, the Mind 
of the sage is the most real subject to no illusion, 
therefore, every event of his life is real, having sprung 
from his Pure Mind. As for the ordinary man, while his 
Mind remains real what he does will also be real, but 
while his Mind is distracted, what he does will lack 
substantiality. 3cV-'3 This explanation by Chu Hsi implies 
that Purity, or the Mind of Heaven and Earth, is no more 
than the continuing process of creation, "the Divinities," 
or "the Spirits and the Divinities" which were discussed 
in the fourth chapter as the link between Principle and 
Material Force, can now be regarded as the Purity of
Heaven and Earth.
There is another relevant passage in the Chungyyung';
The Way of Heaven and Earth may be completely
described in one maxim. It is altogether
without duality and so produces things in an
unfathomable manner.
According to Chu Hsi's commentary, this "one maxim" is 
equivalent to "Purity", as is evident from the description 
"altogether without duality."3ee Therefore, as Principle 
is the Vital Principle, so Purity is its dynamic force, by 
which the universe revolves and Things are continuously 
produced.
How we may conclude our investigation into the 
relationship between Principle, the Way, and Purity.
Principle, the Great Ultimate, is the substance, while
both the Way and Purity are its functions. The Way is the
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objective aspect, and involves the real, natural and moral 
laws. Purity is the subjective, dynamic aspect, and refers 
to the purity and creativity that ensues from Principle 
and sustains the Way.
Although Man must struggle to be Pure, Purity in 
itself is natural both to Man and to the universe, And, 
since the purity of Mind is moral, when the universe is 
examined in its subjective aspect and regarded as Pure, it 
may properly be called a moral universe. Here we find 
another aspect of Chu Hsi*s world-view opposing that of 
Ch’an. I have said that according to Chu Hsi the world is 
real, both because its Way has objective existence, and 
because Principle is its ultimate foundation. But Chu Hsi 
proposed one more reason for the reality of the world, and 
that is, that it is the creation of Purity. Therefore, 
besides the conclusion we have reached that this is a 
world manifesting the Way, we may add that, subjectively 
speaking, this is also a world of Purity.
In Chu Hsi's system, Principle is the reason for the 
existence of the myriad things. Purity, as the dynamic 
function of Principle, may then be regarded as the 
creative agent of Principle, Since the Purity of Heaven 
and Earth results in the creation of things, so in the 
human world, Purity should also express itself as a 
creative process. Purity therefore is not only the 
purification of Mind, but also involves the creation of 
correct knowledge and practice. Morality, then, may be 
conceived of as creative, affecting not only character, 
but also entailing external consequences. In this way we 
come to Chu Hsi' s conception of "honouring the moral 
nature and fallowing the path of enquiry and study" Ctsun- 
te-hsinff erh taa-wen-bsiieh'),
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4. Honouring the Moral Mature and Fallowing the Path of 
Enquiry and Study
In order to discuss this conception we shall first quote a 
passage of the Chung-yung which demonstrates the creative 
character of Purity:
Purity is not only the fulfillment of one's own 
self, it is that by which all things are 
fulfilled. The fulfillment of the self means 
Humanity. The fulfillment of all things means 
Wisdom. These (i.e., Humanity and Wisdom) are 
the virtues of Nature, and also the way in 
which the internal and the external are united. 
Therefore whenever it (i.e., Purity) is 
employed, everything done is right.
This passage presents an ideal of the Purity of the Sage 
which is not merely limited to the accumulation of inner 
Virtue, but simultaneously strives to attain external 
fulfillment. This■ideal attached Chu Hsi, for he made use 
of it in his commentary on many other sections in the 
Chung-yung, In chapters twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty- 
six, and twenty-seven of the Chung-yung, there are such 
passages concerning the Purity of the sages as: "The sages 
by their Purity can develop the Nature of Things;" "They 
can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of 
Heaven and Earth." Some Neo-Confucianists explained these 
passages by saying that the sages mysteriously inspire the 
Purity of others, who may then devote themselves to the 
development and nourishment of their own Nature. 
Nevertheless, Chu Hsi avoided this hind of mysticism with 
the simple explanation that since the sages have 
comprehensive knowledge they can manage Things 
properly. ®f5'/ Chapter twenty-six of the Chung-yung says 
that the highest Purity is uninterrupted, and therefore 
enduring, and therefore manifest, and therefore extensive 
and deep, and therefore ultimately lofty and brilliant. 
Against the contention that this refers to the magnificent
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individuality of character of the sages achieved through 
their inner accumulation of Virtue, Chu Hsi argued that it 
refers rather to the development of their external
career. 3<se
Chu Hsi had said, while contrasting the Way and 
Virtue, that the Way is the aim, and that Virtue is the 
necessary condition of moral endeavour, and that Virtue 
will itself be cultivated through that endeavour. Now that 
Purity is proposed as the subjective and dynamic function 
of Principle, it would seem proper to say that the Purity 
of the sages initiates the Way, just as the Purity of 
Heaven and Earth continuously creates things. This is 
supported, according to Chu Hsi, by the following Chung- 
yung text: "Unless there is perfect Virtue, the perfect
Way cannot be materialised."333 This perfect Virtue of the 
sage is Purity, so Man who endeavours to be Pure must make 
the effort to cultivate his Virtue as the inner source of 
the Way, and to pursue external knowledge and practice for 
the fulfillment of the Way in particular circumstances. 
The Chung-yung text continues;
Therefore the superior man "honours the moral 
nature" and "follows the path of enquiry and 
study." He "achieves breadth and greatness" and 
"pursues the refined and subtle to the limit." 
He "seeks to reach the greatest height and 
brilliancy" and "follows the path of the Mean." 
He "goes over the old" so as to "find out what
is new." He "is earnest and deep" and "respects
highly all propriety."3"-7'0
Commenting these five contrasting pairs, Chu Hsi said that 
each of the former terms in these pairs belongs to the 
category■of "honouring the moral nature", which refers to 
the containment of Mind in order to attain the greatness 
of the Way, while each of the latter terms belongs to the 
category of "following the path of enquiry and study," 
which refers to the Extension of Knowledge in order to 
fulfill the detailed practice of the Through the
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former practice, the perfect Virtue within the Mind may be 
attained - this is to reach the greatness of the Way. 
However, only through the latter practice, with knowledge 
of the external world, can the Mind respond to external 
affairs properly - this is to fulfill the details of the 
Way,
In his latest years, Chu Hsi often stressed this 
point and appealed to the authority of the Chung-yung, For 
example, at the age of seventy he spoke a lot with Ch'en 
Ch'un about the way of learning. He emphasised that the 
Way is not an abstract and unfathomable mystery, but 
permeates the knowledge and affairs of the external world, 
According to Chu Hsi, the ideal scholar should broaden his 
mind to receive the sayings of the sages, and further, he 
should communicate with the wise among his contemporaries, 
observe current affairs, examine military geography, and 
study the rise and decline of dynasties in history. Only 
then can he realise the Way to the utmost. He said that 
since ancient times, there had been no sage who did not 
know practical affairs, or was incapable of responding to 
changing situations, or who merely sat confined within his 
room. The sages knew everything and could do anything. 3V'K"
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C. A FEW WORDS ON THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS
1. The Imperfection of the World from the Point of View of 
Material Force
We have discussed Chu Hsi's world-view from the paints af 
view of Principle, and of Mind, The third element,
Material Force, has also been touched on. We have shown
that Man's moral obligation to strive for the Way and for 
Purity, which themselves can never be completely attained, 
is due to the limitation of Material Force. But it will be 
necessary to end this thesis by examining Chu Hsi’s world­
view exclusively from the point of view of Material Force.
We shall, in doing so, find that Chu Hsi, despite having 
the lofty ideals of the Way and Purity, also had a
realistic outlook and a keen sense of the inscrutability 
of human destiny.
Material Force is the reason for the actual
existence of individuals, as well as the cause of their
moral and intellectual differences. Therefore from the 
point of view of Material Force, the world, as the 
totality of individuals, is composed of all kinds of
contingent goods and evils, and can never be said to be 
perfect.
So, from this point of view the moral values of bath 
Heaven and Man may be seen to be contingent. For example, 
in a conversation dated from 1191, Chu Hsi said:
As regards the evolution of Heaven and Earth, 
there are all kinds of possibilities. For some 
obvious examples: There may be some time when
the sun and the moon are clear and bright, and 
the weather mild and normal. If men in their 
birth are endowed with this kind of Material 
Force, they will possess the clear, bright, and 
generous Material Force, and will naturally 
become good men. But when the sun and the moon
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are obscured, and summer and winter are out of
their regular order, they embody the perverse 
Material Force of Heaven and Earth. If men 
receive such Material Force, they will become
bad men. This truth is beyond doubt. 3V'3
This applies to individuals at any one point in time. But 
Material Force is also the reason for moral differences 
between historical periods. In addition to actualising the 
development of history according to the opposing-and- 
circulating Principle, it contributes many accidental
strengths and weaknesses to that development. As a result 
history will evolve in many different stages of
flourishing and decline, and within each stage both the 
virtues and the fortunes of the people will be diverse.37,/J’
2. The Connexion Between Virtue and Happiness
Before this thesis comes to an end we shall take a glimpse 
of what Chu Hsi had to say about the problem of individual 
happiness, in the light of his doctrines of "Principle and 
Material Force."
In the first chapter of this thesis, I said that 
according to Ch1an, Man can find Emptiness directly in 
everything he meets, and so should be happy and free, 
whatever his situation. But Chu Hsi established his own 
world-view, which opposed that of Ch* an. As the 
metaphysical foundation he substituted Principle for 
Emptiness; as the object of Man's commitment, he 
substituted the Essential Relationships and practical 
affairs for personal freedom. It will be worthwhile to 
compare these two world-views from the point of view of 
Man as an individual.
The basic ethical problem of whether those who are 
virtuous will also be happy, is irrelevant to Ch’an. Since
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if the term "virtue" has any application for Ch’an, it 
must mean the realization of Emptiness, and freedom from 
burden. In this sense, Virtue already includes happiness, 
if not worldly pleasure. But in Confucianism, since the 
world is regarded as having objective reality, Virtue and 
happiness cannot simply be identified, as they are in 
Ch’an. For, so long as the world has objective reality, 
happiness, which would then at least have some relation to 
the external world, can no longer be wholly immanent in 
virtue.
The seventeenth chapter of the Chung-yung describes 
the conformity of virtue and happiness positively:
Confucius said, "Shun indeed had great filial 
piety! In virtue he was a sage; in honour he 
was the Son of Heaven (i.e., emperor); and in 
wealth he owned all within the four seas. 
Temple sacrifices were made to him, and his 
descendants preserved the sacrifices for him. 
Thus it is that he who possesses great virtue 
will certainly attain to a corresponding 
position, to corresponding wealth, to 
corresponding fame, and to corresponding long 
life. For Heaven, in the production of things, 
is sure to be generous to them, according to 
their natural capacities. Hence the tree that 
is well taken care of is nourished and that 
which is about to fall is overthrown. The Shih 
ching says, 'the admirable, amiable prince 
displayed conspicuously his excellent virtue. 
He put his people and his officers in concord. 
And he received his emolument from Heaven. It 
protected him, assisted him, and appointed him 
king. And Heaven's blessing came again and 
again,’ Therefore he who possesses great virtue 
will surely receive the appointment of 
Heaven. M3'3'’£3
The Chung-yung tells us that he who has perfect virtue 
also has the greatest gain, Since virtue does not contain 
happiness, the conformity of virtue and happiness must 
rely on some external link. In the Chung-yung this link 
occurs in Heaven. To him who can accomplish the Way, 
Heaven will give the greatest fortune, to ensure his
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success as much as to reward his labour. However, in 
reality we see that many virtuous men suffer misfortune - 
Confucius himself, for example. So that the relation 
between virtue and happiness must be re-examined.
Chu Hsi was not so positive about the conformity of 
virtue and happiness. In his view, because Heaven contains 
Material Force as well as Principle, any correspondence 
between virtue and happiness can only be accidental. The 
fortune of Shun is consistent with the Way things should 
be but the fortune of Confucius is not. Yen-hut, the best 
student of Confucius, was short-lived, whereas Tao-chih, 
the nortorious bandit, lived long to enjoy his plunder. 
Such inconsistency is, of course, due to the obstruction 
of Material Force, which may be of different moral quality 
in history as well as in individuals. It was good at the 
time of Shun and bad at the time of Confucius, And for an 
example of differing Material Force in the same historical 
period: Yen-hui received a paltry span of life, while Tao- 
chih received a generous one,376
With such a realistic world-view, Chu Hsi proposed 
that one should aim not at external happiness which is 
unreliable, but at the fulfillment of responsibility 
relevant to one’s position. Such an attitude is supported 
by the following text of the Chung-yungi
The superior man does what is proper to his 
position and does not want to go beyond this. 
If he is in a noble station, he does what is
proper to a position of wealth and honour. If
he is in a humble station, he does what is
proper to a position of poverty and humility. 
If he is in the midst of savages, he does what 
is proper to savages. In a position of 
difficulty and danger, he does what is proper 
to a position of difficulty and danger. He can 
find himself in no situation in which he is not 
at ease with himself. In a high position he
does not treat his inferiors with contempt. In 
a low position he does not court the favour of 
his superiors. He rectifies himself and seeks 
nothing from others, hence he has no complaint 
to make. He does not complain against Heaven
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above, nor does he blame men below. Thus it is 
that the superior man lives peacefully and at 
ease and waits for his destiny, while the 
inferior man takes to dangerous courses and 
hopes for good luck, sa"jr"jr
Chu Hsi' s commentary emphasises the first sentence: "The
superior man does what is proper to his position and does 
not want to go beyond this," Because Chu Hsi had a clear
sense of the fortuity of human life based on his
conception of Material Force, he proposed that one should 
maintain integrity and perform one's duties within the 
constraints of nature and society, thereby acquiring a
tranquility and contentment.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the
process through which Chu Hsi formulated a new 
metaphysics; one which, in contrast with that of Buddhism, 
provided the foundation for a world-view characterized by 
morality. I hope that it has not only achieved this 
purpose satisfactorily, but that it has also constituted 
something new to our understanding of Neo-Confucianism.
Before the rise of Neo-Confucianism, Chinese 
philosophy was dominated by the Subjective Idealism of 
Ch*an, which tended to promote individualism and supra- 
moral values. Neo-Confucianism arose with the task of 
defending the validity of social and interpersonal 
morality, and for this purpose Northern Sung Neo- 
Confucianism proposed the metaphysics of Immanent 
Vitalism. But, as I pointed out, during the transition
period between Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism, there occurred 
a stage of Eclecticism, which mediated between these two 
modes of thinking, and which was also the position which 
Chu Hsi adapted in the beginning of his philosophical 
enquiry.
After his initial period of Eclecticism, Chu Hsi 
adopted Immanent Vitalism as a result of his
apprenticeship with Li T ’ung. Nevertheless, while trying 
to approach the Way (i.e., the cosmic life-princlple) 
subjectively, Chu Hsi found that that theory was defective 
in dealing with self-cultivation. So, during the period
from his twenty-seventh year to his forty-fourth, he 
struggled to revise Immanent Vitalism. One of the 
characteristics of his metaphysics which resulted from 
this revision was that Man was not only a function of 
Heaven, as the cosmic life-principle, but was also a 
subject, and because he had Mind, was self-determining and
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had the capacity to establish substance and functions in 
his own right. Tomoeda Ryutaro mentioned the point that 
there is a two-dimensional substance-function structure in 
Chu Hsi’s metaphysics, to which I have added the 
observation that the lower dimension is established from 
the subjective, or the individual point of view. Another 
point deserving notice is that he gradually abandoned the 
tradition of Immanent Vitalism by looking on substance as 
an abstract regulative principle. He formulated this new 
metaphysics as a fundamental rationale for his new moral 
method, in which the Mind played a role of nourishing 
Nature and controlling Feelings.
The development of Chu Hsi’s thought from his forty- 
fourth year to his sixtieth involved an essential insight, 
of which the following is a resumd, That Man cannot
achieve morality without self-restraint reflects the fact 
that Man is a limited being despite his possessing a moral 
capacity. Man, therefore, in addition to being a subject, 
must also be recognized as a creature. Consequently, 
morality for Man cannot be established unless there exists 
a universal Principle as an independent Standard, 
transcending Man’s individual life, Chu Hsi therefore 
modified his new metaphysics and developed the doctrine of 
”Principle and Material Force," Principle being the 
regulative standard, and Material Force being the material 
cause of the existence of individual lives and moral
differences. Goto Toshimizu and Tomoeda Ryutaro have 
offered major contributions to the understanding of the
significance of this doctrine in the history of Chinese 
philosophy. To complement their discoveries, I have 
investigated the place of Mind in Chu Hsi’s new system, 
and his ascription of moral significance to Material 
Force.
With his doctrine of "Principle and Material Force" 
Chu Hsi was in a position to propose a theory of the
nature and the purpose of Man, The combination of
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Principle and Material Force, as they subsists within 
creatures, is Physical Nature, and through it both the 
capacities and the limitations of Man may be explained. 
Man then requires moral practice in order to increase the 
moral capacities of his Mind, and overcome its 
limitations.
Finally, after a consideration of the above concepts 
and their development, I have examined Chu Hsi’s world­
view, According to Chu Hsi, this universe is a moral one, 
Heaven is the source of, and is itself the exemplification 
of, morality, Man, as a limited creature, is bound by 
moral obligations through which he may hope to be at one 
with Heaven. But, although Chu Hsi expounded a world of 
Principle, he held a realistic view of that same world. 
Perhaps this was because he was aware that moral struggle 
presupposes the imperfection of Man and his world. The 
limitation of Material Force is significant not only as 
the reason for Man’s moral struggles, but also is that it 
ensures that his efforts can never guarantee the 
acquisition of his happiness. Nevertheless, it is through 
that effort that he may finally find dignity and 
contentment in his own person, Chu Hsi's world-view, then, 
in comparison with that of Ch’an, is characterized by a 
sense of realism, lacking the llght-heartedness and naive 
optimism of the latter.
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■f f »)
Quoted from Wang Mao-hung, p. 16.
The above description of Chu Hsi’s transition from 
Ch* an to Confucianism is based on Ch* ien Mu's 
study. Ch’ien C1971), III, 12-17.
He was thinking over the Lun-yii, 19: 12. The
sources relevant to this incident are collected in 
Ch’ien (1971), III, 17-18.
Jtfeng'-t.zu 2A: 2. See Chu Hsi’s recollection in Yii-
lei, VII, 104: 14; 4157:
-5-1 2. a  a  .j. -5- f
4 u i * $ t  • > a  * , •  & % *
ttft * ® f  €  *  Itfcf - & $ “«  • * i f l t l - t t i  *
e s i e f  » j
I
See ”Yii Fan chih-ko” , Ta-ch*uan, IV, 37: 6a:
-  w  4  if £  •
Yen-p* ing ta-wen, II, 13b,
Chu Hsi made this recollection with certain 
reservations, see ibid., 14a:
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£ # * *  ' A ' f l . l a i  • $ S T '
tf • I  $ & ! ? • £  • i t T * r &  ' $ i g p £ i ' 1 f $  
$ # , * * ■ &  *
91, " I  ‘ *-i4 ' t $4^
afcJ£° ^ - f i f  ' 4 - l . i i  ' #- & * H 3
#  &  ' #f ii^ * i64*t%: #  to &  ;* ' #. to &  J  ' £
* « . * . &  •
Ibid., I, 34b-37a
92- at-^t Si. 4 ? ^ *  * •■•'&■& t i ' so
$ $ *  8 i «  + #. - Us i T-t > « *  * if# t S) • # * *
ft $ >  feJifeiPJ ' r a i f  SSJ. ^ t | S - ® ^ s k
-& O
/bid. , 35b.
93. This description of the relationship between
metaphysics and morality is based on ibid. :
£ = £  J f -  ' M « 4 f r  ; • * t - V 7 3  J | ^
94. Li T ’ung’s attitude is revealed in ibid., 29b, 34a:
' # * * *  * $ * * * * $  a - •
• « * u t J f c 3 f  B  ’ M - *  *  •’
$ ■ * * , « ? » «  4* ft# * * *
95. This description of the first set of proposals is 
paraphrased from "Jen-wu ying-chao feng-shih,” T&- 
ch* dan, II, 11; 3a:
$  ’ #  «r w  W,M fttbilrtii* M . M ^ft **t 
* $ 3 0 * *  + • i f  * 1 ■«
& k  f  iuM ' £ ® < * T #  ' JSEftf.«’
# « $ K f  i i i i '  > » « r «
* k ' r i # j S  > ! £ 4 * * t e M f )
96. The description in this paragraph is based on 
”Kuei-wei ch’uei-kung-tien tsou-tsa erh,” ibid., 
13: 2b—3a:
* 6 f  ' A « K « >  W A * f
^ n b ^ ' k  ’ 4  &  ®4*jt $  j 3l#tS 4. i ®  •> ®  #4?
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Bl«t t i n s  I '  s$*(£7 '
*  t ' X i - 4  f & f R M '  *S*.3t* SB UB-fr
^ # 4  ' ’ H I * * -
jg t - z z  >
| B |  S C . i , f l f c 7 4 d * | ? X 5 |  ’ H i ^ l '  * 8 1
#Ht > li t l  £'-£7 i « 4  ' # * • £ $ * £ *  0 l& 
t  t ) J w  ' l # £ i - ^ S P  - ! ( *
97. Maruyama Masao considers the uniform reasoning from 
natural law to moral principle as most 
characteristic of Chu Hsi. See Maruyama <1953), pp. 
21-29. Here we have seen the homogeneity between 
nature and humanity. But from the following 
chapters we shall find that the concept of law will 
be a later development,
98. This description of Su Shih’s theory is based on 
Ta-ch’ uan, IX, 72: 20ab:
( f i t # !  ■ f 3-f )
fflil • - f l t - l f *  '
&  l $  1  -  £  ®  4  *.:*** iflhfc
• l tf
& J & — ?rtj|
& e  : fclfcsSflLito* i L i f t H S l J *  K.
99. The description of Chu Hsi ’ s refutation in this 
paragraph is based on ibid. , 20b:
f t * 7®
s . 4 «  ❖  h ’- i& - ® 4 '
%  ' * dU***, •*{KMll|HT«Ht T fc**
^»*b •
100. This description of Su Shih's conception of Nature 
is based on ibid. , 21b:
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101.
102.
103.
104,
105.
106.
107.
108.
fes : 8C(0'f!MPIi|£8f 7 B  : H t f e  , g f  £  4* • j| z>A§!) 
*-tfe > -&i>H§0F|& * T l -
* * - * ' ?  H - f r i
See ibid. :
j fre : =9 4  £-3- W&14& > w > ^ i £  ! i | |  fat-Spg^S-te,
• 1 8 . 4 * 4  ! 5 > B 4  t * 4  * ' A t
& & § ! , #  Bp ! , & £ £ & • '  18 W tf &£.&&<.
See ibid. , 21a:
f e e  : * * & % & * ' •  * 4  » * * * '  4  
± 6 5 4 * 4 4  ! 9 *e  •> * £ 4 4 * '  $ £ 4 t t - f c *  
4 - 4 £ £ f i  M -  ' 4 » 4 J l £ t l £ *  ' • §^0 )8 i fc7 ' io -  HJt 
* * - & # *  • < M t * £  ■ » a f )  •
I ching, Hsi-tz'u A, ch. 5; translated in Chan 
(1973), p. 266.
See Ta-ch'uan, IX, 72: 22ab:
f e e  s , | i  * %  £ 4 & £ * t #  *
; * » 4 m A 4 *  * $ # * * * •  * 4 4 4 . 6 4 - £
■ -§4 a Jl?ibT'*> - feia* t  £ * 4 £ H t t * S | f 4  ! 
fcSi*#. ■ # • £ £ * > '  3 « f t  -
/ chingt Ch*ien, T*uan-chuan; translated in Chan 
<1973), p. 264. Translation modified by the author.
See Ta-ch'dan, IX, 72; 17b:
f e s  : £  * i - fc  • 3 & * -# s  ' £ • £ * $  ' • ^jtofe
i. > £■ £  4  £i ' w  S- ’ At ffr hi &  | ■& •
This description of Chu Hsi’s argument is based on 
ibid., 21a:
* * * £ 4  4 - flrif
* £  1 ' 6 « r * * 4 I S  4 4 *  ' ifcfttfiil
- i f b - W
1t £•& •
This description is based on ibid., 22b:
f c w - M f c * * , *  » # * £ * ,
• l A i i  i f * ! * ?
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109. This description is based on ibid, , 17b:
ift* % I %
' z-*€iftT >® x . #  H U M . '  ft'fpl TSf £ £  7
110. This description of Su Ch’e's theory is paraphrased 
from ibid. , 24a-25a:
& B  ; 3 L * a 4 = j f c * * 3 & ^ T  , £ 7 i&?®|b 4. ,
15)“ § b ; "flj ffb-t % If £51'  ^ 411 £§ “"■3t 3-
tit ft 5*. ' 4fc*AW.S®fl5-&i!L« £  t  7 ^ 5 |
£  ftllfc ■ W. 7  £. *  » lit) + A W . £  t) £  W-hjt-ls • ■£7 g!)
7  &  ' L-xSs
m - m k ! s t a t  * * * # * * « * . .
111. See ibid. , 26b:
jfctM Mf S : X T  HI f t - A '  SbtirM%k»] n • %  6 «  7 £  
Pe  ^ ^ * a w 4 L i 4 ' * 4 6 * * ni i '  « « £ * * '  7 £ f - f e  
• £ i b & >  S o w : # ! * ' f t f e A X t ^ i f c *  6 H
£$1**811 • t  l \ K >  tAS - ft ft •
112. This description of Chu Hsi * s criticism is from 
ibid. :
f t * * T « - A  ' 6 * 4  i A ■ « & £ * '  M « . * - d U  •’ «
’ fa i M ’i t f r K f c  i 4 J P  ?
113. See ibid. , 27a:
3 H E - t t * * f c a .  i f l '  6  ! & & > * $ * # -  a t t i r t * ’9 4 4  '
j61tif±*l|£e • **«.*$*§*.$■ * ’ # » *
ttft’ ft 4 f t  5* ' ! &
A t^ iT 'T 'f ' tf-fff 4 ^  & / f  £  to •’ ft A g. &
tlS? 4 • £*-«&$$ + > m  4tlfe 4.it. • f f l * t £ f r '  wik
' ft l i f t  6 f t #  - £ & 6 : £ A i j $  ; # 4  f t - a t  £  
* I > ffD&tte*#'® * w  Aflfftiin ' * 4 W t  S ®  * 9 
41 ' * £ £ $ ^ £ ^ £ * # 4  •
114- X t H 4 .  ’ ^  1 4 i * *  '  $ i l
Chung-yung, ch. 1; translated in Chan <1973), p.
98. Translation modified by the author,
115. The description in this paragraph is paraphrased 
from Ta-ch*uan, IX, 72: 27b:
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■^l iusrii’ w A . « £ * B # f t \ * 4 = * 4 < «  t £  j m  
ilftftfciiJiHfc* Aft Ml it* ’ ftftfc-jg
g. - ' S d U f  # t * * f . 6  8ifi!
116. See ibid. , 29a:
■. * *tt«t ' 4 4 l$it * M M U f t *  0 aft ft k H * ~  
*» ' &&tfrii8x^£€ - &ftM tit 
f * £ T  • !
117- -&#a#4E°  ’ * 4 } & f  4 - '  • •" A f t  X T
^ * 5  •
Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan <1973), p. 
105. Translation modified by the author.
118. This description of Chang Chiu-ch’eng*s
interpretation is paraphrased from Ta-ch*uan, IX, 
72: 36ab:
3||X : ft £ ft t  ’ w  T- &-fe ; 7  BP &  *  i& S • #  4» fir U }  
f t * # ?  ftrti4jM1IL7tii*&fr$1lL? I
ftx ;
T  ^ - $ 1 1 4 1 - | £ .  A  £  ! 2 . B  : %  t
f t t *  •
119. This description of Chu Hsi's criticism is
paraphrased from ibid, , 29a:
(ftft) a s  : ' ifttfflxft-*# •*«*:&
!# •  J L t f i f c i f t '  & & f t  X T  > « H U i
itift 1 b| > ^  ^  13&. > W.£*ife* ' # 7
' A t  • R * t * * - * # # i t  ’
-te ®
120. For the Ta-hsiieh text and Lu Fen-chung* s
interpretation, see ibid., 43a:
'  4&4&-SD&4S0 £  ° t k f t }
8 ft b  : fil
* - i f # « , S i l * * S . > f t f t * S * S . « *  a  ' « » # [ £ •
121. This description of Chu Hsi's criticism is
paraphrased from ibid., 43ab:
254
« f t u t H « ( * a « H 9  ' Sbf-t^JE 
*  '. « # * * £ * » » * * - * •
tt 6 II i •<&$, 7 ”- «  +  * '  - f c i \ £ A t t  > # ?
£ * » *  •
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CHAPTER III THE STRUGGLE FOR A HEW METAPHYSICS
122. Derived from the following sayings of Li T*ung:
4 “ &  W l(£ ^  M  • j l  W %  K  i, iv jfisSI-lr A. ' £  5|] % A. i6 S£ A  
' jtip ?
' A. & jl i-,1 #
' ifciMia-*1 Mitten ' jfewAfttta* sj
■ $  A  ^  i|fe /£-& “
' Yen-p'-in# ta-wen, I, 8b, 15a.
123. Ibid, , lb, 4b, 6a, 6b, 8b, 19a, 22a, 28a.
124. Cf. the following quotation:
* >  f f  $ & * * £ $ * •  K * s *  * " 6 a
A M ' #  i  a  « J M I  f t ' & |  - - a * * '  i  A t i s » ? • $
' ft °
4 - $  R j l H f l J  1 i f t f t  ’ f t #
&  > * * £ > & * $ &  ’ A & i . £  > £ & & &  •
Ibid., 21b, 31b.
125' L CJ|4£j ) $ » lift i.ft' £ £ * 8  ' «M**
£ f i b  3S.fL&'4°'i*l ’ ®  £  tfr If +  4 .  A. £.
' i f  Id Si
■ « . $ # *  ’ w a i l * * : *  ' ft £  A & '  i f t t f A ' t  ■ t ?  
HftSflt ’ w * S M ?  * iSb-g-^fta * •*» »J -JUfclS- iT'*r Si" 
A ft X >C, z- ff( i-'A ’ itsUb & $ i. tiji'Xit % ' W. £ ,(‘£5»| L
f c t  ' B f f l i . i ' f t .  K r i ^ * b ' I  
& ill - ft |  ft A * ft >fl A- ■ VAfift * &M *«| ■ Stair t 
# 0 C34.f--fci.-f £ 4? SO
"Yen-p1ing hsien-sheng Li-kung hsing-chuang,11 Ibid., 
XI, 97; 27b.
126- ! & ■ $ # « •  f c & t S !  L ?  ' * H i x f i
A f  ' S . T  i j t i i *  S t * * 5 ' ! '•
C.hung'-yun#, ch. 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 98. 
Translation modified by the author.
127. See ”Ta Ho Shu-chlng," Ta-ch'uan, V, 40: 8a:
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128.
129.
130,
131.
132.
133.
* t 3 A d j P 5 T t o f | t o t o *  H S f t f f c X i #
' t l M M * *  ■ f r t l l w f r *  • £ 4 “
• Jft- ■ & & $ & & -  I * * t *
T'fe5f Sfcfc-B *
tfefc &  i &  $ 3§ i  t '
Jl? • #!-£#<:&*
* « * # . •  !
”Tsa-hstieh pien,” Ibid,, IX, 72; 28b.
& 3  : inSUfcS * * * * & * . * '
J&'tfe °
m i * £ •  !
Ibid, , 30b.
& %  ■ %  *
i t S  3 l « f c & '  ^ + > > i i | »
Ibid. , 33b,
This dating is that proposed by the Ch’ing scholars 
Vang Mao-hung and Hsia Hsin, Ch* ien Mu places it in 
Chu Hsi’s thirty-ninth year. But to me the evidence 
seems more in favour of Vang Mao-hung and Hsia Hsin. 
See Vang Mao-hung, pp. 254-256; Hsia, ch. 3; Ch'en 
Lai, (1982a), (1982b).
Vang, p. 22,
See "Ta Lo Ts’an-yi,” Ta-ch’Cian, XII, s(upplement) 
5: 12a, b; also collected in Vang Mao-hung, p. 27:
tIM--it #r *  t - #  • * 4  • $ $  ) i &  . ■••■
¥ & & $  • fcttHfJi I f R f t B
fc' t>
• c s * * a b
£ % . %  > : f i t  4  • c i ^ j o
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134.
135,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
Hu Hung, 4: 2a.
Ibid., 4: 3a.
$  f t  T' &  *  ’ HJSS !
Ibid,, 4; 2a.
Based on the fallowing quotation:
^  { B a s i n g  *
*  S L 4 . i l  * •
Ibid. , 4: 10b.
See ibid., 3: 12b:
# & •
For this description of the two virtues, see ibid., 
1: la:
$ ^ ,.£ ,^ 2 -*$ ' 4? f  «■' : f i  to £  ' ^f|# w £.
f  toft » A  •
This description of the comparison between Buddhism 
and Confucianism is based on ibid., 1: 3b-4a:
If & '  &!££ t-*0still ' •
H i  tibia %  A  > f t t * ) *  £ #  e  ' ? | - T ' * & t o  * “T « 1 t  
ifb$S.*^s4^ tt, •
If ftie-f ' i ; £
i « t >  ;
See ibid, , 1: 6b:
A * *  n f £ T ' » I & i f  • » M R #  - f & t >  f M -
See "Ta Ho Shu-ching," Ta-ch* Uan, V, 40: 10b; also
collected in Wang Mao-hung, pp. 26-27:
i  ( f l t t f p *  * R H u B w S ? a i '  i s f t i
i f  « *  * f  I M i J f i f t d i  '
^ t s J f s . * i i S i ' ( * 4 S f e * )
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143. In accordance with the opinions of Mou Tsung-san and 
Tomoeda Ryutaro, I arrange the four letters from Ta~ 
ch’Lian IV in the following order. The first is that 
of 30: 19a-19b, the second 32: 5a-6a, the third 30:
19b~20b, and the last 32: 4a-5a. See Mou (1968),
III, 93-94, and Tomoeda (1969), pp. 71-76.
144. This description of the first letter is paraphrased 
from Ta-ch* Uan, IV, 30: 19ab:
^  6 #  1  ' B p # f l g  ' ' w
i f r f c '  • M i  f i t  ' Si)
*  1 +  * f e g y t t i  ' - ~ f r 4 a f f i t t 4 . f r  b j s  i B 8
’ f W / U t 4 . f f i 4 '  MtiSbfjt' f c t t a
* 4 7 3 * ^ S M J '  i 4 y B i t t ' t t - B 4 . R 8 '
• ffi# w i f 4.t #  ? &
# * * ■ « £ '  * * * T ' B # f f i a 4 ‘ / P * f r £ f f i 8 d M | 4 4 .
> f t ) A *  S t t f f i A A f c 4  !
145. This description of the second letter is paraphrased 
from ibid., 32: 5ab:
£ & x t  R A - l x i | * t o  • & 4J8JB ' a  Q 4 - A  - a 
# * f f i f c # * f r 3 | *  » ) B t U w  > ig >
! * £ * ! ] # - ^  * & f r - #  * F R f r - &  ’ 
® - % 4 ^ i ? S p t a ® i ^ >  > -iP II) T&- > £ j f .
i  ^  fi i  . *t«r W.tt if* £ > «s«a - & 4. RB' ®
146. These two verses are:
¥ & #  * - 4 * |  • * * * $  * # f e  • H H i w U f s f - i p f M
* % M  E t t - 4 i s *  Ml £  ’ * b a
"Kuan shu yo kan erh-shou" (Two Verses on Reading), 
Ta—ch' wan, I, 2: 10b; also seen in "Ta Hsii Shun-
chlh" V, 39: 15; and collected in Vang Mao-
hung, p. 27. Ch’len Mu thinks they were composed in 
1161 when Chu Hsi was thirty-two, see Ch*len (1971), 
III, 31, But Ch*en Lai presents sufficient evidence 
to justify his contention that they were written in
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1166 when Chu Hsi was thirty-seven. See Ch’en Lai 
(1982b).
147. 0 4  ' JftflVr
* *  • * * * - * # # * # {  R £ & * f e f t  *
-
Ta-ch * uan, IV, 30: 20ab.
1 4 8 ' ’ w t n t i n t
& ;  £ $ i i S §  « i - J - g .  +  J g i  &
ftt
"Kuan Xieh-ts-u ou shu, " ibid, VIII, 67: 24b.
149. For the date of the fourth letter, see Ch’en Lai 
(1982a), p. 268.
150. The description of the fourth letter is based on Ta- 
ch1 van, IV, 32: 4ab: ___
f t  I - *  f t f c f t n f t f t T  ■ » * & + * > - $  - • S r T ' f t x g ^  > 
#r ** * fc*t * *Jl* 4= i ft ft * ®  6 ft*li * mr $ k &  01 
R 8,9 f  l f t #  *  » ftjftjl * B HQ4MLft*-ttf4tt
w S c i l i | f e 4  ’ £ * 1 ' ® ^  > i f b i & f c & i i .
* 3$ fa fib t > 0 ffo4'flb4>
5fc*fc&i.+ * - | . 6 i - f t 4 f t »
* > $ & >
%  - *  f t f c * t t i r  4 i f t  > J E f c 41 ft
4  • ^ * 4 C  ^ . ■ 3 !
151. Vang Mao-hung, pp. 29-30.
152. Chu Hsi criticised Hu Hung and Chang Shih, see Ta- 
ch* uant IV, 32: 6a: .
f t f r t f t t '  « i ; S  * * - - f t f t m u  • '
ttstf i teti* *r >•*#&£ '
• ~4 »t**tfttfttt ’ SRSi* * T'JSE^ -
•
153. The poem is as follows:
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154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
f jfe*
St* +tiq*a» • BiK4.itftj
Ibid., I, 5: 8b; also collected in Vang Mao-hung, p.
30.
"Ta Ch’eng Yun-fu," Ta-ch* uan, V, 41: 18a; also
collected in Vang Mao-hung, p. 32:
£> & % > & &
4  4-*H;1gfg
Here Chang Shih used the concept of ssu-tuan or four 
clues, the Four Feelings which are the clues of 
innate morality, Mencius says:
> £ • & ;  i & L i c  ■ £ & J  f a U L M  
L tv > %  it - 4= > #  eb *|- it' ■% IB £  i  -fe •
"The Feeling of compassion is what we call Humanity; 
the Feeling of shame-and-disgust is what we call 
Righteousness; the Feeling of respect-and-reverence 
is what we call Propriety, and the Feeling of right- 
and-wrong is what we call Visdom. Humanity, 
Righteousness, Propriety, and Visdom are not drilled 
into us from outside. Ve originally have them with 
us." See Meng-tsu, 6A: 6; translated in Chan <1973), 
p. 54. Translation modified by the author.
The text of "Gen-chai ming," see Chang Shih, ch. 7,
pp. 111-112:
%  } &  a £  £  - f t t e i S R *  g
* 4  i f  1 I«t
» 4 ?  f c m i l i  • i ®  jj 4  Sjf > &  $  $
± » ; ft* i t -' Sift 6 #  »
4  > iS 6 t  & 4 J t
ft ! e f t * iik)
"Ta Ch’eng Yun-fu," Ta-ch* uan, V, 41: 17a.
0 9 i «  * lUfcftfli*' % T  '•’Lit
"Ta Ho Shu-ching," ibid., V, 40: 26a; There are many 
other examples collected in Vang Mao-hung, pp. 32-
34.
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159. ’ % % %  ft f a f f  «.’ • /eft
; t %  • W S f i A f t ?  t  f t  ft ! 7
%  > • ( 8) 3t &  )
?’Wen Chang Ching-fu," Ta-ch* uan, IV, 32: 6b.
160. See "Ta Chang Ching-fu," ibid., 8a:
( A h i ' f r m t t t ’ -  ) > « P l £ 9 i t S ® # | ; T 9 i
4  > 41 # r 9 &•&&«. '4 ! & 8 t ' S'Jt Jt^^o
-  i^4 3i)i|*Jtt^ !
A.w > -fT' idt > S 0 & & 9
I. £ * 5  !
161. See "Ta Shih Tzu-ch'ung," ibid., V, 42: 23a: _
'"*fc45*Yft*
162. See "Chung-ho chiu-shuo hsii," ibid., IX, 75: 22b-
23b: ___
&PJ)wH A. > S'J£. Sift £  • f e i |a  3 L i 4  • hkk.
fcfifct t • Jfelfe'ftfS-fc' ftftlffftfllf
 *|&73*.£
f t *  7 4 $
• C t f - l t t # )
163. j l f t i f l t '  *  e f t *  J i t '
* 9  e f t i . *  * & i ' • » % & % '  * 6
m * 4 f t  ! e 4 &
i • a *.«,» SjbN<; ft £ t  £*& ft i ' 
ftfct* l « r * * S 4 2 *
ft £  RSI Kb 2 , ......
* ftfctft * 8p£
m n >  ***#• fctltt •»BJL#w||4 ft**.* *. 
A l t i t t W T T  * I
MYi-fa wei-fa shuo," ibid., VIII, 67: lOa-lla.
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164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171,
' A -!
Erh-Ch* eng i-shu, 18: 17a.
ft tifgift? • * 6
Ibid. , 25; 2b.
(ft a  • % 4 * ' ♦ * * « * IIili * Tlift ? T J H l t e  s '%% 
4 » « f  • t e i  +  f t f t l f t & f t  •*
Ibid. , 18: 15b.
nuft-4 ’ ftJS'gftSitl'ft 7 *  • 7^T
t| £ «.’ •
Ibid., 17a; translated in Chan (1973), p. 567.
For Chu Hsi’s description of the inefficacy of the 
method of examination of substance, see "Yi-fa wei- 
fa shuo," Ta-ch*uan, VIII, 67: llb-12a:
$  ' JL w  m’&  E $  j ®l*[3|Sic4s[>4&g5. -ft 
IrffcfcteT f A  * vxi«fc*p* e
l i f t s  7 5 ) $ $ *  ( a f i
f t & )
* f t  1 1  ' 4 f t f t l S '  4 f t 4 4  • « f t * f t t m f t i  -
A * t f c j L # $ R 7 * . ' Kl ft i t ®  f t *  > ! i t  a ®
£ T M * A X *. . £ e * p f c - £ g i  A f t i *  >
- 7 f t '  MtftiU*.#.' 
ft % &  • * f t - u f K ® f t * A ?  •
Ibid. , lib.
i n i w f t l A f l '  &!f f i * f tJ4.A'  B b * f t i i ± * f t  
©4.1'- (Eft4fttt)
"Yi-fa wei-fa shuo,” ibid., VIII, 67: 11a.
4 * t i < §  * S K ^ i t t '  t f t 4 . |
! (4?lfc«Slft+*p#-t)
”YU Hunan chu-kung lun chung-ho ti-i shu,’* ibid., 
64: 28b,
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172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
' M i  M M  *
Cft-fcttfc)
"Ta Chang Ch’in-fu," ibid., IV, 32: 24b-25a.
W t  B #  i «  ' 3 * . g ± ±  * - * M & 4  ±
( H * i )
"Ta Lin Tse-chih," Ta-ch'uan, V, 43: 19b.
See " I-f a wei-fa shuo,’* ibid., VIII, 67: 12a, Cf.
Tomoeda <1969), p. 158-160:
& B f .• i y . g i v i ' S D ^ «
* ^ J »y£ £  • ( E,
S  I S O
Vang Mao-hung, pp. 51, 53.
Ibid,, p. 166. T ’ung—shu chieh seems to have been 
published earlier, in September 1187 when he was 
fifty-eight. See "Chou-tzu t*ung-shu hou-chl" If) 3-lit 
(Postscript to the Penetrating the Book of 
Changes), Ta-ch'Uan, X, 81: 28ab,
This paragraph is paraphrased from "T'ai—chi shuo," 
Ta-ch'iian, VIII, 67: 16a: ____
X i i t e
» « * * * » •  * * # # $ >  
41 M S f r i - t t ; W - O t i H & i i t t s . '  8 b x . f c i . - M t f
This description of Chu Hsi’s interpretation is 
paraphrased from ibid. :________________________ ___
■ m m *
See "Ta Chang Ch'in-fu," ibid., IV, 32: 24b-25a.
* * * # * & •
'  f t t f r U t  ' i f t f #
M M '  W - t i l & J i  ' ' * # r s f
> j£Jb m t &  “ ( & 5 I & & )
180. See "T'ai-chi shuo," ibid., VIII, 67: 16ab:
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£  I t  s . T i 4 d t - & *  t i * i i
'&'•&*
• 3LIE4, 1  f  to • C * • & & )
181' Wffit'tyz-
&ti • » t t i . * *  •
& a  5 •
Ibid. , 16a.
182. Chu Hsi used the adjective miao in place of
substance. He interpreted miao as "domination and
manipulation." See Yu-lei, 101: 187, VII, 4104. The
substance Is immovable In itself, but it dominates 
and manipulates the circulation and changes of Yin 
and Yang.
183. "Vehicle" is a loose translation of chi. Chu Hsi
explains chi as "treadal" ikuan-li-tsu, ) . When
the Great Ultimate is in activity, it gives rise to 
a subsequent tranquility. When it is in tranquility, 
it again gives rise to the subsequent activity. The 
Great Ultimate dominates and manipulates the 
alternation between tranquility and activity, and so 
the activity and the tranquility Indwelling the 
Great Ultimate may be considered as constituting the 
"treadle." See Yii-lei, VI, 94: 51, 3774.
184. £.*.^35 > ft £  <
i (Kg' S']
f t f t * W f t '  g £ #sc;t i fo&
1 '  * 9 * $ 8 $ '  M f t i « a
' fip’F S| t Sz-fli' m  S U & M M i
Tf ai-chi t'u shuo chieh, 1: 15b. Reprint, p. 22.
185. See i bid. :
Site
186. Tomo.eda Ryutaro proposes the two-dimensional
substance-function relationship. See Tomoeda (1969), 
pp. 139, 161, 192. I add that the lower dimension is
from the point of view of creatures, and therefore 
establishes the position of Man as subject.
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187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
Tomoeda <1969), pp. 102-122, Mou (1968), pp. 229- 
354, CMan (1982), pp. 37-68.
In my opinion, the letters in the Ta-ch* Uan relevant 
to the development of "Jen shuo" may be listed in 
the following temporal order:
"Ta Vu Hul-shu," the sixth letter, V, 42: 13b,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the third, V, 42: 3b,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the third, VI, 46: 26a,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the sixteenth, IV, 31: 4b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the seventeenth, IV, 31: 5b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the eighteenth, IV, 31: 6a,
"Ta Vu Hul-shu," the seventh, V, 42: 14b,
"Ta Vu Hui-shu," the ninth, V, 42: 16a (written in
the winter of 1172, his forty-third year), 
the draft of "Jen-shuo,"
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-three, IV, 32: 16b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-four, IV, 32: 19a,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fifth, V, 42; 5b,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b,
"Ta Vu Hui-shu," the tenth, VI, 42: 17b,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-fifth, IV, 32: 20a,
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the forty-sixth, IV, 32: 21a.
The following quotations constitute evidence:
• ( & 3 I S U )
" Ta Chang Ching-fu," Ta-ch'uan, IV, 32: 4a;
"Yu Vang Kuei-ling," Ibid. , 37: 8b.
The Hunan scholars include Hu Po~fung, Hu Kuang- 
chung, Hu Chi-sui, and Vu Hui-shu. Chang Shih is 
supposed to have belonged to this group, but he was 
convinced by Chu Hsi whom he followed.
*?• 0 : A. j * jfeiS-' !
Lun-yu, 4: 7; translated in Legge <1893), I, 167.
Translation modified by the author.
f l r i l §!)&*&£$• f t * / , # ? *  
l & i J M f c i i )
This passage is Chu Hsi’s summary of the opinion of 
Hu Po-feng. "Ta Hu Po-feng", the third, Ta-ch1uan, 
VI,•46: 26b.
266
193,
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
a ; XiiSte ' « £3-$ * O' A-f
3 | • £  3- £ '  T  A f t t t S  ** ?  *  e  - % & $ . * .  * «  a . i
^ T ' - f - * T ^ 41 .'" ( & £ )
Lun-yu chl-chu, 4: 7, Reprint, 2: 12a. Chu Hsi
followed the interpretation of Ch'eng I and Yin 
Ch’un from 1172, at the age of forty-three. This is 
evident from "Ta Chang Ching-fu," Ta-ch'uan, IV, 31: 
5b:
I  S t - %  R'Ha f  S t - i N #  £  i  f . J %  £  §
■t'HttiJti&S: > » flp
J.*]W- g!)
* T & dt?! ° K S. — > SO *§.&) i. f£i> ^  ft 2.
f f i *  ? C £ 4 « § - f e )
"Ta Vu Hui-shu," Ta-ch*uan, V, 42: 14a.
See "Kuan-kuo shuo", Ibid,, VIII, 67: 14ab:
f t f J S U '  I s H M f t f t f t l l '  8!)
• I  w  » 31 e  0 ^ ' ^ - ’ $■
■ i ? T ' & ! # ; * & $ ) $ '  - * A * 8 * t .
A I; lo.' £ i  $j ■* MtIF ilt i  $..$■& • C fe§!&)
Mou <1968), pp. 314-319, 337-342.
Referring to the Lun-yu, 12: 1:
f t #  RH=. • *  a  : 1  & •
Yen Yiian asked about Humanity. Confucius said, "To 
master oneself and return to propriety is Humanity. " 
Translated in Chan (1973), p. 38.
M  *\*>%  SSf t  %  *& ^  '  >*• 9 1 1 ^
* I M a t * 0 *  '
^  Bp a  • * & f t « F  w . £ & # # ^ 2 6 J b
>i; i  ^  ' Ot 80 * 4"i|.-fc 1 1 |  ’ ft #  $• f- *- -fc ' SO &T
& i  fc>fc i  *. ’ T £ w > f l i  ' T ' S f e & f f u t & I J t , ’ * ? £ ■
•'Ta Hu Po-feng", the third, Ta-ch* uan, VI, 46: 27a.
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199.
200 .
201 .
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
Ch'eng I opposed the definition of Humanity in terms 
of love. See Erh—Ch ' eng i—shu, 18: la:
1 3 - a  : W it  4. w - *  *  ■>"& A.it . W A Q  Hfc
' £ 1  t 'H  - t  f c & O i '
> 2, t  #]H. 1 to A-1 i&ft > gjt©A- 4 > S'i7  5 'ftitg
i  £ • *  » slip ft * ^ - ^ I S 1 | £ '
iM -S i*  5 -
* $ * $ * * » * + = $  • R % f t i a , i = A *  s i f t
R  ^  t  f  f  3 • 6 ' T'feR
i  *  *  * ,$  fir &  %  * JStfc. 1  *  - S. S f t  f t  t  ■f  •
C & S i & O O
"Ta Chang Ching-fu," the sixteenth, Ta-ch*uan, IV,
31: 5a,
« * . * * £ « * $ # * •
Ibid.
See "Ta Chang Ching-fu," the eighteenth, ibid,, 6a:
3 M - ® f t 3 ! £ eJ3-& ’ & M - ' I - i f * r w . } t 3 - t w , ' f - - %  
ilO t 1 f t  • -S'SO ’ f t J H ' f  3-3. '
l i t  3-1 j | . | l i t ' ^ U l ! . 3 t e '  (
J t f c & i O
Paraphrased from the following quotation:
ft A. I ^ K J ' a 3 = S H %  >
) S . | '  S O & t & i S O i ' H  > • ( f c t t )
"Jen shuo," ibid., VIII, 67: 20a; translated in Chan
(1973), pp. 593-597. Translation modified by the 
author,
Cf. Chan (1982), pp. 83-85.
*tJL PH ft js>7 i-A % as ft t 4 £ f  % e •'"*>
" t  I t  1  i z h  * '4. 1  * . «  ’ SO * t t o  &  ’ Sj)
* t  to I K - f t  T ' O i f t  * C 3-tiL)
"Jen shuo, " Ta-ch1 uan, VIII, 67: 20b.
Cf. Chan (1982), pp. 47-50.
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207.
208.
209.
210.
211,
2 1 2 .
213.
214.
215.
216.
i f - f c -  C f c t t )
"Jen shuo," Ta-ch* uan, VIII, 67: 21a.
See the following quotation:
m**. *, > ilf i-fe* ' #tl3fe
Chin-ssu lu, 1: 3b-4a; translated in Chan <1967), p.
9. Translation modified by the author.
See Yu-1el, I, 6: 117, 191:
S. £ £ i- f S  i £  * “IfLl&jk ' 3 •
» R § . P 0>
tf fc» $ ^ f i  *.£• W ?  3 • C fc *!.»*. ' * *H=1K.)
"Ta Chang Ch’in-fu," the forty-fifth, Ta-ch* uan, IV, 
32: 20ab.
* « * * £ * !  U - & )
"Jen-shuo," Ta-ch' i/an, VIII, 67: 21b.
io; ^ I t  tfej ’ M. -t T > -ft f*T T' &  • T' 9  »'A ^
* # >
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung", Ta-ch*uan, V, 42: 7a.
*i i. ttfil •- -S'* »g?!)?)!£&' wti. • £
1 S  ^  1C’ £ 1 Ibid.
See "Jen-shuo," Ta-ch ' i/«an, VIII, 67: 20a:
& J; *fc £ W ' & # 9  ' S *  $ *!l (* ’ Sp 7 i t  • S  i t #
J  • & ! . & & ■  £ $ ?  '  f i p £ S - f e ) t 7 ' i S l - °  ( 4 = $ , )
The following saying of the two Ch'engs is an 
example:
1 S. %  i w  >“ ~ t w.&  i * X ifc tJi4  •
ErhrCh* eng wai-shu, 3: la; translated in Chan
(1973), p. 593.
For example, in the explanation of the two terms in 
Lun-yu, 4: 15, Ch’eng I says:
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217.
218.
219.
220.
&  • * 4 « s ; K t *  » •
"'Integrity* is the Way of Heaven, whereas
'altruism* is the way of man; the former is 
substnce, while the latter is function.’’ Erh-Ch' eng 
i~shu, 21B: lb; translated in Chan (1973), p. 27.
£ AS > Bb A. *3 i.*t> i & # f t  X
* - t n
fe i. > S'J s  ffb & %. !
"Jen-shuo," Ta-ch’iian, VIII, 67: 20a; translated in
Chan (1973), pp. 593-594. Translation modified by 
the author.
The description of Chu Hsi's opinion is based on ’’Ta 
Chang Ching-fu," ibid., IV, 32: 6a:
* ft- s  - ft
#14, i w l  * JM 3*
^ 5 d ’ Al -J- i- o • 'F 31 JE.-& ° %  ¥jizi
? ( . * £ & * )
Chu Hsi’s arguments of the goodness of nature with 
the Hunan scholars may be found in the following 
letters in the Ta-ch'uan:
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the third letter, V, 42; 4ab,
"Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fifth, V, 42: 7ab,
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b-28a.
> ■ * * * ■ «  f  t '-tfclMriftfti t-fc 
* fttH"! t > ©
■e • J t i i M l f l S  * ' « * # * * * * * ’ »]
%  3- l $  > ffb f t  i .  5| g $ J j -e, • C - I - i B ' t e i t )
"Ta Hu Po-feng," the fourth, VI, 46: 27b-28a.
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221. Ch’eng I says:
Ufa $$ l\V °
Erh-Ch ' eng- i-shu, 18: 17a; translated in Chan
<1973), p. 567. Chu Hsi says:
> $p$sSJ 8  ■ > to jo ^
« * * •  I * * * * )
"Ta Chang Ch’in-fu," Ta-ch'uan, IV, 32: 24b.
222. The problems were discussed while the debate about 
the observation of faults was nearing its end, and 
the "Jen shuo" was formulating, probably between 
1172 and 1173, his forty-third and forty-fourth 
year. See "Ta Hu Kuang-chung," the fourth and the 
fifth, Ta-ch'uan, V, 42: 5ab, 6b-7a.
223. .
s .1±4& » e  = t  • $ « , £  & '
H  1 ' s  : ftqufciiii
"Yen-tzu suo-hao ho-hsueh lun, " J—ch'uan wen-chl,
4: la; translated in Chan (1973) , pp. 547-548.
Translation modified by the author.
224-
9 ( 4  ! ( f c t e )
"Yueh-chi," Li-chi.
225- t H t « * sfe^s.4 ■> 4 * 4  j| ' t<!
‘ j l S A U t ’ SJgp^S.^ > < S« 8p ^ * lip
*!!«<£*>*> • 4 . 1 > ?&*§*•*.
* * 4  ! ( J t f e N t t l L )
"Yiieh-chi tung-ching shuo," Ta-ch1 uan, VIII, 67: 
8a.
226. This description of Hu Hung's argument is 
paraphrased from the following quotation:
%  B9 % £ ft i ?*« £ JL •" e ■•"SRS'J A &  • £  w # | t
T a ■-"3-8L!S;»£?L£ > 3bfD5 4 iS H ‘,^ e  •"*.
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227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
■HIT-5b' S.43H.1 ! * < * & ! •  *83-
! 3- ife-fc • i &  !" I
* 8  3- & | 0
"Hu-tzu chih-yen 1-1", Ta-ch*uan, IX, 73: 44a.
hr* 4.*,' Mtftffti.ttiBi'ftU ! 3L*fe'£#.s’
f c i *  # r ! f ^  ’ a M  JLfl? !
& & & { & & •
Ibid. , 73: 44b.
k z.^- 156« t * 7 &  ’
$ $  &  j ' #, £  i n *  •
y 7  -  t  *  ' ifp
! C t ^ D i j L
81)
Collected In Hsing-li ta-ch*uan, 1: 33ab, Reprint,
p. 31,
For example, see Yu-lei, II, 18: 29, 640:
I f  $, 3 • • " - I f  ?£- tn>k' --fe^K J3 ~ J3& "“itjlJ P lf $,-fc
« , J H T £ 4  4 *  *
Goto Toshimizu (1936), pp. 84-87.
Ibid, , pp. 98-99.
Ibid. , pp. 114-115.
Ibid. , pp. 137-138, 161-162.
Ching, <1979), p. 281.
"Ta Liao Tzu-hui" , Ta-ch* uan, V, 45: 18b-20b. The
topic of the letter is mentioned in another letter, 
"Ta Fang Po-mo" ^  ^  V, 44: 21ab, which was
written probably in 1174.
* ■ 1 1  = 8 ' e. £  i »
S i M I 5# #  iff <?*»•& • -  'ttRl.51' T* •
' itifb&f' fcffiE,* ! flTttlH ^ 4 ° # $
$  ''♦jti.ffJb** ' t . # *  •
"Ta Liao Tzu-hui," Ibid,, 45: 19b.
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237. 'ISLftjtg
■&»
Ibid.
238‘ |Lz. Bfc3i ' BStfcifofe £ & ! 13 '±31 >
Ibid.
239. I have followed Goto's interpretation of the
ontology of Chu Hsi, viz. that the universe emerges 
as the combination of the Great Ultimate (formal 
cause) and Material Force (material cause). See
Goto Toshimizu (1936), pp. 174-188.
240. See YU-lei, I, 1: 18, 6-7:
t- «8 K S'J $, * ~ * %.' -Jtij.
& ’ 3--1 - F. f t £ 4 S t * 4 !  •
241. fetf 4 * * +
Ta-ch * uan, V, 45; 19b.
242. See YU-lei, VI, 87; 165, 3586. Goto Toshimizu
suggested that "the Ghost and the Soul" are the 
essence of Material Force. Their functions are
consciousness, movement, perception, and memory. 
"The Ghost and the Soul" refer to the substance 
whereas Mind refers to the functions. See Goto 
Toshimizu (1937), pp. 396-398.
243. "The Spirits" and "return” are read as kuei ,
while "the Divinities" and "expansion" are read as
sleji 4*f. Therefore the Spirits and the Divinities 
are associated with Yin and Yang respectively,
244. Ch'ien (1971), I, 308.
245. > R f t f l j i f p - F  j£ •
H '  • j f c •
YU-lei, IV, 63; 106, 2452.
246. See the following letters written in this periods:
&  & H «  f  •' «  *  4  <  f  * ifc H t k *  t  * * #  4.
ft - Vfrffrfg= & * * ) $ & '  • « t m «  > £
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"Ta Lu Po-kung," Ta-ch*uan, IV, 33: 2b; and
% 1 £,T't£l$ ■ ti'lS- e i.*h • £ & »
"Ta Liu Tzu-ch1eng," IV, 35: 12b.
247. The following is an example:
S ^ n t a  BA# S'J£ & *>•** Stft -
-ifc-g
& £ ;
"Ta Sun Ching-fu," ibid., VIII, 63: 19a. According
to Vang Mao-hung, p. 376, this letter was written 
in 1194.
248. see " Ta Hu Kuang-chung", ibid., V, 42: lab,
probably written after the winter of 1170, when he 
was forty-one years of age, since, in another 
letter (42: 9b) written in the autumn of 1170, Chu
Hsi said that it had been a long time since he had 
heard from the Hunan scholars. Another relevant 
letter is "Ta Vu Hui-shu", 42: 16a-17b, written in
the winter of 1172 when the debate about the 
observation of faults came to an end.
249. See the following example:
* . f ' I M M U '  B # 1 »  » * * * . * •  C H
st ft )
"Yu chu-sheng," ibid., IX, 74: 2a, written at the
age of twenty-five.
250. This paragraph is paraphrased from "Ta Vu Hui-shu",
ibid., V, 42: 16b-17a:
&  &  ^ ' rfc — f> i- + wjfe ' 8 D# 13 ^  3b 4* * 2 -
4 ft ' 4* 7 ft* ’ &'&■*.*>*•!$>? * 4t ft.J'ftifbt - 83 4)15 
W * #3ir4?Ki.®P|Sfcf 1 It A l f c '  $
* * * * *  *
$  t t  >
M i *  * ( 6 a  •- ' t o t #
t H8*
frillftsti »
*p _ L'x1 t ft' fti ° jE
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251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
*.$*.&•  • ) ( & £ a s - * 0
The following saying is an example:
t'J'f M  > §  t 3 £ * • & $  3
' t  X  &**.]>$
4  #
YU-lei, VII, 115: 26, 4425,
One letter of this interchange, mentioned that he 
wished to know Lu Chiu-yiian in order to state his 
disagreement. See "Ta Lii Tzu-yiieh" , Ta-ch* uan, VI, 
47: 20b. Chu Hsi met Lu Chiu-yiian in 1175, when he
was forty-six. So the letter presumably dates from 
about 1174.
a  : # § ! ) &  * - t - S ' J - t  * as x f e s f  < > t c z . ^
m .
Meng-t&u, 6A: 8; translated in Chan <1973), p. 57.
Translation modified by the arthor.
• J £ f c f c 5 S , ® X *
*  1  ! & * . * * ♦ *  '  S K * *
?T*t8 Imfi > ' C
i a  = £ 8 !)$  > $  A ' ) ^ s a t  j c I) a  = *
* 1 & 5 > 3 l i * * i  % • )  d i x f c J t *  I * ' * # *  t S f t *
t t x i f c f c - J I b f l : *  I ;  R i t e * )  M
fl a .» f tH T 'f t  * X l f f  *t»s* ' *  * * f  X '  S>]iM
"Ta Yu Ch*eng-chih, " Ta-ch'ban, V, 45: 4b. Chu Hsi
himself was satisfied with the exposition in this
letter. See "Ta Ho Shu-ching", V, 40: 34b.
Their opinion and Chu Hsi's refutation are as 
follows:
a wtt ' * *  • • Ix.Sp#;gi!p££
m  • it Apt t  i B A ^ i
’ i!) H  ^ r 4  4 - 4  $1 ^  A  «•’ > ifD^Jb -5- i f  3  T' 2 . i -
"Ta Ho Shu-ching", Ibid., V, 40: 34a; and
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* & > $ * * * •  s w * f c » w  
i t £ s * t )
"Ta Shih Tzu-ch’ung", 42: 21b.
256. His opinion and Chu Hsi ’ s refutation are seen in 
the following quotation:
'lift*
J2) /o.' t M k  ! T ' ^ i  i§$z'-'o)XKs i - f e  • L
"Ta Yu Ch* eng~chlh", ibid. t V, 45: 4b.
257, This opinion and Chu Hsi’s refutation are seen as 
the following;
i / e ,  > $ .  R  i  S b  f r  > 8! ) & w  
*it * WStk.m > J3 9Li$1$tM!ttt '
H']*i £ ! i = ! £ & & # '  ¥ ^ f ) y ± >  •
sb*j i , «,’ H  i f e i f  > nfc3Mfc-&° 1  J t  j i ' j3L
€S-£ » jD^aiSt' (/§- g 3.^)
"Ta Lu Tzu-yueh," ibid. t VI, 47: 20b, 21a.
25S' i.«t > 3 b £ i $ «  E '£ *  * , $ *
-$8)£i^' tfrtt&fjgtt,* liUtkfif' 
if - ftioUfctHtA' 
lift' M M * 1**#*, ■ -•
"Nan-chien-chou yu-hsi hsien-hsijeh chi," ibid.t 11, 
77: 22ab.
259. See "Ta Chiang Te-kung," Ibid, V, 44: 37a. The time 
of its composition is according to Vang Kao-hung, 
pp. 349-350.
&#) ill' #f fritlf ! 1* ’ 4Mb® 1
> t - W i ) ’ *  ? i ) l  •
H  •> #.4ft AS 1 • ffiftSfc'tlf) i- * ® 4 > lvUfe
jSl'lliZ-’ 1^*1-4-fc. * kfttMfe' * C f 5 x 1fi-
*6 )
260. "Fu-chai chi," Ta-ch’uan, IX, 78: 12a:
* p f  Ufli' t / . i f  ' f  4 ‘i U U b  •
*°S.> A f t J g i f
4 '  *  i f # * *
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261. Vang Mao-hung, pp. 59-60, Chlng (1974), pp. 165- 
167.
262. £ X.4&R, I $$$ 19 > M i** * > Wig
A } ® ?  i t  i a f  *
I d t o l  ’ » * « * * £ * ’ R S « w 4 | t t f  l i E A A f A l f t
t ft^'«pg.few4C i  o * A T ' 8il%
£ * f  fclg ’ ft-f * &'/££4feffb&a • *tftisj
« & * « . •  t o r t f t  > b o s  4 r &
t i l ’ t f  i > f c * f * ,S i i
t  ' » *  *  i  « L S 8  4fc • l * 3 x f c t f )
"Ta Chiang Te-kung," ibid. , V, 44: 37ab.
263. See ibid., 37b:
I w P M '  » * * * > * « *  W w l !  • l t # f i r # * - f c «
264’ « £ % * « >
%  *
Ibid. , 38a.
265. According to Goto Toshiroizu, Principle as "the way 
Things should be" lies in the "relationship," 
either between man and man, or between man and 
things. For example, the Principle of filial piety 
lies in the "relationship" between father and son. 
See Goto Toshimizu <1964), p. 51. Although this 
explanation makes "the way Things should be" more 
accessible, Chu Hsi*s original meaning is rather 
that "the way Things should be" dwells in "Things," 
but not in the "relationship" between Things, Only 
because it is in the level of manifestation, may 
all other things observe it and act accordingly.
266. See Vang Mao-hung, p. 65.
2 6 7  • •
Meng-tzu, 7A; 1; translated in Chan <1973), p. 78.
Translation modified by the author.
268. See Meng-tzu hua-wen, 13: la:
& ) S & W r T '  SI * » W l f c - g
e > 89® #.WrT')Ui)B-i » #T
tSSiid > if .
277
269. The title of a section in Tomoeda <1969). See p. 15 
of that book.
270. Chung-yungt ch. 27. English translation in Chan
(1973), p. 110,
271. See Vang Mao-hung, pp. 59-60; and Ching <1974), 
pp. 165-167.
272. The above comments are from the same passage:
f  i - t *
• f c * ? -  NUftt
"Ta Chang Ching-fu" , Ta-oh 't/an, IV, 31: 15b-16a.
273. Cf. Vang Mao-hung, pp. 99-101. "Ta Lin Tse-chih"
Ta-ch’Liant V, 43: 31b; "Yu Vu Mao-shih"
, 44: 30b-31a.
274. Referring to Lun-yCi, 14: 25; translated in Legge
(1893), I, 285.
275. Sn&lfcA. &BI A i-t-
• ' » I * a  .hi  3
» f f c *  - x s o
i L t t -  • * *  M f f l a  » £ * l
g i t  • ■ < « * * £ )
"Ta Hsiang P’ing-fu," Ta-ch* iian, VII, 54: 5b-6a.
276. Ching (1974), p. 176.
277. The relevant sources are collected in Vang Mao- 
hung, pp. 124-127. There is a careful study of the 
development of the controversy between Chu Hsl and 
the Lu School in Ch’len (1971), III, 293-358. From 
1185, Chu Hsi began to attack the Lu School 
publicly. See the following example:
» « . * « * .  fc*t73 8 l & & g L &
i  ' 7 f t 4 m  a .' i * # m )
"Ta Ch’eng Cheng-ssu", Ta-ch*Uant VI, 50: 29b-30a.
278. See "Ta Lu Tzu~ching", Ta-ch'iian, IV, 36; 6b,
t f r f  i f e fc a  - f t f t t o & j U f e t A  • * * * . #
B i B L *
278
279,
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
Referring to Lun-yii, 9: 10; translated in Legge
<1893), I, 220.
i-PI 46ft $ % >
H  i f  • i i g  t £ £  • •#>£*.*.» B
TTft- tftttii*)
"Ta Lin T’uei-ssu," Ta-ch*uant VIII, 62: lla-12a.
According to Vang Mao-hung, Chu Hsi wrote it after 
1193. See Vang Mao-hung, pp. 376-377.
Vang Mao-hung, pp. 105-124.
(SRf l tB H  O f t t t f t f c i  ’ - f t  f t
"Ta Shen Shu-hui," Ta-ch’uan, VII, 53: 33b.
A detailed discussion of these topics may be found 
in Tillman (1982), chs. 4, 5.
The description in this paragraph summarizes the 
following quotation:
&»<? ■ s « $ « 4 M K 8 ‘
ftt ! #^®T^,S|' S iiPtt'
«0 +i£ K5£Sb#.A;&>
A # .  • * r  g r a f t s *
- d U t t f c .  « # « -  ’ fcHJRfjg ■
•  *  4  . K ) g ?  j f c | U  u * &  !
i l  - M  a ?  ft#, i. as 4  ! B D i | ,  - M i L f t
* - f t - *  * - £ # < 1 4  > > gT-t.
1 ! ift ’ i.
- - 8 ‘M £ f i M T  •
$ 4 $ ?  c ^ s . @ g ;
"Ta Ch’en T’ung-fu", Ta-ch* Uan, IV, 36; 23ab.
279
285. *  -it-a » & u *s £ v;3d a
f  uAJUteiiEtf&jfl ' 8^fffbT'4s>K° I I
31 i.«.'V| $!]*&' g'jA&i.; A dll * g'J £*tez. iSfffit &
A  ’ & $ * ? >  $>vUfeAiS.&Bf;? ±  •
■fr i-JKT-to .
Ibid. , 24b.
286. See "Ta Lu Tzu-ching" , ibid. t 36: 6b-7a:
B I l f N b  *p?i. — ^  s%^  4 4  A * 4  * 4 . 8 ) j w t w
. f l j t f i t  * 4 * 4 « '  f e £ f e $ f i B * #
i f f * -
287- O  Iff *ff f  ■ f e w * * * * * # . * # ,
ft*if b k t *  A^Mf^L* * & * > £ »  w ^ X i t
f e A S - f e >  S ! l * « r t 8 B ! > f t x ^ * 4 4 F i ^ ?
"Ta Chao Tzu-ch’in," ibid. t VII, 56: 2b-3a.
288. The first few pages of the Yu-lei discuss the
relation between Principle and Material Force. All
of the conversation were recorded after he reached 
the age of sixty except possibly for two items by 
Van Jen-chieh , which were recorded some time
after Chu Hsi had reached the age of fifty-one.
289. See "Ta Yang tzu-chih", Ta-ch* Uan, V, 45: lla-12a:
f  a « * . * . $ *  1 ttttA 
*.*.*!!I)fe
290' 3E^5f £ & & *  ! $ £  5f?p^ £ * 9 . & & & £ #
i s j t  > f e e  - 8 5 #  A
f £ ? § i * | -  fc ■ > ik'X t't» l z- > a « £ PJX ^ t . 4 tw 
4.>  •) C f f  ? * . )
"Ta Ch* eng K’ o-chiu" , Ta-ch’ Uan, IV, 37: 31b. Chu
Hsi acquainted with Ch* eng Chiung when he came to 
govern Nan—kang chun in 1179, his fiftieth year. 
This letter must have been written between 1179 and 
1181. See Ch’en Lai <1985), pp. 52-53.
291. The manuscript of these two commentaries were 
completed in 1173. In 1186, when Chu Hsi was fifty- 
seven, Lu Chiu-shao f t - M b attacked the original 
works of Chou Tun-1 and Chang Tsai. This was an
280
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
important factor in Chu Hsi's decision to publish 
his earlier commentaries, as he wished to come to 
their defense.
Two letters of "Ta Lu Tzu-ching" written in 1188 
and 1189 are concerned with the debate. Ta~ch'uan, 
IV, 36: 7b-16b.
...
* * * & $ i *  >
Ibid. , 12ab.
See Ch‘ien <1971), III, pp. 402-403. "Huang-chi 
pien", Ta-ch'uan, IX, 72: lla-14b.
I t  *  > M > i f e i j i  ^ 4 ^ - 4  > % tktfoi-.
vp Jfc * fib ®  ?|- %  i, W.lfcIE %  jfa ■& •
Ta-ch’Cian, IX, 72: 11a.
£ & %  > fib T' ffr 6 4.4- ' tL
t ’ ft#***.
f t 4 I • J.+ * s . * * * ! * * *  2L» I * £ *  > ti®
I t f c i J L  ’ L s f c *
Ibid. , 13b-14a.
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297 . i. ®  *!2 $ Jl * * 1  ^  31 > *?D _t iS, ^  1
' &  35 > T  ' it {te? 1 4 ' P
t * * ’
* * - #  ' & X f t £  i «  ■ • C # t J l
*.)
"Ta Huang Tao~fu", Ta-ch'uant VII, 58: 4b.
29S- IXJfStfrgffHfc • # & A * ) £ i b f i  *-£ !
• £ & &  - - t L * f t » B l M i  *  « .  •
"Ru-tzu cbih-yen i-i" , Ta-ch * iism, IX, 73: 41b.
299. 4 t f g g  . £ g p £  . ^gp.ji , £  j-Jg^ .
Erh-Ch'efl^  i-sbu, 1: 7b-8a; translated in Chan
<1973), pp. 527-529. Translation modified by the 
author.
300. t t y * * .  4 * * * .
’ t o t s i f t l l -
Ibid. , 18: 17b; translated in Chan <1973), p. 567.
Translation modified by the author.
301. itt' M > J  XJ&i.'&A.f •' f c c A I H t  •
£  3- ^  ^ , 1 !
Chang-tzu ch’uanshu, 2: 18b-19a; translated in Chan
<1973), p. 511. Translation modified by the author.
302. Ch’ien (1971), I, pp. 445-461.
303. I  ± itajft . K  ifcffibfiviif Jg-a , ^ Jtttsf ' -ft S T.ft'M
■& •
Erb-Ch' eng i-shu, 1: 7b; translated in Chan <1973),
p. 528. Translation modified by the author.
* £ A * T lit T'1! *
Yij-1 ei, VI, 95: 53, 3860.
305- t  • > 13H Vi* a
» t £ <  u a * £ £ & * 3 b / i '  # * £ £ & * & & »  f t * #
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306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
^  ^  fil T' %  ■& «>
Ta-hsueh huo-wen, p. 4aj translated in Chan (1973), 
p. 622. Translation modified by the author.
X 1 1 % '  t  , A.|££-e • ^ f t -<§.
jL-fe “ (3§-^2ffe)
"Ta Yii Fang-shu", Ta-ch'i/an, VII, 59: 35a.
f c A & f i i  ' if* •#§;§!]I  fib* £lj§°
$>> M X  f t * £  !
Ibid, , 35ab.
i > J t s - t a  •
%  • Aft 4. > •> 5 b ^ $ * | < g  > ai«s® ^  i » abiat
i T l t  t -ft*, 1  ■ Sflfcwjlb^&l 1  >
> K * t  1  > * £ f t i « r £ i -
■d *
Yii-lei, I, 4: 17, 94.
. t t £  '  H * . >  J t S .
•foi g j f  w . x. e  fc S .H l  «,<|AS • 1
» *  * f c « * f  * ■ #  • * m »  H t  ID *
YU-lei, I, 5: 65, 147-146.
A. iflr 1-1.44 S. * t t  > f a i f e l ! M«.'4,
* # '  * • * ! * £ >  W * # f c
t  i t u & f t  » 8'JQffl i l d >  & & « £ £ « , •  C f c f c t e )
"Ts'un-chai chi", Ta-ch'Uan, IX, 77: 6b.
& - £  l i f  •
Yii-lei, VI, 96: 42, 3994.
' t f i8 .l ^  ?'} • f l & ' $  S.S.H * *
Ibid., I, 16: 51, 515.
H R 5 . s ' rt £ & £ £ $ . £ '  « * . * > £ .  R p ^ a 4 * f c « ® < T
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314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
"Ta P'an Ch*ien-chih", Ta-ch'uan, VII, 55: la.
Originally written in 1189, it was revised two years 
later. See Ch*ien <1971), II, 113.
a 4  i  i - tip E. £ ! ©i-l A  Ai-i£ic' i, H  %  , g>J i-i
* M  • t f l t i o # )
Ta-ch'uan, IX, 76: 21b.
^ 'C *fjl ' if. /£} 'HI %  •
Translation in Legge (1893), III, 61. Translation 
modified by the author.
Tomoeda (1969), pp. 224-227.
SKa < *  t M a w  ; - tfc
.
j*f.& ' ft* lift * lft> ^ S i ' 4  > ? & i - A & * A & z - ^  
t  ’ $ g o £ t - *  ’ - i s *  £  f t * #
t*"#f ' #.'> 'R3®r » %  — §  i t  > f t  A  A'
f  i  S > | & * 4  » f t * 3 S  > B - i
! (  t  & $  $ £ )
"Chung-yung chang-chu hsii," Ta-ch 'uan, IX, 76: 21b.
t •
Translated in Legge (1893), III, p. 61.
$  t k>b *  1°) ’ & £  - f t &  « & w ? t > *
. g'J&i-i&Jtftii' •
• X # t *  - » KlftM&Xfttt ■ £flllFt -
Ta-hsueh huo-wen, p. lab.
See "Ta-hsueh chang-chii hsii" (Preface to the 
Commentaries on the Great Learning') , Ta-ch' uan, IX, 
76: 20a:
A t  A i l  > § ' ] i  i ' i « T  > i t i A t ? - ?  * 6 a - M  » f t  
f c i ' i - A i t ^ & t i i j t i l i S ? . • & < +  * a
^  * 9'JS t t  i * 3 - f  *  > w i ' i  f t * . * * *  i & l  >-J?R
284
* l\iv^ > ft i- All® >f £ 5 >o A i  if, ° (.
fe) §  )
322. See Ta-hsiieh huo-wen, p. 2a.
f t  &  f t  8 A  H- as. *  * S') E  *  ^  #  f t  H i t  ft ( *  #  ^  f  
fte > 1ft Hi * ftti-$ » I f
£  ft**# ft} ! > # & * &  • ilw-Sii:
> * * * <  i # L *  *  - 
' 3 t t # t  * 3b*.X «!B 4lfc fti
323. See ibid., 4ab:
• S A i - i  - » <f £  &  1  £  A a *  * ft *  ft ft • & £  *  t
i HO > &  ft *M1» 4s £<£ * -•&' t*«. > a  * ft ft ft ft1
% s £ £& ’ & * St# ft 1 £&* 7®
f t i f t  > « x * y f t f i i *  •
324. This paragraph Is paraphrased from ibid., 4b-5a:
JK f t  *  8B i f t f l  f t  %  &
ife- ft-Jr&i'i« -  t f t i  >
a»ttt ! ftw%A4fc*.» 8Hafti;iH'f i f  * S&Hffi.
*A»)foSSC *° i  > ft i  ft t  ft 
$  £ t  > ft @ £  ft $  t  £ $&•& ° &  t i-A s it- j£ «.'•$•
1 1 - 8 *  . M x . H r * * f t i 0 < E f  * 4 '  ’ * « .
ft  8B i  i  f t  ft, •
3 2 5 ' t t * * - *  • * * # * . >
Chang-tzu ch’uan-shu, 2: 19bj translated in Chan
(1973), p. 512. Translations modified by the author.
326. See Ta-hsiieh huo-wen, p. 28a:
* * » * * . * »  ft#
4 . * *  i +  » * f t i f * 1 i i | » ' f t » J | w t t . 1 | i £ .  AiSgB
«i$ > miXiftHtifc' iifcf ^ ilL* fcft-ftit
327. f  -  ft I £  1 8 *  - # f  T ' H '  S t t H
& & - ft *_«*
Yii-lei, VII, 117: 35, 4493.
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328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
lb, *
Ta-hsiieh chang—chu, p. la.
See ibid. . , p. 28a:
i fo* * * %  *
8 , f * < - & A H J L f l * * 4 C *  ( l a i l % ) & )
"Ta Vang Ch'ang-ju pieh-chih", Ta-ch'iian, VI, 52: 
35.
$  £ £  t  *t *H# *  S'] •
Ta-hsiieh chang-chii, p. 6b,
1  ^ *. ffl fe T' £  !
Ibid, , p. 6 b.
See ibid. , p. 2a:
M  ' f  ft ; > 10.’ 1  Mr £  ft • ftft 'o.'£Mr3£- >
fofefelfcft*
The description in this paragraph is based on Ta- 
hsiieh huo-wen, pp. 34a-35a:
* . ? £ & -  = st® a * ! * 83*
*  iSPtfeft * £v>A A £# 'li
ft* ft* 3b& &  »
S  > ®  X. Iji.’l  £16) . i-l&£ > ft £ *
& * *  iffiS • % £ ® ’ ®15 ft-ft**3 ft ft fc£tfr&
* > i £ & * ......i*4*.
f  i*L' i r t f c f c S f r i S  » > £*,?()
&  i .  4  5& i  tfT & ’ * 5- *t fib H i t  £
J* f t  f c  i & S  * M x « j « f £ » i i t o 4 | | | * t i £  - * £ * .  
£ #  •
See Ta-hsiieh chang-chii, pp. 6b-7a:
&&80-#>&.&$(: > - # * 8 ! ) a  > > ®>*4*
A * * ® *  i f c & A f t •
A £ - io'. 5l > 9 > >$fe£ '£' £ f  •
Ta-hsiieh huo-wen, p. 37a.
286
337.
338.
f f c i f t  * t  f t  >
• 9 m # .  > so ft  I  ig.4  i f  6 * f  t  *  j ® j f c w ' £  is -jib^  * l f  
l U M  I
Ibid. , pp. 37ab.
See ibid. , p. 37b:
■ t f t l i t M ' £ £  > E e - H t ’ * 1 1  f t * ® #  $ * £ ■ >  8 3 ^  
S $ o u 9&!Jjj£, > 3d $!§$:■
i f i x f e l  > “H S f l r f t *  f a #  * -£ -$ ■  s$ °
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33S>- fib#[S|Rl®2.45 38 ' £.fl * S - J t & # *  § 0
• S f lL U  A f l J  • f c U t / M  - # 4 £ a >  &
Ta-hsiieh huo-wen, 3b,
340- S JE.Jfci.B9f ' • % 4 S . &  ' BO#
Ibid. , 26b.
341. g o l f e d ?  - « M f i  * B O l S f t T O L # ’
t g t t J B f t q s )
"Ta Li Hsiao-shu”, Ta-ch*uan, XII, supplementary 10: 
12a.
342. <$•. H u i £  I L - w  t  i. t isl i c  i & ! $ >  ’ $  * £ # i ! )
’ J0810 4 W it t  4 $ # * . ^  i l l  * if its A
't ’ &$.$ fa J& ’ ft i  ifb ^  »I $l-te, • >£ 5b K. & l| i  tf J| * 
80 4 3 g o ^ ts fliilD  • i-Wr#> 804% £5C.
3 - t f  • tfrt|
- S3 £. M* i  £ - **!«#»
9\ & • 4 * .] *  - 8 0 -4 4 .# *  -  A i l *  > -
Ta-hsiieh huo-wen, pp. 26b-27a.
343. The differentiation of these three terms is taken 
from Yii-lei, II, 18: 82, 658-660:
A M A K f c H I U B y i l f r t f A i i . # *  % ± ± k %d > £ $ £  
- 1 9 4  •KH& f t  A *  A  A N  «  4 4  f t  • - •  s. t  A  81 > 4  %  4  80 
1 U ? 4 p w t $  • * 4 4 # £ i . R ! l  * f t & f t * .
w 4 $ N *  ~ f t t * f a t  * M g * . * ! .
> t l ^ S t t l - f a t  * S O t f M i * - ^  : S . t t K V * '  
f e f t  • * I t f e f l T S t  J B O t f M i f a S t f i f . ........
A t  t t i f t B A *
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344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351,
352.
j£ * I 1 & 8  
■&-^ 5 z, » &lO^ jrtSN'fe. *
Chung-yung chang-ohii, ch. 1, p. lb.
N«.;S • t- *y4i^N-fc*
Chung-yung. , ch. 1; translated in Chan (1973), p. 
98.
-  H i . * #  *
Nyls.ll • 8 * 7  JMN-te •
Chung-yung huo-wen, pp. lb~2a. For Ch'eng I and his 
disciples yung had been interpreted as "constant". 
Therefore, "ordinary" is in fact a new 
interpretation,
% T i N  SI 3. ■ - s ; B £ «  3 •& • • S.#-IS ■
0 B*. ifc-fc° S-f * S . T i i 4 ^  »
Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 
105. Translation modified by the author.
* t - f  t  • # r tH 8 4 t ; 6  ’
’ S M I & O W t  ’ S l iU J fJ *  # ! * £ * #  •
Yii-lei, II, 24: 139, 963.
See ibid., II, 18: 89, 664;
M N  *
# # * * ► T ' 4  m  t  *  • s o 4 4 4  ^  * # $ < & • &  * • 1  * A  
B 1 3 - f ( f l g T f  A t  N X  •  e  • R £ * 1 f r t o a j f e J B f c t ’ £
6. 'oC-J- Rj^ > > 'iEjUfe.N?!• R $ £ i £ 4 i(T$!]&4 *
8 .0 1 4  4 *
( j f j e  * # . f f r * K ® 3 : 4 E . N  -
; 9 !)£ffrl.'A$ fa 7 ^ 1 ) 1  O s  ^ ’S-S. •
4 *  * % ft. *
Ibid., II, 18: 94, 667.
Jt&fe *  *1*4 *S 3. IQ ’ ®  V 8-]Sf i. • * , #  i  * fflt $
! M R g a i g & f e  • fa-ftis&w-e.'
Ibid., II, IS: 97, 669.
See Vang Mao-hung, p. 168.
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353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
See Yii-lei, I, 14: 3, 397:
4  f- ^ -fc.it X  f  '■ t  i &
f | i f  > w l # * # #  i * 1 1 + 4 *  t  u f t t i , .
•£ ■ ' X.T i  £  Site.
^  * S-T i S l t ’ tli i*aOt 4  i| — ■& •
Chung'-yung-, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 
105. Translation modified by the author.
lii&fc' £Tt4-tlt£i£>45&-...
Chung-yung chang ohLi, p. 16a.
® # > i  ’ ^ a ® 4 ° 4 *  3 L £ * » 4  * -•fc*
4- * » -«*
( A i t - .  * * i . f c i . A l N t * )
Chung-yung, ch. 20; translated in Chan (1973), p. 
105, Translation modified by the author.
See Chung-yung chang-chii, p. 16a:
-tt)t#ibe,*! -  Aft HOI * *5-4*18’ l'K*KBfl 
i* !
f t *  5**»<fc * ’ f t * f  S| & f i a t ’ A
> a #  i *.» 4 +  %«.•
Chung'-yun#, ch. 12; translated in Chan (1973), p. 
100. Translation modified by the author.
* S * * . « ■ '  f  S + f * 4 ^ A * # ¥ 4  4 j t 6 & 2 t e ' i . j |  - is)
it i§5$i& •
Chung-yung huo-wen, p. 29b. The quotation of 
Mencius is from 2A: 2,
This description of Chu Hsi1s explanation is 
paraphrased from Chung-yung huo-wen, pp. 29b-30b;
&  i-ifMT ?£ &?!-**£ 4  - fStf ?  &  • ifc4 * 0 $  i $ R !>&;}?-
* %  * it HU ; A T  W  ft 4 A  fa i fc'SNIi ’ it is, 80
B f f l i R S ) ’ i f b l A .
Uli > # * - * . •  ! f
f t f t f c -  6 f t f  k * 4 f  S + lf t fc / .A N  -
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361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
- a t e  s“4 d m J&  s .i u l %  >
**iti5LL.xB8 5 8 .i||®, % % % # > , >  s.* s.*?
i  8831 ’ BO4*17 9\% sttw t tScyi-ifcii' £.<§■ Bb .^% °
•a-Mf , ls i) fe £ ii' ■ # e j t ^  1 $  * ffiir-g iis i.
' - f c h W i  '
• $&*.% ■ A.iii-te, • |a%, T-i&iS&t ' 7' 
SKft . ftfc + fc.* 4 A.-fc • tij4-* • 4f life 1 1 1 • 
$*?*■ ' f P » H  - ■feg.i ' . j g ^ j i ...
Chung-yung‘, ch. 20; translated In Chan (1973), p.
107. Translation modified toy the author,
tStftot.H'tt « ytfc&fc' •
Ibid, ch. 25; translated in Chan (1973), p. 108.
Translation modified toy the author.
This description is based on Chung-yung huo-wen,
pp. 63to-64a:
• K * « i  t  ' SO X. % 4. i f  £
$  fib|Ei - *  i - f .  > f t !  t  - $ a -  Hint 7  *1 '> f ib - %  i ' t
> t-ite 1  » H  f  31 i  -fe * ^  1 1  » 10% A. i  f t  I
fabffi-t-ift > & & > ± £ f c  ’ i ? t  ; f i b - f i t
> fc-kSS# > I f  uitfrft-e, > W - &
K> *JS£.5fc;j*BfiiSfr> BO i f f
3Ht«.’i.4a ’ w5.*.*HJ*fri1fc > « t « b k 7 f  %  • BLflQit
> nos*feWMl' ‘•AiftteJiJtUjj > a«rs % >  %&f 
i f t t  • f r f t f l *  !
JCtteiii’ f -t ’ §'J« !$*«•
Chung-yung, ch. 26; translated in Chan (1973), p.
109. Translation modified by the author.
See Chung-yung chsng-chu, ch. 26, p. 23b:
X  ^  lit ■* "a Sb ^  ^ 'IF i\, > Hf^A ^  -& •
t!i.% ’ ft tl & fib tL te. ’ fft •& • $ 5 > ‘i-'&i > jSktD > 
■$»& • tt *•$!•& ' 'u'ft 1 * 1 1  t  f-tfc •
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Chung-yung, ch, 25; translated in Chan (1973) t p.
108. Translation modified by the author.
367. See Chung-yung chang-ohu, pp. 21b, 22a, 23ab, 25a.
368. The text says;
Chu Hsi comments;
Chung-yung huo-wen, p. 65b.
369- •
Chung-yung, ch. 27; translated in Chan (1973), p.
110 .
37°- ftJft* & £ * * : '  ft
’ SotSt3d 46“$r ’ tfcJI •
Ibid. , ch. 27; translated in Chan (1973), p. 110.
371. See Chung-yung chang-chii, ch. 27, p. 25a;
$  I t t  ' • £ 1 $  ’ ffjr l'JL ®c45° JSd
372. See Yii-lei, VII, 117; 52, 4517;
* * * # £ »  
t f - t  ' f c o j f r i l H ’ t.bi'l*. 
f t . t 4 kH - i : » | L 9 j f e 4 . 4 . *  & £ « *  £ f  A l t *  ±  f t
•EfcJfe t k  > 4.1* f  >A-t8flP3€
® « J  -
it a  *  * f c t e B P M & l i t l t  • !  w & t f r m *  * f * T f c  
- 8 ? $  f i r t ^ S ?
373- JMpXifciii* Mkftffife' * 9 M >  b 5^ efl • M*» 
a iifi S>J&5| % % %  * - t > fllltna-jk*
BJbTH&JfcA. ' W S I T
Ibid., I, 4: 60, 110-111.
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374.
375.
376.
377.
Relevant sources are collected in Ch'ien (1971), I, 
501-507, 516-518.
* B  : A  ’
- S J & i i '  < * « * * '  4 * S
• tfc S. 4. £  ife > 6 * ® * # ® $ , $  » & $ £  *S
4 . » - n * t t  • t f s  S“£ 1 M  3- » l ^ i A .  . ft
&  f  * .  • % 'ife-^' 4- > £  S. 4  *•  *" *5c X #  %  &  •
Chung-yung, ch. 17; translated in Chan (1973) , p. 
102. Translation modified by the author.
The description in this paragraph is based on Chung- 
yung huo-wen, pp. 40b-41ar
4  W t - t f 4 . H L *  s  •. j f c f & f S f c i t t H i f t  ! : g * , # r « f j u
v'At|$Mf£$ffpft
1 ? $ '  • --Hfefc* A *  *
i'X% % % & ' >  Bj**.f<r®i'Al£f50f3|
' f i & w & T & l u i '  f t a n  -
* « * # * # * -  •
T ' H *  * * •  i t i  > J H «
- f t f t t K ;  t i t t -  £ & & •
^ a ® 7 ' £ ^ . |  ! & - M i -  T'flT ; fcT'ft' ^4-t-* 
Sb? ijCfcA > 9']&& ■> £ * &  R  ' T 7  tA. ■ £fcs 3-J|f ^
» <i' Aftj&ujfc.-f °
Chung-yung, ch. 14; translated in Chan (1973), pp. 
101- 102.
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GLOSSARY
A. Glossary of Proper STames
This glossary includes names of people, dynasties, places, 
and titles of works referred to but not cited in the text.
Ch* an
Chang Chiu~ch’eng, Tsu-shao
Chang Shih, Man-hsiieh, Ching-fu, Ch’ in-fu
Chang Tsai
Chao Yen-su, Tsu-ch’in 
Chekiang
Che-tung stfr t
Ch’en Ch* un
Ch’en Huan, Ying-chung, Liao-chai f t  3 $
Ch’eng Chiung, K’o-chiu, Sha-sui 
Ch’eng Hao 
Cheng Hsuan
Ch’eng I 4101
Cheng-me ng
Chi-tsang ^
Chiang Mo, Yuan-shih 
Chih-yen "g
Chin
Ch’ in ^
Chln-kang chlng 
Ch’ in K’ uai 
Ch* in-tsung
Ch* ing 7^
Chou )f)
Chou-11 
Chou Tun-i ® t 0 |
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chu-pu m
Chu Sung
Chung-ho chiu shuo 
Ch u ng-yu ng 
Chung-yung chieh 
Fa-hua ching 4 #  f t
Fa-ta
Fan Chung-yen 
Fukien
"Gen-chai ming"
Han 
Han Yii
Ho Hao, Shu-ching ft*
Hsi-hsia
"Hsi-ming"
Hsi—ming chieh-i
Hsiang An-shih, F ’ing-fu fit
Hsiang tsung 48 ft
Hsiao ching Aft
Hsiao-tsung ^
Hsieh Liang-tso, Shang-ts’ai 
Hsing tsung 'jjfcjJV
Hu Hsien, Chi-hsi 'ft ft.
Hu Hung, Wu~feng ft®
Hu Yuan ft ft
huang-chi fefe
Huang Tao-fu 
Hui-neng
Hui-tsung
Hunan
”hung-fan" 
I chieh
I ching %}$x_
I-hsiian ft*
Jen-tsung sj-'fr
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Kao-shih hsiian
Kao-tsung
Kuei-tsung m
K* ung tsung
K* ung Ying-ta
Lao-tzu
Lao-tzu chieh
Li chi
LI T’ung, Yen~p’ing :
Liao &
Liao Te-ming, Tsu-hui
i M N -3-ft
Lieh-tzu
Lin-chl
Lin Pu, T’uei-ssu 4 - ^ 6  ■i t  IS'
Liu Mien-chih, Po-shui £ > ?k .
Liu Tsung-yuan
Liu Tzu-hui, Yen-ch*ung,■ p i n S “ ’weng, P
f t  4 - ft
Liu Tzu-yu, Paa-hsueh f t *  a f f t
Liu Yii-hsi
Lo Ts’ung-yen
Lu Chiu-ling
Lu Chiu-yiian, Tsru-ching,, Hsiang-shan
Lu Pen-chung, Chil-jen 8 * t £ 4 -
Lu Tsu-chien, Tsu-yiieh
Lu Tsu-ch* ien, Po-kung g t t f t
Lun-yu
Meng- tzu
Ming %
Q-hu ssu t y m
Shao-hslng urn
Shao Yung
Shen-hsiu
Shen SLu-hui a f e & s i l
Shih ching f t *
Shih. Lei, Tzu-ch* ung x,& * *
ing-shan
ftLJj
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Shu ching-
Shun #
Ssu-ma Kuang 4 At.
Su Ch*e, Huang-men m
Su Shih, Tung-p*o m  * *
Sung &
Sung shih
Ta. “hsueh
T* ai-chi t'u shuo 3Mb ntb
T’anchou
Tao-chih &3S
Tao-sheng tilt
Tsa—hsueh pien III
Ts* ai Chi-t'ung
Tsung-kaa, Ta-hui, Miao--hsi "k
T* ung-an
T* ung-shu ili
Tzu-ssu
Wang An-shih
Wang Ch’ang-j u a i l
Yang Fang, Tsu-chih $ 3  * t
Yang Shih, Kuei—shan
Yao *
Yen Hui H ©
Yu Chiu-yen, Ch* eng-chih o
Yii Ta-yu, Fang-shu &*.1R ite.
Yuan
"Yueh-chiM Ultij
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B. Glossary of Technical Terms CChinese Form to English)
cheng J3*, : integrity
cheng-hsin ; Rectification of Mind
ch’ eng-i Purification of the Will
chi 4^: continuation
ch’i ^ ; Material Force; Ether
ch* i-chia Regulation of the Family
ch* i-chih chih hsing Physical Mature
chieh Csila) A  ■ to behave correctly
chieh-shen k’ung~chu : Caution and Apprehension
ch' ien the hexagram of Heaven
chih Knowledge
chih-chi : consummation
chih-chih Extension of Knowledge
chih-chung-ho S i t # '  to actualise Equilibrium and Harmony 
ch’ih-kuo £ » *  Bringing Order to the State 
ch* ii Concrete Things
chin-hsin : to extend the Mind to the utmost
ching Attentiveness
ch’ ing : clearness
chlng-tso quiet-sitting, meditation
ch’iu-j en Seeking for Humanity
chu-ching to Hold Fast to Attentiveness
chung ^  ; Equilibrium; the Mean 
chuo 7^; turbidity 
e ugiy
fa Cdharma) ^ ; Things, Beings 
fa-t’ien to imitate the Way of Heaven
fo-hsing #14* Buddha Mature 
han~yang J Inner Cultivation
han-yung Wk.- Inner Cultivation
ch’a-shih Examination of Substance
chen ^ i Constancy 
Purity
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s.
heng  ^: Flourish
ho : Harmony
hsiao-hsiieh •* Elementary Learning
hsin t Mind
hsin ^  : Faithfulness
hsing (sankara) : activity of will
hslng : Mature
hsing : Physical Form
hsing-ch* i Physical Form and Material Force
hsing-erh-hsia that which has Physical Form
hsing-erh-shang that which is above Physical Form
hsing-hsing-che : that which forms the forms
hsiu-shen : Personal Cultivation
hui (pana)%§ : wisdom
4 /c?
; the Soul 
i ^ : Righteousness
i-ch*eng hsin-cheng h'}H- • the Will Purified and the
Mind Rectified 
i-fa ?.?§■ : the Aroused
i-fa chih ho z$k*.p Aroused Harmony 
jen >{* : Humanity 
jen-hsln : Human Mind
jen-lun s the Essential Relationships
j en-yii Human Desires
j ou ^  r the weak 
jung-shih : melting
kang J^i] : the strong
ko-wu jfetyfy t Investigation of Things
kuei : the Spirits
k’u n ^  : the hexagram of Earth
li ' Principle
li : Propriety, rites
li -^ij : Advantage
li chih chih-chi m y i t i s  ■ consummation of Principle
1 1 -i fen-shu the oneness of principle and the
distinctiveness of particulars
322
ling J|^  : intelligent
mei £  : beauty
ming ^ ! Destiny 
ming Bjfcj : Brilliance
nieh—pan (Nirvana) : renunciation
pen-hsin : Original Mind
piao~chun t standards
p*ien ^ : partiality
ping-chieh tung-shih : siting i°e
p'ing-t’ien-hsia : Bringing Peace to the World
p'offe ; the Ghost
pu-li pu-tsa neither separate nor allayed
sa-j an ; casual and elegant
sa-luo casual and elegant
se ^ : cloggedness
shen Jjj' : the Body
shen the Divinities; spirit
sheng ; to live, life, living
sheng— 1 i & * >  Vital Principle
sheng-sheng-che : that which gives birth to the
1 iving
sheng-sheng pu-i chih chi ; the perennial
living force 
shih real; substantial
shih-shen : scholai— gentry
shih-ta-fu scholar— official
shu-chi hinge-pole
ssu te ; Four Virtues
suo-hsing-che W l  : the formed
suo-i-j an ffT : the reason things should be so
suo—sheng-che : that which is born
suo-tang-j an i the way things should be
ta-chung the Great Bquilbrium; the Great Mean
ta-hsiieh the Great Learning
t * ai-chi the Great Ultimate
t * ai—hsu tie.! the Great Void
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tao 5^: the Way
tao-hsin t Moral Mind
tao-wen-hsiieh : to follow the path of enquiry and
study 
te : Virtue
t * i-ch* a •* expriencing and examining
t’len-li Heavenly Principle
t*ien-ming liu-hsing ^ 7^ ^ : the natural unfolding of 
the Heavenly Destiny 
ting (samadhi) ^ : to discipline the will
ts'al ^ : capacity
ts'ao : to hold fast 
ts'ao-ts'un ^  : self-containment
tse : Standards
ts'un : Containment, to contain, to 
tsun-te-hsing to honour moral
t* ung i l /  clarity 
tsu-hsing tit : Self Mature
wan-fa t Ten Thousand Things
wei-chi chih hsueh ■ learning
wei-fa chih chung : Unaroused
wu ^  : Thing 
wu >\% : Enlightenment 
WU ; having no being 
wu-chi ' the Ultimate of Mon-being
wu-chi erh t*ai-chi the Ultimate of Mon-being
and also the Great Ultimate 
wu-kuo-pu-chi ch* ia-hao te tao-li 
exactness and criterion 
wu-ming <avijja> : Illusion
yang ^  : the positive material force 
yin 1^; the negative material force 
yu having being
yuan 7(j: Generation 
yuan-ch* i Primitive Ether
yiieh ^  ; music
preserve
nature
for self-cultivation 
Equilibrium
yung ^ : Courage 
yung }£) : Function
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C. Glossary of Technical Terms (English Form ho Chinese)
the Aroused: i-fa £ ^
Aroused Harmony: i-fa chih ho
Attentiveness: ching
the Body: shen
Brilliance: ming
Buddha Uature: fo—hsing 44£
Caution and Apprehension: chieh-shen k* ung-chii 
Concrete Things: ch'ii ^
Constancy: chen ^
Containment, to contain: ts*un ^
Courage: yung ^
Destiny: raing ^  
the Divinities: shen
Elementary Learning: hsiao-hsueh i]\^ p 
Enlightenment: wu
Equilibrium: chung vj*
the Essential Relationships: jen-lun A  ^ 5 
Ether: ch‘i ^
Examination of Substance: ch'a-shih 
Extension of Knowledge: chih-chih itfp
Faithfulness: hsin
Four Virtues: ssu-te 
Function: yung )^|
Generation; yuan 7Q 
the Ghost: p* o
Great Learning: ta-hsileh
the Great Ultimate: t’ai-chi
Harmony: ho jp
Heavenly Destiny: t* ien-mlng 
Heavenly Principle: t*ien-li
to hold fast: ts’ao ^
to Hold Fast to Attentiveness: chu-ching £ * t  
Human Desires; jen-yu
Human Mind: jen-hsin X./C’
Humanity; jen Ip.
Illusion: wu-ming <avijja)
Inner Cultivation: han-yang 7^ ^
Investigation of Things; ko-wu 
Knowledge; chih 
Material Force; ch* i ^  
the Mean: chung 
Mind: hsin
Moral Mind: tao-hsin st-io;
Mature: hsing
the oneness of principle and the distinct!veness of
particulars: li-i fen-shu
Original Mind: pen-hsin j^s
Physical Form: hsing ^
Physical Mature: ch* i-chih chih hsing
—Primitive Ether: yiian-ch 
Principle: li
Propriety: li
JtVi ^Purification of the Will: ch*eng-i §3^ Jfj
Purity: ch* eng
the reason things should be so: suo-i-jan 
Rectification of Mind: cheng-hsin jEL hi' 
Righteousness: i
Seeking for Humanity: ch’iu-jen
Self Mature: tsu-hsing
the Soul: hun 4  
the Spirits: kuei ^
Standards: tse 
Substance: t*i
Ten Thousand Things: wan-fa ^ 7^
Things: wu i(^  ; fa yfc
the Ultimate of Mon-being: wu-chi
the Unaroused Equilbrium: wei-fa chih chung
Virtue: te
Vital Principle: sheng-li 4 *
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the Way: tao
the way things should be: suo-tang-jan
